

3 1761 11971376 6

FINAL REPORT
(volume II)

Author: Norma E. Walmsley

Title: Some aspects of Canada's
immigration policy.

Div: VIII-B

Report No. 16



Presented to the
LIBRARY *of the*
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
by

Mr. Royce Frith
Commissioner

Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

ACCOPRESS

GENUINE PRESSBOARD BINDER

CAT. NO. **BP 2507 EMB**

ACCO CANADIAN COMPANY LTD.
TORONTO

OGDENSBURG, N.Y., CHICAGO, LONDON

Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government, Winnipeg
and Areas

196A

CA1 Z1
-63B500

By: Dr. M.S. Donnelly
 Assistants:
 Walter Zyla, Roger Turenne

A SUMMARY

SEE TABLE 3—
 P192-3.

OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS.
 53% - ENGLISH - RATALE
 Tha. FR. -

The Approach:

The work covered three municipal governments; Winnipeg, St. Boniface and Metropolitan Government. The governments were looked at from the point of view of ethnic participation in the political structure and the civic services.

The historical trends in Winnipeg and St. Boniface were examined closely (Metro Government is too new) both from political representation and the civic service structure. Historical data was extracted from city documents and this along with computer analysis provided the bulk of the material from which conclusions were drawn.

The General Background:

When Manitoba joined Confederation the numerical balance between French and English was about equal. As migration moved from Ontario, the balance shifted quickly in favour of the English. As this numerical superiority of the English increased, the strength of the French position as to language, religion, education and finally constitutional rights themselves (guaranteed in 1870) was undermined. The

COMPUTER
 STUDY.
 CENTRE
 OF RESEARCH.

French lost every major struggle that occurred with the Anglo-Saxon group in both Provincial and Municipal affairs. The culmination was reached in 1916 when English was made the sole and official language of instruction in education in the province.

The history of the province does not entirely explain the position of the French now in St. Boniface municipal affairs. The city did not try to make itself the bastion of French rights. In 1870, St. Boniface had twice the population of Winnipeg yet it took no steps to incorporate and even resisted municipalization for some years. Minority status seemed to creep up on the St. Boniface French. Unlike some of the immigrant groups from central Europe, they did not organize to protect their civic interests. At first such organization was unnecessary but when it became necessary the citizens seemed unable to create it.

[BRPST - REAL FOCUS. - WHY DID OTHERS. SEE LOC GOVT AS St. Boniface. VEHICLE FOR PROTECT OF ITS WHEREAS FR. DIDN'T - ? ANSWER: CHURCH?]

From 1880 to 1911 St. Boniface had a French Mayor and a majority of French aldermen.

From 1911 to 1924 an "entente" provided alternate French and English Mayors, but by 1924 the English had achieved a sufficient majority to command the choice of mayor and the majority of aldermen -- a situation which existed until 1960.

Census figures in 1940 showed an even balance

between French and English in the city; by 1951 a slight majority of French was evident and by 1961 a four per cent bulge in favour of the French was seen. The increased interest on the part of the French community in municipal affairs -- which resulted in the election of J.P. Guay as Mayor in 1960 -- was attributed to (1) the trend in the census figures and (2) the new and vigorous spirit in Quebec.

M. Guay was elected in 1960 with a popular vote of 38.6 per cent, almost exactly the proportion of French in the city. The vote percentage was up appreciably as well. He has won two elections since then (one by acclamation) and has gained considerable support among Anglo-Saxon elements in the city. The representation in the council strictly reflected the ethnic percentage in the wards.

Done VERY CAREFULLY
Poll By Poll

The linguistic question in the civic service of the city -- although comprehensive statistics were not available -- reflected its ethnic composition in the city. For example, from 1911 to 1924 English was the language of record, although not the exclusive one. From 1924 on, it became the exclusive language of record and as this trend continued the French personnel became bilingual and the English personnel remained unilingual.

Interviews conducted in six departments (City Clerk, Treasury, Welfare, Fire and Engineering) showed four use French rarely on official business. The City Clerk and Treasury offices use French regularly in official business and often in dealing with the public. In all departments, the public can be dealt with bilingually, but the departments

.....4

generally do not find much occasion to use French. (The present Fire Chief, who is French, said: "if a Frenchman's house is on fire and he phones the fire department, he speaks English -- he doesn't want any mistake!")

No one, however, suggested to the interviewers that French should be used more frequently nor did anyone state language was a problem in their work.

Winnipeg:

Ethnic participation in Winnipeg is more complicated than in St. Boniface. The French fact has been almost non-existent in both politics and the civic service. The French element has never been more than about five per cent of the population. Almost since the beginning of the century there have been more Ukrainians (now about 13 per cent) and more Poles (now about 11 per cent). At the same time the Anglo-Saxon element has dropped from 83 per cent in 1871 to 42 per cent in 1961.

By 1900 Winnipeg had become a cosmopolitan city, by mid-century the most cosmopolitan in Canada.

The city used the Mayor-Council-Committee system almost exclusively since 1908 when effective democratic government was instituted. The Mayor is elected every two years; 18 aldermen from three wards are elected every two years, with elections in each ward every year.

It is safe to say that none of the ethnic groups in Winnipeg (with the exception possibly of the Jews) either

.....5

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024 with funding from
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761119713766>

.....5

influenced or participated in municipal government until after the First World War.

A combination of anti-alien feeling during World War One, with consequent loss of citizenship plus the similar type of feeling and laws provoked by the 1919 Winnipeg general strike, served to hold back participation by ethnic groups. To the end of the World War Two Anglo-Saxons dominated the Mayoralty office.

ACTUALLY REVOKED CITIZENSHIP
GERMANS
+C.

After the anti-alien feeling of World War One died down a strong correlation between the ethnic composition of the Ward and ethnic origin of the successful candidate developed. Ward One has been predominantly Anglo-Saxon; Ward Two a majority Anglo-Saxon and Ward Three a majority of ethnic.

also down economically
is a trend of
2 + 3.

Since 1945 the Anglo-Saxon predominance in aldermanic elections in Ward One has dropped from 100 per cent to roughly 70 per cent (all expressed in man years) and in Ward Three has remained constant at about 33 per cent.

This trend supported the thesis that ethnic composition of a given area has played a major role in determining the election. Not one alderman has been elected in a Ward where he did not have a community of his ethnic origin to support him.

In the Mayoralty election of 1956, in which Mayor Stephen Juba was elected for the first time (two acclamations and one other election since) ethnic

.....6

.....6

participation did not constitute a complete explanation but it played a part.

In Ward One, for example, Juba's Anglo-Saxon opponent got twice as many votes as Juba; in Ward Two Juba won by a majority of 1,500 in a vote total of 26,500 and in Ward Three, he won by 11,000 in a vote total of 28,500. Total participation in the 1956 vote was the highest since 1938. Generally total vote proved to be the highest when the ethnic factor enters the picture.

The composition of the Winnipeg Civic Service showed 94 per cent Anglo-Saxon in 1921; 90 per cent in 1941 and 63 per cent in 1964.

A thorough analysis of the civil service to relate the ethnic factor to education, age, position, length of service, etc. showed that ethnic origin is no longer a factor in permanent employment in the civil service. Since 1957 no statement of ethnic origin has been asked for on application forms or solicited in interviews. There is convincing evidence all recruiting is by merit only.

Is ethnic origin a factor in the type of position held and in promotion to a better position?

Using education, age, experience and ethnic origin and by controlling ethnic origin, it was found that ethnic origin became an independent factor.

Some generalizations came from these findings:

Education: in low education category (grade eight or less) the Anglo-Saxon representation was almost exclusive

.....7

Not just ethnic of course but economic Juba played a role in ethnic...

→ i.e. ethnic origin is important in promotion.

see p 66. →

.....7

in the highest positions; in the foreman-supervisory level, it was double any other group.

--in middle education category, (grade 9 - 11) Anglo-Saxons 2/1 in upper two classifications.

--in high education group, ethnic origin not significantly related to position held.

Age: In younger age group ethnic origin plays a smaller part in position held than in older group.

Experience: in higher positions, among those recruited in last 10 years, ethnic origin plays small part. Those recruited more than 10 years ago, Anglo-Saxons have 2/1 representation in higher positions.

The language in the Winnipeg Civil Service is strictly English, excepting an ad hoc interpreting service in the welfare department and some use by Ward returning officers in elections. No attempt in application forms for employment is made to discover what other languages are spoken.

A random sample within four departments showed that from clerical workers up, 50 per cent of non-Anglo-Saxons claimed "fair" and "good" knowledge of their respective ethnic language, compared to 100 per cent knowledge of English.

The higher the non-Anglo-Saxon rose in position, the less interest he held in ethnic value or, alternately, that he does not find higher positions open unless he discards his ethnic characteristics.

.....8

Either way, it is clear that no straight line of progression exists to lead the non-Anglo-Saxon from his place in the ethnic social hierarchy to a corresponding position in the dominant group. It appears a conscious choice is made by the non-Anglo-Saxon white collar worker to (1) discard his ethnic remnants and seek status in the larger social context or (2) try and reconcile maintaining ethnic values and social position and risking slower progress in larger social context.

Metropolitan Winnipeg:

It was created in 1960 as the second authority in Canada of this sort after Toronto. It was defined in area as comprising nine local municipalities; part of seven others and portions of three others. In addition, it was given control of an area five miles further in all directions.

In the larger area Metro functions were: assessment on a uniform basis of all property; planning zoning and building controls.

In the Metro area itself: water and wholesale distribution; sewage; arterial streets and bridges; public transport; major parks and recreation; civil defense.

The government is run by a council of 10 elected from 10 metro electoral divisions, arrived at by an independent commission. It cut across old ward lines and "there is no such thing as St. Boniface representation".

The dissection of old ward boundaries is the most important factor as Metro relates to this study. Although

.....9

it only has limited powers Metro may become the great unifier.

The civil service of Metro is 50 per cent unskilled workers (compared to 25 per cent for Winnipeg itself).

Ethnic origin is also no longer a factor in employment here as in Winnipeg.

Metro is officially English. If a French citizen of St. Boniface makes inquiries at Metro offices, he will have to speak English. If he writes a letter in French, it will be given to one of the bilingual employees for translation.

"Last year the annual report of Metro was issued in both French and English, but the French translation was done informally by employees who were familiar with both languages".

Conclusions

Winnipeg (a) civil service:

--conclusive evidence that Civil service has developed from an Anglo-Saxon preserve to multi-racial group, with ethnic origin meaning less and less.

(b) council:

--the council seems to illustrate a two-way process, that is ethnic candidates are successful because of support in their ward but once elected they become part of the larger political process and are assimilated.

St. Boniface (a) civil service

--civil service has own adjustment process of "bilingualism where necessary but not necessarily bilingualism" while a conscious effort is made to balance positions of

.....10

importance between two groups. There is very little friction involved.

(b) council

--faithful representation of the numerical status of French and English in wards. There has been little conscious effort by French group to organize until recently. The authors interpret the most recent moves to organize as maybe an acceptance of a mid-point between melting-pot and mosaic.

Metro:

On both the level of civil service and political representation, if the authority is extended, it may prove to be the great mixer.

"Perhaps the most striking characteristic noticed in this study is the almost-complete absence (except for 1914-1918) of tension and bitterness that has accompanied the many major adjustments between groups in civic affairs in Metropolitan Winnipeg".

"In Winnipeg proper, it appears the answer is neither a melting-pot nor mosaic but a gradual working out of the problem in a way that has distinctive characteristics of its own. In the civic service it seems likely that ethnic origin will eventually cease to play a part at all.

The City Council of Winnipeg proper illustrates a somewhat different point. There has been a very substantial degree of ethnic consciousness in Aldermanic elections but once the group has elected its candidate he becomes much more a prestige symbol than a representative.

785
AND THAT
civics will
BE UNCHANGING.

.....11

The St. Boniface Civil Service and Council are evidence of quite a different phenomenon, namely, the reaction of the French group, geographically isolated and without majority status, within their own city.

One characteristic of the French group in St. Boniface stands out -- that have not organized as a group to the extent found among other ethnic groups. The explanation is two-fold; they began in St. Boniface with majority status and they have, in the past, believed themselves to have constitutional protection for their most important rights. The majority status has gone and the constitutional protection have proven ineffective.

The existence of Metro may have a great effect on the existing patterns of civic politics...if the authority of Metro is extended, it may prove to be a great 'leveler' or 'mixer'."

CA 21

43 A500

VOLUME II

SOME ASPECTS OF CANADA'S
IMMIGRATION POLICY

Report prepared for the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Norma E. Walmsley

April, 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Volume I)

CHAPTER

I	INTRODUCTION	
	Terms of Reference	1
	Problem	2
	The Method	7
II	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	15
III	FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND POLICY	
	A. General	49
	B. Post-World War II Policy	76

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

(Volume II)

CHAPTER

IV PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION AND POLICIES

A. Survey of Provincial Policies	148
Refugees	162
Welfare	165
Adopted Children and Orphans	166
Language Classes for Immigrants	168
Comments on Provincial Action	175
Prince Edward Island	177
Nova Scotia	177
Newfoundland	179
New Brunswick	179
British Columbia	180
Alberta	182
Saskatchewan	183
Manitoba	185
Notes	188
B. The Province of Ontario	
1. Historical Background	192
2. Policy - General	199
3. Policy - Specific Schemes	
(a) Drew 'air-lift'	206
(b) Industrial Immigrant Plan	215
(c) Agricultural and Farm Labour Movements	217
(d) Policies for the Years 1956-62 -The Hungarian Refugee Movement	219
(e) Recent and Present Policy	221
4. Comments	
Chart No. 1 -- Immigrants to Canada Naming Quebec and Ontario as Their Destination, 1914-64	231, 232
C. The Province of Quebec	233

CHAPTER

V FACTORS INFLUENCING IMMIGRATION

A. External Factors

Introduction	262
French	268
Algerian Immigration	281
Belgians	285
British	287
Italian	287
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration	288
New Trends	291

B. Domestic Factors

Business and Industry	302
Organized Labour	303
Agriculture	305
Religion	306
Voluntary Agencies	313
Professional Societies	320
Citizenship	321

C. 'Ethnic Balance'

Public Opinion	326
A Controversial Concept	332
Chart No. 2 -- Proportion of British and French in the Total Population, Decennial Census, 1871-1961	336
Emigration	338
Illustrations	340
Summary	345

VI CONCLUSIONS	349
----------------	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHY	363
--------------	-----

CHAPTER IV - PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION AND POLICIESA. Survey of Provincial Policies

While the terms of Confederation gave the provinces jurisdictional share, concurrent with the federal government, in the sphere of immigration policy, few of them have seen fit to take much action in this regard. There are some exceptions to this during specific periods of our history and these will be covered briefly in the following pages. However, provincial action of any significance in the field of immigration has been undertaken in this century only by the province of Ontario. (Very recently, of course, Quebec has announced its intention to change this situation, as will be discussed later.)

Accordingly, in this report an attempt is made to treat provincial policy under three headings, as follows: Section A will include general comments about past and present provincial policy in all the provinces, although separate treatment has been given to Ontario and Quebec for reasons which will be outlined in the areas concerned. Section B will provide some of the details in the case of Ontario's particular immigration policy, while Section C will consider Quebec separately, in view of the special relationship which this province bears to the subject under discussion.

Present-day policies of the provincial governments (with the exception of Quebec's very recently announced new interest) indicate that most seem happy enough with federal policy providing some additional population for them -- particularly if it means more professional or skilled people to fill the great shortages in these categories. As a rule they are quite willing to leave the field to the federal Immigration Department authorities, although some provinces find it necessary to send their own officials abroad to recruit for special positions, e.g. teachers, doctors and nurses.

Before discussing any details of current action in this regard, perhaps a brief reference should be made to the difficulties involved in obtaining information about provincial government policy for a short-term piece of research, especially in view of the limitations within which this study has had to be prepared.

It was not possible to discuss the question of immigration policy or practices with every Premier nor with officials of every province. The majority, therefore, were consulted by correspondence. A list of questions ¹ was sent to each premier for comments. (Quebec was treated separately by the special study referred to earlier.) All replied, except the Premier of British Columbia. A personal visit and correspondence failed to achieve any response from this Premier, whose aides advised that he was too busy. However, some

1 See Appendix A.

information was obtained from other officials in British Columbia and this will be included elsewhere.

As far as information about provincial practices from all other sources is concerned, it is regretted that no opportunity was available to study the situation properly in each province. Even the sparse data that was acquired has had to be reduced to the briefest of comments because of space. Accordingly, it is earnestly hoped that a complete study of all the aspects of provincial policy in the field of immigration will be undertaken under some appropriate research auspices in the very near future, since there is a dearth of material available in scholarly form.

To add to the difficulties above, the fact that so few provinces have their legislative debates available in printed form made it very difficult indeed to trace official expressions of policy. Of course, the debates of the House of Commons are useful and were used to the degree possible under the circumstances.

As much information as possible was also obtained from the official files of the federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration, as well as from personal interviews with officials and politicians, as indicated in Chapter I.

As far as historical background is concerned, obviously each province differs considerably and again, space will not permit a treatment of each one. However, reference will be

made to the significant highlights and to any incidents which might prove relevant for the purpose of this study.

Generally speaking, the provinces, while interested enough in the subject at Confederation to have it placed under concurrent jurisdiction, seem to have lost interest after the Immigration Conferences of 1869, 1870, 1871 and 1874, referred to earlier in Chapter III. This is rather interesting since, in fact, some had been rather active in the field.

Prior to 1867 and following, the governments of some of the areas which later became provinces carried on their own 'colonization' or immigration campaigns. It seemed obvious to them at the time that, if the resources of their areas were ever to be developed, people were needed and immigration was a logical policy. Encouragement of 'settlement' as such came in for high priority. But as it was an era of migration, it was usually a case of receiving immigrants unsolicited and often of questionable value.

Nova Scotia, in fact, was obliged very early¹ in her history to take legislative action to protect not only the province but the immigrants themselves.

However, problems did not cease with the coming of the

1 An act in 1828 imposed responsibilities on the Master of the Ship and later Acts imposed head taxes -- the funds to be used for the sick and destitute.

modern era of immigration. In fact, there have always been and still are today many areas of potential disagreement as to which government should be responsible for policy. It is a question of whether or not immigration itself is needed, how many or what kinds or types of workers, refugees, etc. and, perhaps more important, of the consequences of those moves. Problems can arise at every stage before and after arrival -- such as the successful establishment in business or employment of the immigrants concerned, to say nothing of their medical, educational and social welfare needs after they have arrived in their province of choice.

But how does the immigrant determine that choice of location? Do not promotion and advertising of particular provinces (i.e. the selling job) become important and decisive factors? Who has the best facilities to do the job? Who has the most at stake? A host of problems come up at every point, and, of course, many different methods of approach may be both necessary and appropriate.

For example, the atmosphere has often been a bit cloudy concerning the negotiations abroad with respect to trade promotion, tariffs, etc., where it involves settlement of businesses and personnel. Who has or should have the proper facilities and services to do this? The federal government maintains it should make the arrangements, whereas the provinces feel they should be solely concerned, since they are the authority in the particular area where the settlement will take place, if arranged.

The answer clearly lies in co-operation of both levels to work out mutually acceptable goals and practices, but this has not always been achieved. In such circumstances, one would expect continuous negotiation.

Strangely enough, not much formal consultation on immigration policy seems to have taken place between the federal and provincial levels of government since those very early conferences immediately after Confederation. At various times, meetings have been held on specific topics of interest common to the federal government and one or more of the provinces -- Similarly, departmental officials have intermittently been in contact with their opposite numbers, but full-scale conferences on immigration between the federal government and all provinces are conspicuous by their absence.

According to verbal information from an official of the Privy Council office, the subject of immigration has never been on the formal agenda of any of the dominion-provincial conferences (of which there have been so many, particularly in recent years).

Yet there has been very little hue and cry about this fact, either by provincial governments or by the general public. It would appear that the provinces more or less sit back and let the federal government do what it desires without much comment one way or another -- from the very level of government which, in fact, has most to gain or lose

depending upon what the federal government's policy is at any particular moment. That the provinces are seldom consulted is made obvious by statements in the press from time to time by provincial spokesmen and also may be gathered from a reading of official files in Ottawa.

Many references are found in the minutes of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (D.A.C.I.) meetings over the period 1950-58, indicating that papers were presented by the Ottawa staff at federal-provincial meetings on immigration which were held from time to time. For example, in the minutes of November 1, 1950 the agenda of a proposed conference included papers on:

- (1) Significance of immigration to the development of Canada.
- (2) Present immigration policy.
- (3) Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
- (4) Adaptation and integration of immigrants.

It is noted that this particular conference was at the administrative, not the ministerial, level.

Consultations also took place in the field. At the January 22, 1951 meeting, the chairman advised that the Director of Immigration would be making a trip through Canada in order to consult with the provincial governments "regarding immigration generally and to examine Immigration Services in Canada."

At the November 10, 1952 meeting of the D.A.C.I., the need was expressed for more liaison, since requests had been received from certain provincial governments for closer

consultation. It was stated that a fair amount of co-operation exists at the operational level in the field, but if senior officers were called in perhaps they might find themselves more committed to oppose many things now being worked out at the lower administrative levels. Still, it was felt that all discussions should be informative, revealing and of real value to the Department.

On May 20, 1953 when preparing the agenda for the proposed meeting with provincial officials, it was pointed out that most provinces have taken a neutral position in respect of immigration and that it might be premature at that time to ask them to take a definite stand. The Director said in a memo to the Deputy Minister (November 17, 1952), with reference to the topics to be discussed,

...It will be observed that the subjects for discussion have been couched in general terms. This was done in the hope of avoiding the risk of non-receptive or even negative attitudes on the part of the provincial representatives should we intimate to them in detail the multiple aspects of the questions to be discussed. It is feared that should the provincial representatives adopt a negative attitude, the efforts of non-governmental organizations which have been carefully nurtured and stimulated by our field staff might be seriously jeopardized.

The need for closer co-operation with provincial governments was stressed and in some instances more formal liaison facilities were suggested, especially in the Atlantic District and in the Province of Quebec. With regard to British Columbia, it was suggested that the appointment of a liaison officer by the provincial government to correlate activities of provincial departments and to facilitate

co-operation in immigration matters would be most helpful.

Prior to the meeting with the provincial representatives, the D.A.C.I. discussed the suitability and effectiveness of provincial immigration offices abroad. Several members felt that the operation of such offices had a damaging effect on the over-all federal immigration program in that provincial officials often informed suitable desirable immigrants that there was little or no opportunity for establishment in their occupation within that particular province. This had a discouraging effect on the prospective immigrant who then abandoned the proposed migration to Canada, whereas he might well have been sorely needed in another province. Accordingly, members concluded that:

...the provincial offices abroad could perform a useful function if they would restrict themselves to furnish up-to-date publicity and information regarding their provinces, but not enter the immigration field. ...

At that time (1953), 18 Canadian Immigration offices had been opened up in Europe, in addition to one in New Delhi and one in Hong Kong. It was pointed out that "the Department of External Affairs, through its missions abroad or British diplomatic or consular officials, look after Immigration matters in those countries where this Department has no representatives. Uncertain cases are always referred to Ottawa before visa action is completed."

The Director made it quite clear that:

...it is principally through that group of immigrants known as the 'unsponsored' category, which represents a very substantial part of the

total immigration to Canada, that we exercise selection and control the flow of immigrants to this country. As indicated, all prospective immigrants in this group must qualify for admission to Canada on the basis of their trade or occupation, such trade or occupation must be one in which there is a shortage of qualified Canadian labour ...

(Needless to say, the immigration officer decides whether the immigrant 'qualifies' in such cases.)

The first of the 1953 series of meetings with the provinces was held June 8, with the Government of Ontario officials. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration himself addressed the meeting, stressing that since "57% of the total flow of immigrants in recent years had settled in the Province of Ontario ... the federal Government authorities were anxious to obtain the advice of the Ontario Government ..." He assured them he was aware that "Ontario has done its full share in accepting, placing and integrating immigrants in the past four or five years."

The Deputy Minister then addressed the meeting, pointing out that the Department was hoping for a frank exchange of views and that was the reason why no members of the press were present. He stated, too, that representatives of the province of Ontario only were present because the Department felt that the interests of the various provinces differed to such an extent that meetings had been arranged on the basis of geographical areas.

Matters of mutual concern were discussed at length and one question, directed to the Head of the Operations Division,

enquired, "Is any information available regarding the organizations which have been set up by the other provinces to deal with the question of placing and integrating immigrants as compared to that existing in the Province of Ontario?"

The Chairman stated: "None of the other provinces has an organization comparable to that of Ontario. Alberta, Newfoundland and Manitoba have Branches or Divisions responsible for immigration; New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia have Land Settlement Branches only. Quebec has no organization specifically responsible for dealing with matters pertaining to Immigration. Saskatchewan has entered the field on a very small scale only. The situation in British Columbia is at present unsettled and for that reason the meetings with that province and the federal authorities have, at the request of the province, been postponed."

The possibilities of establishing better facilities and informational services abroad in order to encourage immigration to Canada were discussed, with Ontario officials expressing the opinion that many more workers could be absorbed in Canada than are now arriving.

The question of establishing particular ethnic groups in one area was discussed; the Director stated that experience had shown that this tended to slow down or prohibit integration with the Canadian population and was not considered desirable. The Ontario representative did not agree that this need always

be so, and gave examples (such as the Dutch group settlement at Cochrane) of what he considered valuable additions to Canada.

Ontario officials raised the question of establishing an advisory committee on immigration, composed of representatives of business, labour, religion, etc. The Chairman replied that if such a committee were to be established there would have to be representatives from three or four unions, church and ethnic groups, welfare organizations and others -- approximately 100 members -- all wanting to have a voice in immigration policies. He stated such policies are required to be flexible to meet changing circumstances and he felt that such a committee would be too unwieldy for flexibility.

The Maritimes representatives at the D.A.C.I. federal-provincial meetings in June 1953 expressed disappointment at the number of immigrants remaining on farms after being brought in to the Maritimes, theoretically to do farm work. The Director pointed out that these immigrants were not required to sign definite contracts -- They had paid their own transportation to Canada and should be free to go where they wished. He felt that if contracts were required and immigrants forced to stay in one type of employment for any specific period it would result in severe criticism and fewer immigrants.

The same complaints (about immigrants taking work on farms and not staying on them) was voiced by some of the western delegates (particularly Alberta) at their meeting,

and they argued that something should be done about it.

Since no major complaints were registered at these meetings, it must be assumed that there were no areas of strong disagreement. No startling proposals for a change in policy were presented, although discussion was held on all aspects of the immigration situation as it pertained to each province. Unfortunately Quebec and British Columbia chose not to be represented. ¹

The general consensus was that there appeared to be considerable demand for skilled and professional immigrants, especially doctors, dentists, nurses and teachers. Some criticisms were voiced on the attitude of certain professional associations toward immigrants in the professions.

Emphasis was placed by the federal Immigration officials on the need for organizations in the community to assist the immigrants to integrate after arrival and to protect them from undue exploitation or hardships arising from any lack of knowledge of their new environment, and so on.

There was an expression of concern among some provincial delegates present that, if immigration proceeded at too rapid a rate, unemployment might result. But this was the minority view.

1. Reference is noted, however, in the D.A.C.I. minutes of April 13, 1956 that B.C. was showing an interest in improving the flow of immigrants to that province.

The question of ethnic balance was briefly mentioned, but only in connection with white versus non-white. Also the Alberta delegate said that that province did not discriminate against any group, but they recruited in Britain because that was the only spot where qualified people were available; they had not met with much success in other countries of northern Europe such as Germany and France, where skilled people were in short supply and, in any event, did not wish to emigrate at that time.

In the House of Commons, the question of how much liaison existed between the federal and provincial governments¹ on the question of immigration was asked by Mr. Fulton :

Does there exist any intergovernmental committee or organization whose purpose is to ensure co-ordination and avoid duplication as between dominion and provincial programs of immigration and settlement?

The reply was in the negative, but when asked about the nature and extent of the co-ordination the government replied:

Continuous liaison on departmental level is maintained between federal officials of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and officials of provincial government departments concerned on all problems of mutual interest affecting the placement of immigrants, land settlement as it pertains to immigrants and agricultural workers schemes.

1 Mr. Fulton, House of Commons Debates (revised), February 22, 1954, p. 2295

Specific reference was made to the invitation in 1953 by the federal government to all provincial governments to attend meetings of senior departmental officers on immigration subjects -- eight had sent representatives. No comment was made on why neither Quebec nor British Columbia representatives had attended.

While it is regretted that there are no records of other such meetings, at least we have an indication for the period of highest post-war immigration (with the exception of 1957 with its Hungarian refugee influx).

Refugees

After the 1956 Hungarian Revolution when it became essential that Canada join other countries in solving the consequent refugee problem that arose, the provinces were asked to assist. Some responded immediately and unconditionally, for example British Columbia replied to the federal government's request for co-operation by offering all possible assistance and saying, "We'll talk about the cost later." Later on a great deal of haggling took place over payment of claims, despite the assurance of full co-operation by the Premier; nevertheless, the Province's interested agencies responded very well indeed and a large number of Hungarian refugees were brought into British Columbia. Of particular note were the splendid arrangements made whereby the University of British Columbia accommodated virtually the whole faculty (professors and students) of Sapron University on the Vancouver campus.

Several ran into a misunderstanding over who would operate reception arrangements and over the amounts to be reimbursed to provinces by the federal government. The question of medical and other expenses was also a problem which caused long months of correspondence between the federal government and the provinces concerned.

The Premier of Quebec replied to the Prime Minister's first telegram for co-operation by stating that he would be

...happy to do everything reasonably possible in the circumstances to allay the suffering and the misery caused by the inhumane Russian persecution in Hungary.

However, when the federal government requested specific details and assurance that reception centres would be set up, no reply was forthcoming. In the end, the federal government itself had to attend to all this in Quebec.

After some difficulty, specific agreements were drawn up with each of Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland. The Saskatchewan agreement was used as a model for the other provinces, although at one point it appeared that Saskatchewan wanted to withdraw, and the Director of Immigration was prompted to say:

It would seem that the provinces are still of the opinion that they should reap all the benefits from newcomers to Canada while the federal government underwrites responsibility for any and all problem cases ...

The degree of co-operation between the federal government and Ontario for the Hungarian refugees program left a great deal

to be desired. (This is discussed in Section B of this chapter.) The Minister of Immigration at the time, Mr. Pickersgill¹, argued that Ontario was trying to indicate to the public that it was doing a great deal for these refugees when, in fact, the federal government was coping with the major work involved and particularly bearing the brunt of the fiscal arrangements and solving the numerous problems at the working level.

A further indication that federal-provincial policies with regard to refugees were in need of clearer definition came from Saskatchewan when the Prime Minister requested provincial support for the federal program concerning the World Refugee Year 'Tuberculosis refugee' movement in 1959. It is rather indicative. The Saskatchewan reply pointed out:

If the provincial governments are to participate in this program ... it is unfortunate that they were not consulted prior to an announcement being made in the House of Commons. With increasing frequency we find ourselves being called upon to take part in programs which have already been announced by the federal government and about which we have no opportunity to express an opinion.

It is interesting to note that in this particular case all the provinces expressed support (in varying degrees) except Quebec, which was non-committal. In the final arrangements, the provinces paid approximately half of certain

1 According to information given in a personal interview with the writer, Ontario tried to get the federal government to reimburse them a larger settlement for expenses involved but Mr. Pickersgill would not authorize it. Apparently a change of government and a new Minister did agree to do so.

costs. (Newfoundland did not really wish to accept any refugees in this category. The reason given was that the province had the highest tuberculosis rate in Canada at the time.)

During a discussion of refugee problems in the Alberta legislature February 18, 1960 a resolution (introduced by a private member) was passed and forwarded by the Speaker to the Prime Minister. It requested the federal government "to convene a meeting in the near future with the Provincial representatives and with representation from the Canadian Association of Municipalities to discuss the problems concerned with Canada's policies as they affect the refugee." It was referred for consideration to the Immigration and the External Affairs departments but nothing really came of it.

1

Welfare

After immigrants arrive in a province, there are many areas of concern both for the immigrant himself and for the authorities. Chief among these are employment, housing and education but questions of medical and social welfare in general can sometimes become great problems for the municipal government if provincial plans do not exist. In many instances immigrants are not eligible for the same benefits as ordinary citizens until a certain period of time has elapsed. The federal Department of Immigration has authority to provide emergency welfare assistance for immigrants who require such

1 Space does not permit elaboration of all the many details involved in this question of social welfare for all provinces, but a generalized comment can be made for the purposes of this study.

aid during their first year in Canada. However, most of the provinces (except Quebec and Manitoba, for different reasons) have now agreed to accept responsibility for the welfare of immigrants subsequent to their initial placement in employment by the Immigration Branch.

Agreements have also been concluded with most of the provinces whereby medical costs are shared equally by the two governments concerned but administration of the agreements is vested in the federal government with the provinces being reimbursed for claims submitted.

Adopted Children and Orphans

Brief reference is made elsewhere in this study to the federal government's attitude toward adoption of British war orphans, but the point should be made again that the admission to Canada of orphans (British or otherwise) is, because of the constitutional implications, a question for both federal and provincial levels of government.

The difficulties which have plagued this matter for many years came to a head during World Refugee Year when public criticism became acute. In defence, the provinces and the federal government tried to blame each other. Ontario, in particular, quite firmly stated that they would not support adoption applications unless it could be established that there was no suitable child in the Province. (The Ontario government was careful, however, to omit any reference to the fact that they, not Ottawa, had imposed this restriction.)

It is difficult to see why some federal-provincial agreement could not long since have been reached and specific, clear and definite regulations incorporated into our immigration regulations. Since the question of determining admissibility to Canada is, in the final analysis, one of federal responsibility, the Immigration Department might well have taken strong initiative.

One of the complicating factors which accounts for the Department's reluctance to place "adopted children" in the admissible category was, no doubt, the Asian (and particularly Chinese) situation where a tremendous number of 'alleged' sons or daughters (children of concubines) -- blood or adopted -- were involved. This was why the Department felt it necessary to insert in the regulations a definition of the term 'child' which excluded adopted or illegitimate children. The Cabinet sub-committee which studied the situation had decided that adopted children, as such, should not be specifically provided for in the regulations; this meant that deserving applications had to be dealt with by special order-in-council. Confusion arose over the fact that the policies applied for the regular procedures respecting adopted children differed from those for the special orphan refugee adoption program. Restrictions have been relaxed somewhat in the last few years, but again this depends upon the particular requirements imposed by the provincial government concerned in any given case.

All provinces were again contacted in February 1964 with regard to a modification of existing regulations. Quebec

did not reply and the Department took the attitude that "...As a relatively very small number of applications for children for adoption originated in the province of Quebec, it has been decided to pursue this question on the basis of the opinions and suggestions of the other nine provinces."

The French-Canadian attitude toward this special category of immigrant does not seem to differ from its attitude toward immigration generally. The general fear of upsetting ethnic balance seems to pertain.

Language Classes for Immigrants

One area of federal-provincial co-operation which is in need of more attention is the problem of language instruction for those immigrants whose mother tongue is neither English nor French.

There are some who argue that language instruction should begin abroad before the immigrant is brought to Canada. At that time the motivation is highest and if it were a condition of admission then the immigrant would make more effort to learn. Many critics of immigration policy recommend, therefore, that the federal government should set up the type of training which was a precedent at the time of the Hungarian refugee movement. Due to shortage of shipping some of these refugees had to be kept in camps in Holland (and other spots) prior to their departure for Canada. The Canadian government was approached to set up a course of language instruction which they did (supplying teachers and textbooks, etc). This meant that upon arrival

these particular immigrants were not nearly as handicapped as ordinary immigrants always are when unable to speak the language of their work and community environment.

While it is conceded that in these days of rapid transportation, the old experiments of teaching basic English (or French) 'en route' aboard ship, etc. are impossible, still some plan should be worked out. The Department officials with whom this problem was discussed told the writer that pre-arrival instruction was impractical because of the costs involved and difficulty of bringing the immigrants together in one place, prior to departure. However, this seems to be a rather poor argument -- since costs are involved whether one gives the classes before or after arrival. The high motivating factor (if rudimentary knowledge of the language were a condition of admission) would offset most of the 'alleged' difficulties of collecting up enough in one spot for a class of basic instruction. (Films, records, and even telephone-hook-up instruction might be used.)

To institute such a program for all immigrants would mean co-ordination with the provincial (and municipal) authorities to ensure continuity (after arrival) of the classes, following the rudimentary beginnings. The difficulties and costs are considerable, but surely the benefits would warrant at least an attempt. The present federal government, however, would need to be convinced. Perhaps the provinces, who bear the social and economic repercussions of illiterate immigrants, could take the position that some experiments must be

undertaken in the near future. Surely if a 'screening' program is necessary and can be organized successfully, it should be possible for officials to figure out a way to provide basic English or French and other 'orientation' instruction prior to the immigrants' departure for Canada.

Ottawa has made an attempt in the past to meet the language problem for the immigrant after his arrival. Obviously there were constitutional problems obstructing federal action in the education field, but the Immigration Department has moved carefully by working through agreements made with the various provincial governments in this regard.

The need for language instruction arose shortly after the first immigrants arrived following the close of the Second World War. At a meeting arranged between the federal Citizenship Branch and the various provincial educational authorities, the federal government agreed to provide textbooks -- in English and French -- and the provinces to organize and conduct the classes.

In 1953 arrangements were modified to provide financial assistance for the classes as well, owing to the increased burden on the local taxpayers. Formal agreements were entered into by all provinces except Quebec, whereby the Federal government:

...undertook to pay 50 per cent of any amount expended by the provinces themselves towards the teaching costs (teachers' salaries) of language and citizenship classes for adult immigrants. Although no reference was made in the agreements

to the provision of textbooks, the Citizenship Branch continued to supply them free upon demand, as in the past. It should be noted that, while the Province of Quebec did not enter into the agreement on sharing teaching costs, free textbooks were provided to Quebec classes on the same basis as other provinces. An amendment to the agreement in 1958 extended "teaching costs" to include registration fees charged by local school boards for instruction provided to indigent immigrants during their first year of residence in Canada.

Then it became evident that the provision of text-books by the federal government was placing that government in the position of having to select from an ever-increasing array of new publications in the field. The Branch decided it would be preferable to leave the provinces free to choose their own. So in 1962 the Branch approached the provinces with a proposal that:

... the provincial education authorities undertake to select, purchase and distribute their own language textbooks for use in adult immigrant instruction and claim reimbursement from the Government of Canada under a formula based upon the current five-year average of expenditures for such textbooks in respect of each province. All of the provinces have entered into the agreement, with the exception of Quebec and British Columbia ...

Language classes, then, are conducted by local school authorities under provincial regulations, and depending on the need in the area. Most classes are held two nights a week for two hours per night, about 20 - 26 weeks between October and March. In some major centres, summer school classes are held, but this depends on interested parties and the support of authorities in a particular city or town.

Financial support varies, depending on the grant structure of the province. Under terms of the federal-provincial agreements, the province can be re-imbursed for one-half of its cost.

As indicated above, the province of Quebec has not entered into any such agreement but it does pay local authorities for teachers' salaries, provided instruction is offered in both official languages. Incidentally Quebec local education authorities did not hesitate to accept free text-books for use in the program. The average cost to the federal government for text-books sent to Quebec alone over the five-year period of 1959-1964 was about \$21,500 annually. A study of all the records of shipment of books to all provinces,¹ not only indicates that large numbers of French text-books in addition to the English, were requested by Ontario, but that Quebec had requested more English text-books than French in certain years. When questioned about this, Departmental officials confirmed the point and said the then Deputy Minister of the Immigration Department had become so concerned as to send two officials down to find out why. (The reasons are not indicated in the records.)

1 Note: Detailed data for the years 1949-1964 of the types and quantities of text-books supplied by Ottawa (upon request) to each of the provinces were also obtained from the records of the Citizenship Branch but space does not permit inclusion.

In addition to the amount paid by local school boards or the provinces, the contribution of the Government of Canada for this program is about one-quarter of a million dollars annually. Unfortunately this arrangement, while seemingly agreeable to all provinces (except Quebec), is not sufficient to meet the needs of adult immigrants and, of course, does nothing to meet the problem of the ever-increasing number of immigrant children who are unable to cope with regular school classes because of their language handicap.

The situation has become serious in Toronto where a recent survey indicated that less than one-third of Toronto's schools have any 'special class' for immigrant children who are unable to speak English. Even these classes consist only of a period or two a week of English; for most children it is just a case of 'sink or swim'. Only one school (Main Street School) is equipped with teachers, facilities, and a special approach to do the job thoroughly, but it can handle only 72 pupils out of the thousand in similar straits. It is meeting with surprising success but it is still in the experimental stage and what of all the others? A more satisfactory solution must soon be found before the situation becomes extremely acute. If the immigrants (children particularly) are unable to speak the language of the area in which they live, the social and economic problems will be costly indeed for the whole country.

This is an area of joint federal-provincial concern which cannot be left too long unsolved. It is one in which the federal over-all responsibility for immigrants could

1. Note: Considerable data was collected on this subject of language instruction for several of the provinces but it became apparent that since the administrative procedures as well as policy differed greatly not only from province to province but from one local school board to another, it would necessitate an extensive study to get a complete picture. In view of this researcher's terms of reference, the matter was dropped. However, broad generalization can be made to the effect that outside of Quebec and a few cities in Ontario practically all such classes for immigrants are given in English only -- because that is what the immigrants ask for even though in some cities courses in both languages are available and would be given if sufficient requests were made. Also, depending upon the degree of enlightenment in any given community, non-governmental organizations such as various Immigrant Aid Societies and Service Clubs make a considerable contribution by providing language classes for immigrants as a voluntary community service. The organizations could obtain free text-books from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration but bore the costs of instruction, etc. themselves.

The question of language instruction can be argued to be a citizenship matter of national dimension and therefore considered a legitimate concern of the federal government, as are technical and vocational training. But given the present attitude of Quebec and the political situation in Canada, it is not likely that the federal government will act very quickly in this regard unless public pressure is more manifest than it is at this stage. Evidence suggests that the role of the Citizenship Branch needs a complete re-assessment as does language instruction generally, -- for all residents of Canada, not just immigrants -- but that is outside the terms of this study.

well justify new and forward-looking steps on behalf of the national good. Human resources are far too valuable to waste but, even more important, the social and political implications of such sins of omission warrant a full federal-provincial conference at the highest level. Shortages of teachers and facilities are common to all provinces and no one province has a corner on all the answers, nor is any one province in a position where it could not gain from joint action in this regard.

The question of language instruction for the non-English or non-French immigrant is further complicated by the fact that often the immigrant is illiterate in any language, even his own. The increasing number of such children and adults coming into Canada, as a result of the present 'sponsorship' regulations, is so large that the situation is not only a tragic loss of human resources but is sociologically enormous and politically quite explosive. Federal government has blamed provincial governments and provincial governments hide behind excuses of "local school board autonomy", but the day will have to come when all such 'buck-passing' is stopped. Pressures must be relieved, and to do this both levels of government must act before it is too late.

Comments on Provincial Action

What is the degree of action exerted in each of the provinces? What specifically does each province do? Are they organized for action?

In 1947 the federal Immigration Department was able to state (in a reply dated June 17 to a letter, from the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, asking for information about provincial organizations for promotion of immigration in the nine provinces of Canada): "This Department has no knowledge of the existence of any provincial organizations for this purpose"...

Roughly twenty years later, one might pose the same question but it would have to be qualified as to whether one means 'governmental' or 'non-governmental' organizations. It would also depend upon the province, and whether or not one is concerned with church-affiliated associations, ethnic groups, immigrant aid-societies or the innumerable service organizations; but most provinces would have some sort of voluntary structure concerned with immigration. However, very few provinces have what might be termed governmental organizations, although several have one office (or officer) to handle immigration enquiries.

Ontario has been fairly active (since 1945 especially) and separate treatment is accorded that province in Section B which follows. Quebec, too, is peculiarly differentiated from the other provinces, as Section C indicates.

But aside from the few provinces which maintain Agents-General abroad, most provinces seem content to let the federal government have the field entirely to themselves. Very brief reference is made below to each of the other provinces. The information is based upon the replies to

our questions, as supplied by each provincial government, but space does not permit elaboration of the details.

Prince Edward Island

The provincial government of Prince Edward Island advised that they "do not have any immigration programme" but that they are in close touch with the representatives of the federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration with reference to securing suitable farm workers.

While language classes are conducted in English for new Canadians, there has been no demand for teaching immigrants French.

All four Maritime Provinces contribute to the costs of Atlantic House in London, England. (The London office covers enquiries from other European countries also.) In correspondence with the Agent-General for the Canadian Atlantic Provinces, it was ascertained that the work of that office (Atlantic House) is basically to promote industrial development and business investment throughout the Maritimes although, in addition, they do handle any enquiries from potential immigrants. These are usually referred, however, to the federal officers in the area.

Nova Scotia

This land has always had a special attraction for Americans from the Atlantic seaboard but, of course, large numbers from the British Isles and also from Germany settled the area in the 19th century. Over certain periods the

province has lost population by emigration, due to a shortage of economic opportunities.

While this province was, during the 1950's, active in attempting to attract skilled agriculturalists (mostly from the Netherlands),¹ the government advises that they do not now have any real program of immigration. Some effort has been made to bring in teachers from the British Isles, but not to any large extent.

Various statutes regarding immigrants have been passed over the years, both before and since Confederation, by the Nova Scotia legislature. Most of these concerned land settlement and the Department of Agriculture, but there is now no legislation dealing specifically with immigrants. "The Nova Scotia Land Settlement Board does not now make any direct approach to immigrants in their country of origin, but works through the federal Immigration officers to bring in skilled farm labour." In fact, considering its slim resources, most federal officials feel that Nova Scotia has really done more than its share for its immigrants.

Language classes are given under arrangements similar to those in other provinces. If demand were to arise, instruction would be given in French, but, to date, immigrants have generally requested English.

1 The Province had an agreement, dated January 18, 1956, with the Government of the Netherlands whereby the Nova Scotia Land Settlement Board made loans to Dutch settlers. Part of the loan was guaranteed by the Government of the Netherlands.

Newfoundland

Premier Smallwood advised that ... "this Government has undertaken no program of any sort in the field of immigration." It is interesting to note that in the November 1, 1950 minutes of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration reference is made to a newspaper clipping reporting that Premier Smallwood had been in Germany recruiting immigrants. He was quoted as "preparing plans for a mass immigration of German workers." (The Committee simply noted the report, and it appears nothing much came of the Premier's intentions.) Immigration statistics reveal that Newfoundland receives comparatively few each year, i.e., only 6047 for the period 1946-1964 inclusive.

New Brunswick

While this province was quite active in the early 19th century in attempting to attract settlers, the provincial government advises that "New Brunswick has not, in the past 50 years, had an immigration policy. ... The province has generally left immigration policy and programs to the federal authorities." In the 1870's an agent was maintained in London, but there has been none since, although the Agent-General for the Atlantic Provinces in London refers enquiries to the federal Department, as for other maritime provinces.

Early legislation did exist, mostly for immigrant orphan children, but nothing of consequence in this century.

Language instruction for immigrants is through the Adult Education classes, available upon request.

British Columbia

The geographic location of this province -- that is, its proximity to the Orient -- has been a factor in determining its attitude toward immigration. In fact, the B.C. legislature attempted the first controls of Chinese immigration in 1878 when it imposed a tax on each Chinese in the province. Even though the provincial Supreme Court held the tax to be discriminatory, the legislature ignored the judgement and continued to enact unconstitutional measures against Orientals until 1908. As a further indication of its determination to make Orientals unwelcome, the British Columbia legislature, by its Provincial Elections Act, barred all Chinese, Japanese, Hindu or Indians (including Orientals born in Canada) from exercising the franchise. Not until the end of the Second World War was this law changed.

In 1947, when the federal Chinese Act of 1923 was repealed, the action was considered by many to be a breach of trust on the part of the federal government toward the province of British Columbia. One federal M.P. argued: "...We are simply saying to B.C., we are going to dump an impossible problem on your doorstep, you must take it and like it."¹

Despite its discrimination against Asians, British Columbia, even before Confederation, carried on an active campaign for settlers, preferably from northern Europe.

1 Mr. Blackmore, House of Commons Debates (revised), May 5, 1947, p. 2786

However, more recently the government has been criticized for its lack of action on the subject of immigration.

One federal departmental official cynically comments: "B.C. has always hollered about wanting immigrants, but the moment one pops his head over the mountains they cut it off."

Since the Premier of British Columbia and ministers concerned were too busy to answer our questions, it was not possible to get first-hand or official information on what is the present provincial government's attitude towards immigration. However, officials of the Education department advised that they had been recruiting teachers in the United Kingdom because of the serious shortage, and that they were happy to accept qualified applicants from any country.

The very comprehensive adult education program conducted by the British Columbia Department of Education includes a language instruction course for immigrants and is very successful from the point of view of enrolment.

Increasing criticism is reflected in the press and from industry regarding the shortage of professionals and skilled labour. In fact, a manpower survey undertaken in 1965 by provincial officials in cooperation with federal immigration officials revealed ¹ "an additional manpower requirement for professional, technical and skilled workers by January 1, 1966 amounting to 21,567 people." The Minister of Immigration pointed out that federal action was being stepped up in the U.K., France and the Netherlands to select skilled immigrants,

1 Hon. J.R. Nicholson, public address in Vancouver, June 11, 1965

and the Vancouver Sun editorialized: "This province's shortage of skilled workers is demonstrably serious when special immigration teams must scour Europe to plug our labour gaps..."¹

Opposition leaders and some government officials claimed that the B.C. government has steered clear of making any policy announcement regarding immigration because of possible political repercussions, given the attitude of some sections of organized labour to immigrants or what is reported as 'imported' cheap labour. Other unions maintain that a selected immigration policy should be instituted, as do certain industrial manufacturers and business generally. The provincial government has not set out any clear statement of its intentions on the matter, although opposition parties and the press have strongly urged some clarification of policy.

Alberta

While Alberta's representatives to federal-provincial meetings seemed interested in immigration, particularly in the 1950's, the government has not really done very much. At present there is no provincial immigration program of any consequence, for example, last year's annual report of the Department concerned indicated that they had handled less than 100 applications -- 41 from Alberta House in London.

Alberta is interested in skilled and professional

1 The Vancouver Sun, editorial of May 18, 1965

immigrants. From time to time advertisements are run in foreign newspapers. The usual language classes are held for immigrants where requests warrant.

In response to our question concerning federal-provincial co-operation on policy, the Premier replied:

The Alberta Government has pressed the Federal authorities to consult with the provinces concerning any proposed revisions of immigration policies. We feel this request is valid because immigrants settle in the provinces and the provinces then become responsible for the health, welfare and education of these people. At the present time we have no say in policy, but if the provinces have to assume responsibility for the immigrants when they are located in Canada then it is only fair that the provinces should have some say in the establishment of immigration policies.

Saskatchewan

This province has had an interest in immigration from its earliest days, but it has not always been an area of immigration. For several years it lost more of its population than it gained. A provincial Royal Commission was appointed in January 1930 to study the question. It claimed, in fact, to be the "first attempt by any government in Canada to secure a scientific examination of the facts bearing on immigration and settlement." The Report recommended that immigration was necessary for Saskatchewan's development -- one of its main recommendations was that an "advisory Federal Board of Commissioners be created to consider and recommend policies of immigration and settlement, on which will be represented every province." It recommended also that a Provincial Council be established to determine the Province's needs. There were many other recommendations, but space doesn't permit any further

discussion. The relevant point is that the Commission advocated provincial influence in policy making.

A change of government, combined with the depression years, sufficed to relegate this Report to the proverbial 'shelf'.

In response to our queries, the present government in Saskatchewan advised that they maintain an Agent-General's office in London to encourage immigration. They are especially interested in obtaining professional and technical personnel, particularly dentists, for which there is a Special Recruiting Program currently underway, and, to a lesser extent, for teachers and nurses.

The Department of Education, in conjunction with local boards and other bodies, conducts a fairly extensive program of basic English and Citizenship classes.

The Provincial government states it has no particular disagreement with present federal policy, except to prefer more emphasis on education and skills in the selection of immigrants. They are pleased to welcome immigrants of any ethnic origin.

The Agent-General in London advised: "...We do not engage in general immigration activities and only advertise when specific vacancies exist and we have the name, salary, location and other particulars of the employment. General immigration is outside our activity and we deem it to be the responsibility of the Government of Canada." The Agent-General then went on to list the numerous professional

vacancies for which his office attempts to recruit qualified personnel. With regard to ethnic origin, the letter stated, "...We are not thinking very much of the percentage of racial groups in Canada. We are thinking primarily of getting people with the highest possible professional qualifications." Interestingly enough, one of the recruitment categories is for teachers to teach French because ... "it is apparently difficult to get Canadians of French speech to teach in Saskatchewan or other parts of English Canada."

Recently a manpower survey in the Province is reported to have highlighted a drastic need for skilled personnel, and recruitment to fill this need is being emphasized by the federal government officials.

An agreement was reached in 1965 between the federal government and the Government of Saskatchewan whereby that province will, in effect, reimburse the federal government for Assisted Passage Loans granted to certain immigrants destined to Saskatchewan and who remain in that province for two years.

Manitoba

During the early history of Manitoba, the clergy and the Métis opposed any immigration, first because fur-trading was in jeopardy from settlement and secondly because they wished to keep the area for the French¹ and the Catholics. Progress

1 This is documented by Prof. W.L. Morton in Birth of a Province, published by Manitoba Record Society, 1965.

toward settlement continued slowly, nevertheless, as groups from Ontario (and the United States) moved West to take up the rich farmlands. After Confederation, the government acted¹ to bring in settlers of varied backgrounds, including the Mennonites, whose descendents form such a large part of the population in the southeast corner of the province today. Icelanders also were added, and thus the French-English duality of the ethnic composition was ended. Soon groups of Scandinavians and, still later, Central Europeans, joined the English, Irish, Scottish and French.

Government action to recruit immigrants in the late 1880's and 1890's included the distribution of pamphlets and opening of offices in Eastern Canada and in England. The first Ukrainian settlers came in 1891 and after 1896 Eastern Europeans came in large numbers. After the First World War, various plans, such as the Soldier Settlements, etc., were tried, but the depression of the 'thirties' saw a severely restricted program. While after the Second World War Manitoba had an Agent-General in England for European contacts, immigration was never really emphasized and, in any event, the office was closed out in 1964.

From 1951-61 it would appear that Manitoba suffered

1 A pamphlet first issued in 1871 written by Thomas Spence (erstwhile rebel, and later Clerk of the Council!) extolled the virtues of Manitoba's Resources and Advantages to the Immigrant and Capitalist as compared with the Western States of America. A Joint Committee of both Houses approved its contents and recommended that it "should be read by every intending Emigrant [sic], both in the Eastern Provinces and Europe." It was widely distributed by the government and those interested in immigration.

severe losses (an estimated 60,000) in the rural areas and these were not entirely balanced by the urban gain. The over-all population gain for the province, through immigration, was very slight. It succeeded in replenishing the losses, but not much more, since Manitoba was not as successful in attracting immigrants as were the other provinces. Since very little gain occurred in what was a period of high immigration, the situation during years of low immigration, such as the early 1960's, reflects an over-all decline in population.

The fact is that Manitoba's urban areas have been unable to attract and hold population as rapidly as the rural areas were losing it. This has caused the provincial government to concentrate upon finding opportunities to keep Manitoba's people, especially the young, from leaving the province.

As one minister put it, "We must stop this 'give-away' program; we are tired of training countless numbers of young people and then losing them to other provinces or countries. We must get into secondary manufacturing and generally develop the industrial capacity of the province so that opportunities and jobs can be found for the present population. In particular, there is reason for great concern over the large numbers of unemployed Métis and Indians in Manitoba."

As far as a provincial immigration policy is concerned, the Premier stated, in response to our questions, that "Manitoba has no desire to enter into the field of immigration so long as the federal government is doing the job sufficiently well for the whole of Canada. There is no need to duplicate;

only when the federal government falls down on the job does the province feel constrained to act." Meanwhile, they have every intention of trying to meet the challenge of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future¹ (COMEF) when it stated that Manitoba would need to find 75,000 new job opportunities by 1975. To do this, a great emphasis must be put on training the unskilled and developing to the full all the industrial potential of the province.

Manitoba's Economic Consultative Board, in its Second Annual Report (1965) advocates increased immigration on a selective basis, centered on skilled and professional people, in view of the shortages already apparent in these categories. COMEF, however, did not anticipate that Manitoba could expect any significant increase through immigration -- "Manitoba will be almost entirely dependent on natural increase for population growth in the future."²

Language and citizenship classes are offered upon request through the Department of Education, and also voluntary organizations, in the usual manner.

Notes:

The question of how active provincial governments should be in the field of immigration is still controversial. Some federal officials seem to feel that the role provinces can

1 The report of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, 1962-1975, was compiled under direction of a 42-citizen committee, in co-operation with government, labour, university and business.

2 Report of COMEF, 1963, p. IV-1-10

play in setting the tone or climate in the province for reception of immigrants and providing employment opportunities, etc., is very important; they wish that provincial governments would do more in this respect. Some argue that if provinces really want immigrants they must get busy and do something toward helping the immigrant to fit in.

The manpower surveys¹ are quoted as a good example of what the province can do. The 1965 ones were, theoretically, joint federal-provincial endeavours. Some officials, on the other hand, question the basis and reliability of the current surveys, claiming they are not thoroughly or scientifically conducted and they say that, in any event, departmental policy should not be tied to a 'job vacancy' concept. This is impractical, they argue, because by the time selection, counselling and processing and so on are done, the stated needs in a given spot have changed. It is not possible to get the right people in the right place at the right time, from the very nature of the immigration process.

Further, if a cut-back comes on the part of a particular province or specific trades, immigration itself takes a long time to recover. Officials feel that the provinces would criticize very strongly if certain types of people were

1 In the late fall of 1965 manpower surveys had been completed in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario and New Brunswick and were continuing in Manitoba, with discussions just getting underway in Newfoundland and Quebec. Similar surveys were contemplated for the remaining provinces.

brought in at a time when the demand for that given category was light. This would simply mean a continuation of the old 'tap-on-tap-off' policy, whereas they maintain that a policy should be national and based on the philosophy of bringing in good quality immigrants on a steady basis. If this is done, specific needs for certain skills in given places will inevitably be met in the ordinary course of events. If the right national policy is carried on , the provinces will benefit in the long run.

The argument of some senior officials is that the provinces are too cautious and are not willing to use immigration policy as a catalyst, stimulating the economy and creating employment.

Undoubtedly, as long as the various provincial authorities thought in terms of farmers and agricultural immigrants, generally, they were right to proceed cautiously, since eminent authorities on 'land use' in Canada have long argued that suitable land was really in short supply. They claimed, in fact, as far as the prairie provinces were concerned, that if all those farmers presently on sub-marginal land were placed on good farms there would not be enough land to go around. However, numbers required for an industrially-based population are much greater than for an agriculturally-based one. An industrialized economy -- for a country with a small population -- means immigration. But the degree of immigration depends upon the opportunities available, services required and markets for the products produced.

Some provinces, such as Manitoba today (because of the Métis and Indian question), and formerly Quebec, have been reluctant to promote immigration until the economic base of the province is broadened and sufficient opportunities are made available for their own people.

How much should provinces do, then, as far as immigration is concerned? How much can they do? The question of just where provincial and federal jurisdictions¹ begin and end is still debatable. During a discussion in the House of Commons, the Minister of Immigration stated:

...I do not believe the provinces have the right, the authority nor the administrative machinery required to compete with federal immigration offices in the various countries of the world. On the other hand, we would be most pleased if the provinces would advertise abroad in that connection and set up employment offices as soon as possible in order to help us in getting those people settled here in every province of the country...²

The federal concept of jurisdictional authority was seriously challenged in 1947 by Ontario and some consider it to have been challenged by Quebec in its recent stand on the immigration question. Both these will be discussed in the two sections which follow.

-
- 1 For an interesting article on the respective legislative powers of the federal and provincial governments, and to what extent the local government may act if the federal policy is prejudicial to a province, see the Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 22, 1944 for a translation of extracts from a lecture by Jean Mercier of the Bar of the Province of Quebec.
 - 2 Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 25, 1964, p. 1469

B. The Province of Ontario

1. Historical Background

In recent years immigration, with all its implications, has probably been of far greater importance to the Province of Ontario than to any other region in Canada. Since the end of the Second World War, out of a total of 2,357,262 immigrants who have come to Canada, Ontario has been the stated designation of 1,232,524. In addition, untold numbers of those who originally arrived in areas outside Ontario were subsequently attracted by this most industrialized, and densely populated province of Canada and have since gravitated there -- especially to the city of Toronto.¹

In my discussions with various government officials in Toronto, it became evident that, while immigration looms very large in the province's economy and general development, the Ontario government has only periodically "called the tune" in formulating (or having any undue influence upon) federal policy. Only in the period immediately following the war (i.e. July 1947) when Mr. Drew, then Premier of the Province, initiated his

1. Immigration from abroad and from other provinces has been an important component of Ontario's population growth. In 1871 some 27.2 per cent of the Ontario population was foreign born. Since then the lowest proportion of foreign born living in Ontario was revealed in the census of 1901. At that time 14.8 per cent of the Ontario population was foreign born. The latest census (1961) indicated that immigrants from abroad accounted for 21.7 per cent of the total population. Canadian born, other than Ontario born, living in Ontario represented 9.3 per cent of the Ontario population.

famous 'air-lift' of immigrants -- much to the chagrin of the federal government at the time -- is there any real evidence that Ontario's weight in the matter of federal policy-setting was significant. (There was another short spurt of activity by the provincial government in 1951 and 1952 when a plan officially named "Industrial Immigration Plan" was emphasized in cooperation with the federal government. Similarly a movement of agricultural workers was initiated on a joint basis. Details of these will be described later.)

Mr. Drew's 1947 'air-lift'¹ was a new departure indeed. It was the first mass migration by air in history and was inordinately successful.

Nevertheless, for a province that has benefitted so much by the influx of this human resource in such abundance its government has been strangely lacking in any long-term policy. Apart from the famous Drew scheme (and again very recently) no really concerted attempt has been made by the government to view this matter in perspective, or to spell out any type of 'blueprint' for the future - it has not even attempted to set forth to the people of Ontario any clear-cut or long-term immigration goals or objectives.

1. See description of this scheme below in the Policy section under sub-section Specific Schemes - Drew 'air-lift'.

Yet having said this, it must be quickly emphasized that in another way there has been a pronounced degree of consistency, at least since 1945. The cynic, of course, would say it is simply a lack of any real change or positive action and that, except for the highly imaginative but short-lived air-lift by Drew's government, Ontario has just sat still and let the immigrants come rolling in.

This is not quite true, however, even for the present; certainly it is not the case at all for earlier times, when the province took an active role in immigration. One can go as far back as 1869 and find copies of posters, drawn up and distributed by the government of Ontario (Dept. of Immigration), extolling the virtues of rural Ontario and offering free grants of land "without any charge whatever" ... "a free grant of two hundred acres of land for himself and one hundred acres additional for each member of his family, male or female, over eighteen years of age"... These posters also exhorted 'capitalists' (as they are designated on the poster) to emigrate... "persons living on the interest of their money can easily get eight per cent on first-class security"... (See Appendix C .)

In those years immediately following Confederation, co-operation between the two levels of government was the order of the day and "persons desiring fuller information concerning the Province of Ontario" were "invited to apply personally, or by letter, to the Canadian Government Emigration Agents" in London, Dublin, Belfast, Glasgow and Antwerp.

Ontario has had representation in London much of the time since these early days. Immigration agents were sent on periodic visits to the British Isles to recruit farmers and labourers for the Province but "no offices were provided and the work was carried on through cooperation with the shipping companies. A common practice was to pay a bonus to shipping agents for each emigrant recruited".¹ In addition to agents, "The first official Ontario Government office in London became a reality in 1908 and various offices sufficed until 1930 when a new Ontario House was officially opened. It was closed again in 1934, due to the depression, and re-opened in 1944 -- but chiefly for the purpose of serving the Canadians on active service in Europe and to lay the foundations for post-war activities".²

Of course, a prime function of Ontario House had been to promote trade and industry for the Province, but its personnel have always endeavored to serve the prospective immigrant well and have consistently attempted to spread the 'good word' about the virtues of Ontario. This is no mean task. As pointed out in the pamphlet previously mentioned, "Few people realize that in moving fifty thousand emigrants to Ontario over the past six years (1944-1950) it was necessary to deal with over five hundred thousand enquiries."³

-
1. A pamphlet on 'Ontario House' (no publication date), issued sometime in the first few months of 1950 under the authority of Hon. Wm. Griesinger, Minister of Planning and Development, p. 31.
 2. Ibid., p. 32
 3. Ibid., p. 15

The Ontario House selection process was designed with the purpose of controlling the flow of emigrants into the Province to those persons who were desirable and who could be easily absorbed into industry or employment. In this way home labour was protected.¹

To ensure that the public was not under any misconception about the respective rules of the two governments, the pamphlet goes on to say:

The Canadian Government Immigration Offices in the U.K. are established for the purpose of ensuring that the Canadian Immigration Act is not contravened. Their primary purpose has been to satisfy themselves that the emigrant is physically fit, of sound mind, has a clean record without crime, and has money for a passage and rail fair to his destination, with a few dollars for the first week or so before he finds employment. They are neither designed nor equipped to solicit emigrants or advise them extensively on trades, employment, housing, cost of living etc., nor do they aid emigrants in securing passports, chest X-rays, sea bookings, rail reservations or transfer of funds.

On the other hand Ontario House was there primarily to get immigrants and to help them as much as possible...

Until recently Ontario House, in close collaboration with the Federal authorities, gave the emigrant a complete all-inclusive service. The Immigration Department of Ontario House assisted the applicant through the various steps, and led him up to the federal medical examination, and when they were through, took over again and finalized his plans. There was the closest co-operation between the two offices and no duplication of services. Thousands of emigrants have only lost a day's work in the process and many only lost ten days or two weeks from the time they left work in the U.K. and became employed in Ontario. No other state or country offered such an efficient service.²

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

With such a smooth running arrangement one wonders why the operation did not continue ad infinitum. However, the same pamphlet does concede that even though some changes in the amount and kinds of services rendered to the immigrant by Ontario House were effected, still Ontario was indeed interested in immigrants, especially British. Perhaps the next several paragraphs of this pamphlet on "Ontario House" might be worth quoting in full; they give a clear indication of the role of this office at that time.

Ontario wants good young British immigrants. The department will function principally as an information bureau, advising on conditions and opportunities in the Province, and at the same time directing enquiries to the various U.K. agencies.

There will be close liaison with steamship and travel agents, assisting them in the selection and processing of emigrants. The services offered in Toronto will include advice on temporary accommodation, employment assistance by National Employment Service officers and counselling on special cases needing assistance.

Immigration can only be planned on a long term basis, and reasonable selection and control is desirable in attaining a well-balanced population. The United Kingdom, with its heavy concentration of fully employed people is a permanent reservoir for an excellent grade of immigrants and this source can produce any number of any trade that our Province is able to assimilate. The British emigrant pays his own fare to our country, speaks our language, knows our laws and customs, is educated and usually has already some apprenticeship, training, or trade. His settlement in our land is not a major adjustment, as he generally has friends or relatives willing to assist him in the initial stages.

"The Economic Value of Immigration to the Province"

The economic value of the U.K. migration into Ontario runs into large figures and is not fully appreciated. It is estimated that ten thousand workers support a city of thirty thousand people. They will earn \$20 millions annually and have a purchasing power of \$18 millions. Their investment in homes, furnishings, cars and businesses are [sic] substantial and every merchant or tradesman in the community benefits.

"What Selective Immigration Does"

- (1) Immigrants bring in new crafts, skills, training, cultures and processes.
- (2) They diversify our productivity and start new industries.
- (3) They do much of the heavy duty labour in which most Canadians are disinterested.
- (4) They are in demand because of their high technical and engineering training.
- (5) They develop our natural resources.
- (6) Fifty percent of them settle in rural areas and strengthen our small towns and villages.
- (7) If Canada had more home consumers she would be less dependent upon her export trade.
- (8) Immigrants mean more wage earners - which means greater purchasing power and more retails sales.
- (9) More wage earners mean more taxpayers, and spreads the tax burden over more people.
- (10) Immigrants bring cash and personal effects into a country.
- (11) A number of Canadians emigrate to U.S.A. yearly. In the main these are fine young educated men, and a large number come from Ontario. It is essential that we at least pour in at the top what leaks out at the bottom.
- (12) Economists have estimated definite values for immigrants based on age, trade, nationality, etc. The value ranges from \$10,000 to \$20,000 per head for those over 20 years.

- (13) For immigrants over 20 years, the receiving state has had no expense of education, hospitalization, welfare, governmental or other charges.
- (14) British immigrants assist us in the assimilation of foreign immigrants.¹

2. Policy -- General

It can be seen from the above that, during this period at least, Ontario's policy was very definitely geared to the British emigrant. They made no bones about it; their policy was quite clear.

Other than that, however, policy is rather difficult to identify and analyse. As a provincial government official stated:

In one sense, the Government (Ontario) has never had a long-term immigration policy, but in another it has, insofar as most short-term policies have not been altered in approximately two decades since the Air Immigration Plan. Of course, some policy changes have been made and some attitudes revised, but the record seems to indicate that early post-war pronouncements regarding immigration are markedly similar to current statements on the subject.

The same official further stated that, in fact, consistency of policy has other effects, namely resistance to change. He claimed,

When the provincial government decided after the 'air-lift' to close down its immigration activities and ordered Ontario's Agent-General in London to close the office, he simply ignored the letter and went right on operating, but with curtailed services.

1. Ibid.

According to one provincial official, presently in the Economics and Development Department, there are really ten points to Ontario's policy as regards immigration. He made a check of all provincial policy files, and claims that the opinion that Ontario should have an immigration policy is supported by most sectors of government and society. He points out that the Ontario government, following the early days of free land grants and assisted passages -- when no passports were required and rules and regulations were few and far between -- has, with the exception of the war years and the depression years of the 'thirties', always been interested and active in immigration.

Since the Second World War, however, the case for immigration in Canada has been argued on economic grounds. For example, whenever it is seriously contemplated, it would appear that federal officials spend their time trying to find reasons to justify the argument that Canada is underpopulated and that she needs a larger population to keep her farms, forests and factories working at a high level of production.

On the other hand, the provincial government has not often resorted to arguments based on political and strategic points or to the humanitarian pleas for admitting immigrants, simply as an act of charity. Nevertheless, just because these arguments have not been advanced publicly, they cannot be entirely discounted as possible motivating factors behind government action. It is interesting to note some isolated comments in this connection from correspondence on file:

Canada needs immigrants to defend her from the creeping paralysis of Communism. World domination is intended and the rich lands of the West must ultimately be its objective. Can Canada defend her vast resources and tracts of land with only 13 or 14 million people? (1950). Canada must face facts and decide which of two alternatives she will adopt: encourage and admit immigrants of the right philosophy in their hundreds of thousands, or wait until the land-hungry hordes of Communists arrive and wrest from her all she values.¹

It is impossible to determine how greatly attitudes such as these, when held by some of the personnel involved, can influence policy, but they cannot be overlooked entirely.

The second string to the Provincial bow regarding immigration has undoubtedly been a strong desire to ensure that provincial action should not conflict with that of the federal government. The provincial files reveal ample evidence of ministerial instructions on immigration to the effect that Ontario should co-operate with the federal government in every way. (Some provincial officials maintain that this is why Ontario has not been as active as might have been expected, since there was a fear of possible duplication of federal immigration efforts.)

We note, for example, that in 1955 the Ontario Minister responsible informed his Agent-General that he was:

1. Brief from the Agent-General, 1950

...not unmindful of the fact that the question of immigration is a matter that is (chiefly) within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. There does not appear to be any need for your Immigration Branch to try to recruit immigrants in England which amounts to duplicating the work that is presently being done by the Federal Government in this regard.¹

It is assumed by many provincial officials that Ontario's immigration policy must always be responsible to the province's level of unemployment. However, the files do not seem to show any ministerial direction on this question. Actually, if there had been instructions that this be so, up until recently it would have been difficult to ascertain this scientifically, since the administrative machinery for ensuring that an immigration program be responsive to economic conditions was just too inadequate.

Another assumption with some basis in fact is that the Ontario Government's immigration program should be selective. In a speech to the Canadian Exporters' Association in 1948, the Hon. Dana Porter stated, "Canada's advance demands that a selective immigration policy be carried out", and this is what would govern Ontario.

When the Minister (Hon. Wm. Nickle) travelled to Europe, the Globe and Mail referred to his trip as a "manpower hunt", and

1. Ontario Government policy files.

quoted him as saying that Ontario policy was selective, in contrast to that of the federal government at that time:

So far as the Federal Government is concerned, the intention would seem to be just to drop a bunch of bodies in Ontario and let them look after themselves. This is not what Ontario wants. If we are going to have to absorb 85,000 new people, we want to be sure they are the right kind and that we have jobs for them.

However, there have been some differences of opinion as to what the basic principle of this selective policy should be. At one time it appeared that Ontario was simply trying to obtain as many immigrants as possible -- to be established as useful citizens; but later it was "to give assistance to industry in obtaining certain classes of skills not to be found in Canada."¹

Perhaps the policy had changed in 1950, because prior to that we have, for example, Hon. Dana Porter informing the Agent-General in London:

It has never been the policy of this government to solicit any particular trades or specialists on behalf of any employers or for any other purpose... We are not the agents for any employers or any group of employers. Our purpose is to bring as many people out here as possible, who will have a good chance of becoming settlers in this country, and our whole selective system is designed for the purpose of facilitating a movement of this kind.

1. Ontario Government files, 1953.

The motive underlying this was that the Government did not wish to be linked to the fact that companies were hiring unskilled textile workers in England at sub-standard wages and bringing them out to work in their factories in Canada. A telegram sent by the Minister to his Agent-General states:

Essential that we should not be party to any pre-arranged employment of immigrants entering under our auspices ... Immigrants should be advised to take their chances with other citizens in finding employment through the ordinary channels when they arrive.

The emphasis seems clearly not to be on filling specific gaps in the Ontario labour force.

However, in 1950 and after, something known as the 'Industrial Immigration Plan' seems to underly Ontario's policy. In 1950 a press release by the Minister said the plan consisted of bringing classes of needed skilled immigrants from the United Kingdom and Europe. Since then, in fact, this has been more or less the role of the provincial government's immigration office. Certainly by 1962 the Branch was really a placement agency service in Toronto. The vacancies they detected were matched by the London office to applicants interviewed for employment; these applicants were then assisted to emigrate to Canada to the specific positions available. This plan does not work out as completely or as simply in practice as it sounds in theory; the main factor here is obviously that admissions are decided by the federal, not the provincial, government.

Evidence is not conclusive for all the years involved, but up until recently nearly every action of the government has distinctly supported the charge that Ontario favours British immigrants to all others. However, in 1950 we find this comment by Ontario's Director of Immigration, writing to his Minister:

I do feel that we should maintain balance in this new population, preferably one British to four others, and any preference to British is given simply because they are our greatest source of skilled help, where there is no language difficulty and a minimum of readjustment to our way of life. (Underlining is the writer's!)

In spite of the Government's emphasis today on selection of specific skills for specific jobs, the Agent-General's function in London is really to provide an advisory, consulting and informational service. That is to say, apart from helping private companies to advertise specific job vacancies, the role is a passive one.

Although in earlier years the Ontario Government had contributed to societies like 'Dr. Barnardo's Homes', etc., it appears that policy in post-war years was not to grant assistance to societies set up to sponsor or aid immigration. In 1957, the Minister refused a request for financial assistance from the Canadian Hungarian Federation.

One thing that has caused some friction is the question, "From which source in the Government should policy emanate?" With London as the main operational base, as it were, for the

Province's immigration activity, the question of who decides policy and who directs it was at times a matter of dispute. Even today, the officers in Toronto still appear disquieted by the action and role of the Agent-General in London. In 1961, however, we find a memo to the Minister, "Whatever we decide to do on immigration at the provincial level, the policy should be decided here and directed from here", and the Minister's reply: "The policy in regard to immigration is determined from time to time by Cabinet, acting upon the information and advice of responsible officers." Nevertheless, there is still some uncertainty in this respect at the present time.

Before we consider the present-day situation, a description of some particular policies might prove valuable.

3. Policy -- Specific Schemes

(a) Drew 'air-lift'

This scheme, which turned out to be overwhelmingly successful, ran into stormy weather from the federal government the moment it was announced by Premier Drew in May 1947. Returning from a trip to England "to firm up plans", Mr. Drew stated that the provincial government would fly 7,000 men and women from the U.K. to Toronto during August, September, October and November (the first flight to arrive August 2). Premier Drew had signed a contract with the Trans-Ocean Airways -- "one of the largest charter air contracts ever signed", claimed the Agent-General in London.

Reconstruction Minister C. D. Howe, (Minister of the Canadian government responsible for Transport), announced in the House of Commons that the Federal Government viewed as serious the arrangements made by the Ontario Government which ... "break across our treaty arrangements with the international civil aviation authority and also the air transport authority." He said he had informed the Ontario officials "instantly that U.S. planes carrying immigrants from the U.K. would not be able to land in Canada." ...He pointed out the "need for special permits and that they would not be issued to Trans-Ocean Airways because TCA operated these lines."

In a letter dated June 2, 1947 to Prime Minister St. Laurent, Mr. Howe said very testily: "Should Premier Drew visit Ottawa in this connection, I suggest that he be advised that immigration is a matter for the Federal Government." ...(Presumably the Reconstruction Minister had his own interpretation of Section 95 of the B.N.A. Act.)

However, by June 27 the Minister had changed his attitude and assured the Ontario Minister of Planning and Development -- the provincial official responsible for the operation -- that ... "the Immigration Branch of the Department ... will do everything possible to facilitate the movement of these prospective immigrants to Canada." ...

Strangely enough, the provincial officials did not officially consult with the federal government until July 22, 1947 when, in a two-page letter to the federal Director of Immigration, they set out the details of their plan.

When the federal government had stated that the license for the American planes to land in Canada would not be granted, Mr. Drew planned to have Trans-Ocean fly the immigrants to Buffalo, N.Y. and then transport them by bus to Toronto. However, it was finally decided to allow TCA to sign a sub-contract with Trans-Ocean to fly for the first two months and then TCA would take over "when they have sufficient planes. ...TCA were to be responsible for proper documentation of planes and immigrants."

The scheme was a tremendous success and went off very smoothly indeed, with great fanfare and resultant publicity to the Ontario government. There is no doubt that it called for a great degree of organization and hard work on the part of the provincial government officials and, later on, of the federal government also. As explained in the copy of the brochure issued to each prospective immigrant by Ontario House in London, some of the reasons for the Plan were "the serious shortages of many kinds of labour in the Province, and preference for British stock in Ontario" -- "As many continentals and foreigners are now being permitted to enter Canada, we feel it essential that we maintain our present percentage of British stock..."

The general public seemed to approve of the policy and, as an article in Saturday Night (June 28, 1947) put it, ... "Mr. Drew's 7,000 will constitute an admirable addition to the population of Canada." ... Although the article was not entirely pro-British, for the writer comments: "We think that an equivalent number of D.P.'s would have been almost as good, but any move to bring them out by the same methods would have lacked the imperialist appeal of the Ontario gesture...". The article further commented that this would "put the U.K. in a position to replace their emigrants with refugees from the D.P. camps in Europe," saying that it was easier for these refugees to get to Britain than to Canada, and that Britain is in a better position to assimilate them without difficulty and without social disturbance.

The provincial government claimed that its scheme was operating most efficiently and that all the necessary arrangements and full documentation could be finished in a few hours, all in the one spot ... "The only thing applicants must do elsewhere is to obtain their own passports from the British passport office," boasted the Agent-General at the time.

Such efficiency and speed was, no doubt, the envy of the federal authorities who viewed the whole scheme with a jaundiced eye, although on-the-spot support and co-operation was given by field officers in quite substantial degree. In a letter from the federal officer in London to Headquarters, Ottawa, January 27,

1948 the London Superintendent reported: "I have already intimated to you that back of this Ontario business there is, in my view, an ulterior motive, namely, to get the question of immigration into Ontario entirely out of Dominion hands, this being the subject of my first conversation with Major Armstrong (Agent-General for Ontario) and also Premier Drew when he called at this office." ...Then the Superintendent went on to report that travel agents in London were complaining of losing commissions, etc.

On the occasion of the ninety-third trans-Atlantic flight to have been made in the 87 days since the scheme was put into operation -- the arrival of the 3,500th British emigrant -- one editor wrote:

The clock-like regularity with which the program has functioned has already vindicated the highest hopes of its planners. By the same token it has been a crushing rebuke to those critics who greeted it with scorn ... The success that has attended the operation ... is irrefutable evidence of its soundness ... Ontario should not have to expand its present operation, and other Provinces should not have to set themselves up in the immigration business to accomplish by nine little plans the same objective that could be reached by one national program... (however) ...apathy has settled over Ottawa. If Ottawa is not prepared to carry out its announced policies and accept responsibility in this field, this Province ... will have no choice but to continue and expand its own program.¹

1. Toronto Globe and Mail editorial, October 31, 1947

Meanwhile 'Rainbow House' continued its avowed task, and young men and women continued to pour in from Britain. By March 14, 1948, 7,000 had stepped off the planes at Malton Airport, with never a hitch in the program. Thousands more came in the months that followed.

There was no doubt that the Ontario government's highly imaginative and positive immigration policy had paid off for the province.

Closing Down of Rainbow Corner and the end of the Ontario 'Air-lift'

The estimates for 1948-49, which included a sum of \$503,400 to "bring immigrants from overseas", gave every indication that the air-lift program would continue. Why, then, did Premier Frost close down the operations? The reasons are not too clear. An article in the Financial Post on October 29, 1949, states that it was an economy measure. However, Le Devoir of November 3, 1949 in a more sinister vein, attributes a different motive to Ontario's decision to close up shop in London and in Glasgow. It claims conflicts, between the Ontario English and the newly-arrived British immigrants, were numerous and were similar (in the French-Canadian journalist's view) to those

... clashes which too often occurred between
the French Canadians and the French from France
...The only difference is that our English co-
associates have stood them patiently as long as

they felt proud to belong to the British Empire and profitted by their trade with England." ...¹

The Ontario government's official statement, made by Premier Drew in the Ontario legislature on April 7, 1948, when speaking of the prospect of the air contract being terminated, was that:

Mr. Howe has scuttled our plan. ... In doing so he claims, however, that he is in a position to carry all air immigration. ... If TCA has the machines available there is no earthly reason why the Ontario Government should be subsidizing a 'well-established and very commendable immigration movement' of this kind when the aircraft are owned by and are under the control of the Dominion government.

Actually Mr. Howe had said a year earlier that the federal government planned to bring in immigrants at the rate of 3,000 per month, using both ships and planes. The contrast between achievement and inaction was noted by a newspaper editorial:

Premier Drew announced his plan on June 21. Forty-two days later the first flight arrived. Mr. Howe announced his plan on August 22nd, seventy days have passed and nothing has happened..."²

Nevertheless, in a letter dated November 8, 1949 to the federal Superintendent of Immigration in London, Ontario's Agent-General stated that the reason for closing Ontario operations was really a proposed expanded federal government program or, as the Agent-General had said in an earlier letter to the federal government,

1. Le Devoir editorial, November 3, 1949

2. Toronto Globe and Mail editorial, Oct. 31, 1947

...Our Government understands that the federal government proposes extending its immigration services in both Canada and Britain, and it has therefore been decided that we shall materially curtail our activity in this work at home and here. We intend closing our Glasgow office immediately, and to commence winding up our operation at Rainbow Corner which we will evacuate before January 1, 1950. ...In the future we plan giving only a limited immigration information service, operating from Ontario House with a staff of possibly ten or twelve persons, and doing no processing of emigrants...

During this period, the Ontario government also made several statements to the effect that it did not wish to duplicate services being offered by the federal government. As the Agent-General pointed out in his November letter, "Our government is anxious that overlapping with the Dominion services should be avoided. It is most desirable that there should be an integrated and co-operative effort on the part of our respective governments." Further, a letter dated November 15, 1949 from the Ontario Director of Immigration notified the Deputy Minister in Ottawa of the change in Ontario's office to just a..."counselling and information service" ...and stated that the Agent-General in London had been authorized to close up and dispose of the Ontario Immigration building in London known as 'Rainbow Corner'.¹

1. This building was offered to the federal government at a very low figure, complete with equipment and personnel. The offer was declined by Ottawa, although just a year later they were claiming desperate shortage of space, etc., as has been indicated elsewhere.

Thus Ontario withdrew from the limelight after having taken a most imaginative step and been responsible for bringing to Ontario, in a very short time, at least 10,000 immigrants by air and several thousand more by sea. But, more importantly, it had set an example for the federal government that caused many a federal official to squirm with chagrin. As one of the leading newspapers stated at the time of the launching of the scheme:

...This business-like arrangement stands in contrast with the baffling and annoying handicaps facing Britons who have sought to emigrate to Canada by using the Canadian federal immigration machinery in London. They have been subjected to delays, evasions, repetitions, conflicting authorities, indignities, and even downright stupidity in the lengthy documentation procedures. Coupled with this has been the difficulty of making reservation for the drastically limited transportation space.

The audacity of Premier Drew's government in using air transport to move these people in a hurry should also be an eye-opener to the federal government. ...The record of the Immigration Department (federal) ... has been one of complacency and slovenliness.

...Its accomplishments add up to practically nil. Now comes the crowning condemnation of its do-nothingness, when the government of a single province can launch a bold immigration policy ...on its own which puts the federal government to shame." ...¹

Ontario policy, then, indeed had a salutary effect and can be said to have exercised a significant influence on the formulation of federal policy at this particular juncture.

1. Excerpt from the Vancouver News Herald, quoted by the Toronto Globe and Mail, August 4, 1947.

(b) Industrial Immigration Plan

While the 'air-lift' was a plan to bring large numbers of people from the U.K. to Ontario, the Industrial Immigration Plan two years later was designed to bring immigrants with specific skills to the Province. In a circular letter distributed in February 1951 to travel agents in the U.K. (and labelled as "Ontario's New Immigration Plan"), the Agent-General for Ontario stated that conferences had been held between Federal and Provincial authorities and that the Ontario government was announcing new plans to send selection teams to interview skilled immigrants (in the U.K.) to come to Ontario.

Incidentally, the federal Director of Immigration in Ottawa, in a letter to the federal officer in London, complained of the approach taken by the Agent-General for Ontario in this particular circular, and instructed him to find out (as diplomatically as possible) why the federal government's procedure was not mentioned.

Thus we see that while in 1949 the Ontario government had offered its immigration premises and equipment, etc. for sale, closed "Rainbow House" and, ostensibly, had gone out of the immigration business, it was now back searching for 15,000 skilled workers

"We are very busy at Ontario House ... and have taken other quarters in New Burlington Street ... there will be a big increase in movements (of immigrants) if passages are available."¹

Ontario's newest undertaking was cause for further conflict of jurisdiction between the federal departments of Immigration and Labour. In an exchange of correspondence between the Deputy Ministers of these two departments in February 1951, the Immigration Deputy Minister says:

I note in the Financial Post of February 1951 ... in an article entitled "Here's what the Provinces and Industry are doing to Speed Immigration", the following statement (referring to the Ontario provincial government):

..."The Province is taking all requests from Ontario industries for labour orders which cannot be filled by National Employment Service. These requirements are then publicized in the U.K. through Ontario House in London and Branch offices..."

The Deputy Minister went on to say:

Politically speaking, I believe that if this statement is correct, it might cause embarrassment to the government (federal) ... it would be a great help if you would agree to instruct your N.E.S. officers that whenever they cannot fill labour orders for industries, they should immediately pass such information to this Department, and I can assure you that we would take steps to see that immigrants are selected abroad to fill these jobs.

1. The Agent-General of Ontario.
Files of the Immigration Department, Ottawa, March, 1951.

During this period, correspondence on file reveals that there was some confusion and considerable misunderstanding arising from the fact that, in addition to receiving correspondence from the provincial government, industries were receiving visits from federal Immigration officers, provincial authorities and N.E.S. representatives, as well. Although the program left something to be desired in co-ordinated organization, it would appear that Ontario's needs and her government's readiness to act affected federal policies accordingly.

The Industrial Immigration Plan has been a part of Ontario's government policy ever since, with varying amounts of emphasis in any given year.

(c) Agricultural and Farm Labour Movements

In the spring and summer of 1951, because of the 'rural-urban drain' resulting from increased industrial development, the province of Ontario became aware of acute shortages of farm labour. The provincial government initiated action through federal government to bring in farm workers -- for example, a movement of about 2500 German farm labourers was arranged. This particular scheme was the source of more friction between the Labour and Immigration departments, but federal-provincial co-operation seemed to be somewhat improved. Federal-provincial Farm Labour Committees were very much involved in trying to arrive at a suitable agreement on Assisted Passage Loan Schemes,

although difficulties were encountered at first, due to a shortage of funds available in the Assisted Passage fund. Various schemes were subsequently agreed upon on a cost-shared basis, and groups of agricultural workers were enabled to come to Canada.

By February 1952, it seemed that a number of provinces had agreed on similar Farm Labour programs. Federal-provincial Farm Labour committees in the provinces concerned, (including Saskatchewan, Alberta, Ontario, Nova Scotia and Manitoba), directed the reception, distribution and supervision of workers brought forward under the program.

During January 1952, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Ontario Department of Agriculture visited Immigration offices in the U.K. and on the Continent. The Director of Immigration, Ottawa, sent letters of introduction ahead of him, requesting federal officers abroad to assist him to secure the required supply of farm workers for Ontario.

Ontario government immigration policy seems to have remained passive for a few years. As table indicates, nothing of a very active nature was pursued during the period 1952-1956, but no policy announcement was made to this effect. Nevertheless, Ontario continued to receive between 52% and 53% of all immigrants coming to Canada under all auspices -- provincial, federal, sponsored and unsponsored. (See pp. 231,232.) In view of this, the government, no doubt, was not moved to exert any special effort to this end.

In 1956 we find indications of a stepping-up of the Province's activities. (Ontario even considered opening offices on the Continent as well as in London, England.)

(d) Policies for the Years 1956-62

On February 2, 1956, the Agent-General for Ontario wrote the Deputy Minister (Ottawa) the following assurance of co-operation:

You will be interested to know that my government (Ontario) has established the firm policy of giving every possible support this coming year to the drive for immigrants by your Department. I am instructed to step up our entire U.K. activity, working closely with your London office, in an effort to increase the immigration intake into the Province. ...I was delighted to learn of the aggressive policy which is now being taken on immigration, as I feel it to be quite essential.

Again in October of that year, the Agent-General wrote the Director (Ottawa),

"...our government is anxious to stimulate further migration to Ontario within the framework of your federal administration ... (but) ... We recognize that certain of the foreign governments are not enthusiastic about emigration from their countries and that any promotional activities have to be undertaken with caution..."

It is to be noted that the Ontario government, at this point, was not wholly committed to immigration of British stock. For example, the Agent-General wrote:

"...it does seem that it might be advisable for one of our senior immigration officials to make occasional visits abroad, working in close liaison with the officials of your Department, as is our practice in the U.K."

He then asked the federal government if the Department would distribute Ontario pamphlets in foreign languages, and expressed a desire to receive samples of a type of pamphlet to be distributed in France, Belgium, Holland, Germany and Scandinavia.

In 1956 another international event -- over which Ontario, of course, had no control -- the revolution in Hungary brought human resources in large numbers to the Province's doorstep.

The Hungarian Refugee Program

The October Revolution in Hungary threw hundred of thousands of freedom-seeking individuals on the world migration scene. The Canadian government announced its intention of bringing in 31,000 and, in response to a telegram from the Prime Minister of Canada, Ontario agreed to receive its portion.¹

Refugees were provided with room and board, clothing, education and recreation at two staging camps, established in Toronto and operated by the Red Cross. In a series of agreements (mentioned in Section A), the federal government requested provinces to provide medical costs for the refugees' first year in Canada, and agreed to reimburse the provinces for these costs.² After the first year, refugees were to come under

1. During the year 1957 alone, 9,191 Hungarians -- one third of the total for Canada -- emigrated to Ontario.

2. A disagreement ensued over the proportion which Ontario considered should be reimbursed by the federal government. (See p. 164.)

the regular health and welfare schemes for ordinary citizens or residents generally.

The Provincial government's citizenship branch did much to persuade municipalities to help establish provincial committees which assisted the refugees to meet their housing and employment needs. Ontario had such committees in 45 municipalities.

(e) Recent and Present Policy

In 1961-62 there began to be a renewed emphasis on immigration. What began to be referred to as Ontario's immigrant placement¹ service occupied the time of the Toronto provincial office.

In a letter dated July 26, 1962, from the Ontario Agent-General in London to the Deputy Minister, Ottawa, we note:

...Ontario government policy on the question of immigration from the U.K. is to continue to be

-
1. In a pamphlet entitled "Specialized Immigration Services", issued by the Immigration Branch of the Ontario Department of Economics and Development, (no date, but bearing the name of the then Minister Robert W. Macaulay -- probably between 1961 and 1963), a description of the services provided is given...

..."The Immigration Division will assist industry, hospitals, schools, municipalities and other organizations in securing in the U.K. professional and technical personnel who are not available in Canada"... To do this, it purported to study the requirements and needs, if necessary by personal contacts with the industries and employers concerned, obtaining descriptions of job vacancies, planning advertising campaigns, screening applicants abroad and arranging interviews for employers who wished to go over to meet with prospective candidates. The provincial officers in the Toronto office were to handle this side of the arrangement and the London office to work on the overseas aspect. The pamphlet claimed that "constant liaison is maintained with other Departments in the Ontario government and the appropriate departments in the Federal government such as Labour, Citizenship and Immigration, Agriculture, etc."

active and we are moderately broadening our services both here and in the province on the receiving end. ...We hope that it will prove to be an increased movement in 1962 and still more in 1963 ...

Because of the many enquiries being received from industry and institutions in the province, officials reacted to the specified "need for certain types of skilled workers, technicians and professional people." Simultaneously, Ontario House was receiving heavy numbers of enquiries from prospective emigrants in the U.K.

In 1962 the Agent-General toured the European offices of the Federal Immigration Department, discussing Ontario's needs and emphasizing the need for skilled, technical and professional immigrants. Throughout 1963 and 1964 activity continued at a high level, with Premier Robarts also taking a European trip to "drum up business".

The Director of federal government services in the U.K. reported to Ottawa, June 23, 1964:

... I am sure you have heard of the Ontario Government's plan to step up the tempo of their immigrant recruiting campaign. Plans are underway to open an office in Glasgow and one in Belfast. In addition, they hope to appoint officers to a number of countries on the Continent ...

Both Premier Robarts and the Minister to whom the Ontario Agent-General was responsible visited the U.K. to emphasize the importance they were placing on immigration and the need for an increased rate. The federal officer reported to his Ottawa chief that he had been informed that ... "there is evidently growing pressure to increase immigration from our

principal source countries in Europe."

How far this was to develop was to depend upon a proposed trip of the Ontario Director of Immigration to the Continental countries. The federal officer exhibited some mixed feelings:

... If (the Director) can achieve a break-through on the Continent, it will be of great help to us; but on the other hand, if he succeeds where we have seemingly failed, it could be a bit embarrassing to the Department ...

Apparently the Ontario Director's trip to the Continent was motivated by a desire on the part of the Ontario government to counter the criticism that it had been inactive in gaining immigrants for Ontario and particularly to disprove a charge that it favoured British to the exclusion of other immigrants.

Although this Director of Ontario's Immigration Division had been warned of the difficulties in recruiting in countries who did not want to lose their skilled people, and of the extreme need for caution where press releases or advertising of this purpose was concerned, he chose in various countries to make public statements which resulted in a burst of adverse publicity.

There was reaction from the External Affairs people in Germany and Norway, particularly, because of his ...

undermining the confidence in Canada which we are trying under difficult circumstances to build up. ... Neither the Ontario Government nor the Government of Canada have [sic] benefitted from (the Director's) visit. ... Attempts to use high pressure tactics or to 'mount a campaign' to get immigrants for Ontario (or for any other province in Canada) could upset the arrangements which

have been so carefully worked out here over a number of years. Indeed, in certain circumstances, indiscreet action or publicity by Canadian officials, whether they be provincial or federal, could lead to Canada being asked to curtail its immigration activities.¹

Obviously the need for federal-provincial co-operation was most evident and the federal immigration minister attempted to meet with the provincial authorities. One or two brief and informal meetings were held, but results were not too evident, since the Ontario Director stated it was his intention to increase his advertising of specific job opportunities in North European newspapers.

Other evidence of lack of understanding at the federal-provincial level was the action of an officer from the Toronto office of the Provincial Immigration Branch on a trip taken to Hong Kong to recruit for Ontario one hundred cabinet-makers. A member of the federal department wrote on September 16, 1964:

...am quite concerned to hear that Mr. (the Ontario officer) has been in touch with (a Chinese agent in Hong Kong), as he was warned in advance about this man's activities and it was understood that he could not become involved with Chinese of this type. ... We will oppose any scheme that involves persons who, in our judgement, have been participating in the illegal immigration racket past or present ...

This type of situation, together with the fact that the Royal Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had, as a result of the Ontario Director's (London office) visit, lodged a formal complaint, should have been sufficient justification

1. Departmental files.

for very circumspect action on the part of all Canadian immigration officers, provincial or federal. Certainly, it again underlined the very great need of co-operation and of co-ordination for all such activities.

Of its own efforts, the annual report for 1964 of the Ontario Department of Economics and Planning had this to say:

The Immigration Branch enjoyed its busiest year since 1957 and the demand for skilled personnel continues to exceed the supply available in Canada. Evidence of this situation was emphasized by the results of a personnel deficiency survey initiated by the branch's Toronto office in April. The survey also brought to the attention of many more Ontario employers the services available to them and new organizations are now taking full advantage of these services.

During the year, 161 companies and institutions requested our assistance in obtaining skilled workers. Of this number, 96 authorized the branch to advertise their needs at a cost of more than \$63,000. Thirty-nine companies sent representatives to the United Kingdom to interview and select personnel.

In view of the great need in Ontario for specialized workers, the government decided it was essential to expand its immigration activities. In the past the Ontario Immigration Branch concentrated its efforts on the United Kingdom; now it is recruiting in Scandinavia, Holland and Germany. The fullest co-operation is being given by the federal authorities in an endeavour to welcome emigration from these countries.¹

When Ontario's Minister of Economics and Development addressed the Ontario Legislature during the 1965 estimates debate, he referred to the increased efforts of the Provincial

1. Ontario Department of Economics and Development, 1964 Annual Report, p. 36

government's Immigration Branch in its search for skilled workers to fill Ontario's needs. But he stated:

It will be clear to everyone that many factors involved in reaching our targets are beyond the control of the provincial government. In particular, much will depend upon the policies followed by the federal government.¹

4. Comments

Without question, the present government of Ontario is deeply concerned with immigration, because of what it considers to be a pronounced skill shortage, detrimental to its objective of rapid economic growth.

Differences of opinion have existed as to the exact purpose of an immigration policy, that is, whether it should be to increase the population or to meet specific skill shortages. The Ontario Minister of Economics and Development has given speeches in Tokyo and Hong Kong (among other places) carrying the message that Ontario alone needed 15,000 skilled immigrants immediately, and could absorb 25,000 - 30,000. The minister has, therefore, pressed for the opening of new federal offices in Japan.

Today's provincial government in Ontario has three major departments concerned with immigration: the Department of Economics and Development, the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, and the Department of Education.

1. Legislature of Ontario Debates (daily edition), April 27, 1965, p. 2302

The latter two share the costs of their programs with the federal government to some extent. The Estimates for 1965-66 provide substantial sums for the encouragement of immigration. Of course there are other departments involved -- The departments of Labour, Public Welfare and Agriculture, for example, and also a host of voluntary organizations (particularly in Toronto) are concerned with various aspects of the immigration procedure.

Although it constitutes a study in itself, no discussion of Ontario's immigration policy would be complete without reference to the numerically important sector of immigrants who have arrived, not as a result of provincial policy, but through individual and federal government action, i.e., family sponsorship (elaborated in Chapter III, p. 115).

Major social and economic problems result from the influx of such numbers, especially when an overwhelming proportion belong to the unskilled category -- many unable to speak the main language of the province.

Strong criticism has been levelled at the provincial government for not providing the necessary services for their integration. Teaching facilities for immigrants in Ontario, and especially in Toronto, are criticized as being hopelessly inadequate in terms of the dimensions of the problem. The Department of Education, the Citizenship Branch and voluntary agencies of all descriptions attempt to meet some of the need.

The International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto and 'COSTI', the Italian Community Education Centre are only two of the many organizations providing some facilities for the immigrants, but when one considers the enormity of the task, the difficulties caused by innumerable divisions among the ethnic groups involved, the political machinations of local leaders, to say nothing of the involvement with provincial and federal politics, it is clear that the situation has the potential for disaster.

The transition from immigrant to useful citizen is an easy step for a rare few; for the majority it is painfully slow; some never make it. The Citizenship Branch of the provincial government is charged with neglecting its responsibility but the arguments on both sides are not pertinent to this particular study and are too extensive to be treated here in any event. Co-ordination and co-operation of governments (both federal and provincial) with voluntary organizations leave a very great deal to be desired; while the immigrant suffers directly, the whole of society is the victim in the long run, as these social and economic evils multiply.

An inter-governmental committee composed of members of the various provincial and federal government departments concerned, (under the chairmanship of a member of the Ontario Economic Council), held a series of meetings in 1964 and 1965 on the subject of immigration policy as it pertained to

Ontario's total requirement for skilled labour.

The published report of the Ontario Economic Council on Human Resource Development in the Province of Ontario contained this Committee's recommendations which included emphases on:

- skills as criteria for admission.
- necessity for long-term forecasting, by a co-ordinating committee, of federal and provincial needs.
- an annual base-flow of immigrants for Canada, to at least off-set the annual emigration from Canada, irrespective of the economic conditions at any given time, but with government administrative machinery ready to cope with sudden requirements of additional immigrants, should the economy warrant.
- retention of Ontario's own immigration service, co-ordinated with that of the federal government.
- learning of the language of the community as essential preparation, in order that skills may be utilized; governments must be prepared to provide teaching facilities before or after arrival.

Ontario's emphasis on the need for skilled labour is not merely an estimate, but a realistic calculation based on a recently-completed manpower study. A figure of 70,000 skilled and professional workers was calculated to cover actual job requirements at January 1, 1966. This was not a projection of the needs of the province as a whole, but the actual needs of 4000 Ontario employers only.

The government states its intentions are to attack the problem on three fronts: education, re-training and immigration.

In this account of Ontario's immigration activity, some aspects have been intentionally emphasized. The reason for this is obvious. Ontario has been the only province in post-war Canada to formulate and implement a positive immigration policy with specific goals. In this, the Province was within her constitutional rights, and any or all of the other provincial governments could have done likewise, had they chosen to expend the necessary funds and initiative.

In attempting to influence its own immigration to achieve something approximating its choice of ethnic balance of population, Ontario has kindled the smouldering resentment of one of its sister provinces, Quebec. Substituting 'Quebec' for Ontario and 'Paris' for London in the above chronology of events, would we have the theoretical solution to the situation? There are certain extenuating factors which should be considered in determining the plausibility of such a theory.

Chart # 1IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA NAMING QUEBEC AND ONTARIO AS THEIR
DESTINATION, 1914-64

<u>Year</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Quebec as % of Canada</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Ontario as % of Canada</u>
1914	73,595	20.0	120,497	32.8
1915	23,569	18.6	42,046	33.2
1916	4,584	12.2	12,582	33.6
1917	7,683	11.8	23,541	36.1
1918	4,167	6.3	20,889	31.7
1919	3,675	7.5	11,834	24.2
1920	9,900	9.1	36,873	34.0
1921	17,398	12.5	59,816	43.1
1922	11,040	13.4	32,047	38.9
1923	7,628	11.3	28,893	42.8
1924	18,984	13.1	64,299	44.3
1925	16,279	14.6	45,912	41.2
1926	11,367	11.8	29,293	30.5
1927	16,642	11.6	40,604	28.2
1928	18,469	12.2	45,052	29.7
1929	18,659	11.1	47,656	28.4
1930	23,917	14.7	59,974	36.7
1931	16,290	18.5	33,652	38.1
1932	5,106	19.8	11,503	44.7
1933	4,113	20.8	8,787	44.4
1934	2,735	19.7	5,970	42.9
1935	2,258	20.0	4,786	42.4
1936	1,995	17.1	4,913	42.2
1937	2,611	17.3	6,463	42.8
1938	3,301	19.1	7,107	41.2
1939	3,433	20.2	5,957	35.1
1940	2,556	22.6	4,447	39.3
1941	1,931	20.7	3,365	36.1
1942	1,399	18.5	3,315	43.8
1943	1,369	16.1	3,852	45.3
1944	2,066	16.1	5,361	41.9
1945	3,428	15.1	9,342	41.1
1946	9,712	13.5	29,604	41.3
1947	8,272	12.9	35,543	55.4
1948	24,687	19.7	61,621	49.1
1949	18,005	18.9	48,607	51.0
1950	13,575	18.4	39,041	52.8
1951	46,033	23.7	104,842	53.9
1952	35,318	21.5	86,059	52.3
1953	34,294	20.3	90,120	53.4
1954	28,419	18.4	83,029	53.8
1955	22,117	20.1	57,563	52.4
1956	31,396	19.0	90,662	55.0

(cont'd)

Chart # 1 (cont'd)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Quebec as % of Canada</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Ontario as % of Canada</u>
1957	55,073	19.5	147,097	52.1
1958	28,446	22.8	63,853	51.1
1959	24,816	23.2	55,976	52.3
1960	23,774	22.8	54,491	52.3
1961	16,920	23.6	36,518	50.9
1962	19,132	25.7	37,210	49.9
1963	23,264	25.0	49,216	52.8
1964	25,973	23.1	61,468	54.6
<hr/>				
<u>Total for Period</u>	<u>831,373</u>		<u>2,073,148</u>	

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration,
Immigration.

Note: 1. Data to 1943 for fiscal years, from 1935
onward for calendar years.

2. Since the Second World War, the most important groups of Ontario immigrants have been the British, who accounted for about one-third of the total (1963) followed by Italians with about one-fifth and Americans who represented about one-tenth the total number of immigrant arrivals to Ontario.

C. The Province of Quebec¹

As the Robichaud study was designed to determine what role the Quebec Government has played in Immigration policy, it is necessary here only to present the situation from the point of view provided this researcher from consultation of the Departmental files in Ottawa together with any such other data as have been obtained in the course of the complete study.

It should be pointed out, too, that while the next chapter on 'factors influencing policy' contains brief reference to attitudes generally, it was considered advisable to include in this particular section, in the interest of organizational

¹ See separate study by A. Lajoie-Robichaud Politiques et Attitudes à l'Égard de l'Immigration Depuis La Confédération which gives an historical presentation of the Quebec provincial action since 1867. There are gaps in the data provided, presumably because records seem to be lacking and the time available to Mme Robichaud was limited. It offers no explanation for the inaction of successive Quebec governments as far as immigration is concerned nor the lack of cooperation with the federal government, but it indicates clearly that the French Canadians considered immigration policy to be a "means put in the hands of the Federal authorities to change the cultural composition of the Quebec community" and therefore, on principle, opposed all schemes of immigration except those bringing French-speaking immigrants to Canada. A change of attitude is indicated, as reflected in the present policy of the Quebec government to take some positive action and to use the newly-organized immigration service to promote the interests of the Province.

coherency, the French-Canadian position with respect to immigration.

Since early last year, much has been heard via press, radio and television about the Quebec Government's action, announced in the Quebec Legislative Assembly on February 10, 1965, to establish an Immigration 'Department' or Service of its own. It seems to have been viewed as something very unusual (even considered by some as a challenge to the federal government's authority and by others as "getting even" with Ottawa, etc.).

It is, of course, nothing of the sort. It was a perfectly constitutional step and one which could (and perhaps should) have been taken by the Quebec government long since. In fact, it is precisely what the federal authorities, and others, had been urging that province to do for many years. Other provinces, notably Ontario, have been sufficiently interested in immigration and immigrants (as has been explained above) to have their own offices abroad and, in varying degrees, counterparts in their own provincial governments -- even if, as in some cases, it was just one officer. It is too soon to say, of course, just exactly what form the new Quebec Immigration Service will take or what influence it will have on federal policy. At the moment it is in the process of becoming organized. Before discussing the present situation further, however, perhaps it will be helpful to outline briefly some of the background as far as Quebec immigration is concerned.

The traditional opposition of the French-Canadian to immigration (for the years up until the Second World War in

particular) is so well known that it is absolutely unnecessary to chronicle further. However, beginning with 1945 and immediate post-war years, slight indications of changing attitude appeared. How much influence the bidding of the Pope in the Vatican had is difficult to say. His Holiness reminded Canadians especially of their duty to humanity, with numerous messages to accept the displaced and refugees and to "Open your hearts and lands to new immigrants." He also drew attention to the advantages to all concerned. Among such a Roman Catholic community as Quebec this was bound to have a certain degree of effect. Both the church clergy and the French-Canadian press repeated the Pontiff's views at length. Cardinal Léger commented on these views at a conference on the subject urging acceptance of "our brothers" and in addition, admonished that:

We blame immigration for our own faults.
The lazy have always blamed the industrious
for their own misfortunes.¹

One newspaper stressed the influence of the church in an editorial Our Moral Obligation saying:

The people of Canada generally, and their Government in particular, should pay close attention to the statement on immigration issued this week by the nation's Roman Catholic leaders. The bishops and archbishops did not mince words. They said flatly and frankly that countries which have occupied land-- for example, Canada -- have an inescapable moral obligation to accept people from countries which are over-populated. It is, in other words, a sin for them to shut the doors.

Some Canadians will be puzzled by this. Aware that the majority of Canada's Roman-Catholics are in Quebec, and aware that that Province has in past years taken a cool, even a hostile, attitude toward immigration, they may wonder whether the prelates' statement will find support among French-speaking Canadians...

1 Cardinal Léger in an address to the "Semaine Sociale" on Immigration. Mont-Laurier December 23, 1954.

...It is true that until fairly recently, Quebec did not care for the idea of bringing in immigrants. This was not for religious reasons -- though foolish and unscrupulous politicians, determined to control a bloc in Parliament, often sought to make it appear so. The opposition actually sprang from racial and cultural reasons which, to the French Canadians, made good sense....the people of French Canada felt that immigration on any substantial scale would tend to submerge them.

But during the last year or so, Quebec has come around to a broader and, we think, more constructive viewpoint. One reason for that has been its rapid economic development.... and (it now) requires a manpower supply far greater than its own cradles can provide. Quebec's friendly rival, Ontario, has exactly the same problem, and is solving it through immigration. Quebec is now prepared to follow suit by accepting French, Italian and other immigrants who can easily be absorbed into its cultural pattern...¹

As early as 1946 criticism was directed at the Quebec government from within the province, for its lack of activity in the matter of immigration. An article in L'Action Catholique, October 24, 1946, written by Mr. G.H. Daigneau, advocated a provincial immigration policy ...

to bring to Canada Europeans who are capable of becoming French-speaking Canadians and of offsetting the flow of Anglo-Saxons which the English provinces have called in to their rescue.

And in Parliament, voices critical of provincial government began to be heard. For example, the French-Canadian member from Gaspé² hotly denied a charge that the federal government deliberately discriminated against French and Latin immigrants or had connived with the Ontario government to bring in British but nevertheless he, too, advocated that the province of Quebec take an active part in bringing in French-speaking immigrants.

-
1. Editorial, Winnipeg Free Press, October 11, 1952.
 2. Mr. Langlois, House of Commons Debates (revised) March 1, 1948 pp. 1757, 1758.

But throughout these years, aside from the few who, because of the humanitarian aspect were in favor of bringing in refugees, most of the French Canadians who spoke in immigration debates argued that while there was any unemployment there should be no immigration. In fact, one member tried to attribute the unemployment in 1949 to the post-war immigration while most of the Quebec federal MP's were disgusted with the inaction of the Quebec government, in view of the unemployment in the Province. Mr. Caouette was very antagonistic toward immigration...

I inquired if provincial authorities had ever protested against this immigration to the province of Quebec. The federal government informed me that the provincial government offered no objection. It is the duty of the Province of Quebec to protest energetically to those mining companies in order to prevent them from hiring foreign labour when so many men are available here for this work.¹

Of course, not everyone in Quebec was against immigrants or immigration nor blind to its importance to Canada generally or Quebec specifically. In 1950 the Société d'assistance aux Immigrants opened a new centre in Montreal to aid new Canadians in the many problems they face in their adjustment to their new environment. Among its listed objectives, (besides assistance to the immigrant) was:

...to banish all prejudice against immigrants and create a current of feeling for them which would allow people to appreciate them individually at their personal value... (Translation from the original French.)

At an official opening ceremony in Montreal, October 19, 1950 the then Monseigneur Paul-Emile Léger, Archbishop of Montreal,

1. Mr. R. Caouette, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 10, 1949, p. 1362

blessed the premises of the new Société and defined the attitudes Quebecers should have toward new Canadians. He said, (translation

...First of all, every immigrant comes to our shores with the wealth of his national culture; it is a treasure we do not wish to take from him. But above all, there is the problem of religion and of the conservation of the Catholic faith.... The immigrant must not expose himself to losing his faith, and we, on the other hand, must exert ourselves to incorporate him into a Catholic environment.

Incidentally, the annual meeting of this society in December 1951 decided to "protest to the Minister against the situation that these immigrants are made to face and the consequences of the program of mass immigration for Canada." The Immigration Department files indicate that the Minister denied that there was any 'mass' immigration program and declared that immigrants were brought in only if it was possible to absorb them into the economy. He claimed that, in fact, the Department was at that time being 'urged' to bring in workers because of the current industrial expansion and a shortage of labour and technical workers.

(Later correspondence between the Department and the Société indicates "profound gratitude" on the part of the organization's personnel for all that the Deputy Minister had done for them, as individuals, and for assisting with the Société's work and aims.)

In 1950 and 1951 we do find requests from Quebec's Deputy Minister of Agriculture, asking Ottawa to bring in Italians as farmworkers -- 200 on one occasion, 700 on another, etc. Quebec had also asked, (and Ottawa agreed), that a Quebec member of the

Federal-Provincial Farm Labour Committee be sent to Italy to assist in the selection. (Later Quebec decided against sending the officer.)

The chief of operations of the federal Immigration Department Ottawa had written the Italian Ambassador in January 1952:

May I request you to be good enough to ask your government to be solicitously careful in the selection of this group on which the future of farm workers' movements from Italy largely depends. As I have pointed out to our Officer-in-charge at Rome, it is not without serious misgiving that this movement has been authorized. Our experience last year has not been happy and it is earnestly hoped that the Italian authorities will do all that is in their power to ensure that this group will be such as to make a favorable impression in the Province of Quebec and, what is more important still, will make an effective contribution to the task of assisting Canadian farmers this year.

However, the selection group ran into difficulties trying to find sufficiently suitable persons from the farm-type workers of southern Italy; the rejection rate was about 90% and the consensus of all concerned was that there were far too many difficulties involved in selecting from this type of worker. (The Northern Italians had a better record.) Problems after arrival for the immigrants in Quebec proved manifold. Workers left their employment on the feeblest excuses and for all concerned, the project caused deep dissatisfaction.

Through the years the federal government (immigration and settlement officials) tried settling several types of immigrants in Quebec but only a few, (namely Dutch market-gardeners), ever succeeded. Departmental files indicate a lack of cooperation between the two levels of government but, fundamentally, the difficulty was sociological. A difference in language and

customs, and a lack of basic community support all combined to prevent the new immigrant from feeling 'at home'. (Some failures, of course, were due to the individuals themselves.)

That the province could have done more to make the immigrants welcome, was undoubtedly true. Organizations such as the Montreal Chamber of Commerce were not hesitant about drawing attention (long before most other Québec groups) to the inadequate welcoming and/or other welfare organizations for immigrants. In commenting upon the 1952 'brief' prepared by the Chamber, the Immigration Department's Chief of Operations in Ottawa said that he agreed with their argument that reception facilities for immigrants are inadequate. He said he, too, had always felt that both officially and privately more should be done to assist immigrants in Quebec, although he felt the federal officers do what they can. He agreed with various of the other recommendations, namely that the Province of Quebec could benefit greatly from immigration, that the Province could profitably maintain an office in France to advise immigrants and that there could be much closer cooperation between federal and provincial governments. He pointed out, however, that while the assistance of the Province was welcomed in an advisory capacity the power of ultimate decision on selection properly belonged to the federal government and should remain so.

As has been indicated earlier, the question of just what constituted federal policy was never really very clear. Much pressure had to be brought to bear on the federal government in the immediate post-war years in order to have admission granted

to refugees and D.P.'s, to say nothing of ordinary immigrants. In fact in 1950, one French-Canadian M.P. in Parliament congratulated the government for not having a strong policy.

I remember that after this war considerable pressure was exercised upon the government, I shall not say to institute mass immigration but certainly to adopt a strong policy on immigration ... I ask (the minister) to be most severe in the orders and regulations given to officials here and abroad for complete and persistent attention in the process of screening immigrants so as to have a complete picture of the religious, political and social affiliations ... 1

The same speaker expressed his feeling about 'ethnic balance' by saying:

... No one can blame my French compatriots for asking for Belgian or French immigrants. In doing so they simply follow the same path as other provinces in asking for immigrants from the British Isles. There is nothing wrong about that on either side. It is quite natural ...

Then he went on to quote several newspaper articles calling upon Quebec to implement its own immigration policy. These are indicative of the change that was taking place at the time (and since) in the attitude of Quebec people. (He implied reason for their interest was a fear for the 'ethnic balance'.)

The member was indeed aware of the need for Quebec to do something about the matter. He quoted La Terre de Chez-Nous, a French periodical issued by the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs, of Quebec in its November 5, 1948 issue:

... It is not enough to have fairer immigration regulations. They must also be put to good use. Immigrants from France have access to our country just like those from England and the United States. ... One wonders finally if now we will see the province of Quebec admit French immigrants in as large a number as the group of British people welcomed to Ontario. Observers feel that it is

1. Mr. Gauthier, House of Commons Debates (revised), June 13, 1950 p. 3593.

up to Mr. Duplessis and the industrialists of this province.

If British immigrants settled in great numbers in the neighboring province, it is due to the fact that, first of all, Premier Drew went and fetched them in Great Britain and that, with the agreement of Ontario employers he opened a provincial employment bureau for immigrants in London. If we want the French to settle here, our government and our businessmen should do likewise. If we feel that recent immigration from Britain disrupts the ethnical balance of our country, the remedy lies after all, in our own hands.

The member went on to quote another article in the January 1950 issue of Relations ...

'Will Quebec therefore continually refuse to open its doors, its barricaded territories, even to our own kin?'

then another quotation from Le Droit (no date).

'Do and say as we like, Canada will always receive immigrants, and if we do not make use of them for ourselves they will be made use of against us.'¹

In 1952, this same member admitted a traditional dislike of immigration on the part of French-Canadians generally and of a recent change of heart in his own case:

One reason why the people in Quebec were not in favour of immigration in the past is that we always trusted in Providence, we always had enough children to fill up our empty spaces, provide the necessary hands to do our agricultural work and help in the development of the wealth of our province. But the way things have been going, Quebec will have to do something about immigration. I have often been quoted as being one who was almost radically opposed to immigration, but I have had to change my mind after the war, especially in connection with displaced persons.

Then he repeated again...

1. Ibid., pp 3593-95

It is clear that immigration must be organized methodically in the province of Quebec if that province is to profit by it...¹

It was obvious, however, that the provincial government of the day did not intend to do very much about immigration. A letter from Premier Duplessis to the federal Immigration authorities in Ottawa (April 7, 1952)--at the time that Ottawa was trying to renegotiate agreements with the various provinces regarding hospital and medical expenses for immigrants -- indicated the province's official attitude:

...in our humble opinion, the only immigration which could be advantageous to Canada is that of fine citizens, capable of providing for themselves and their families and likely to adapt themselves fully to the Canadian life and customs and more particularly, in what concerns the Province of Quebec, to the life and traditions of our Province...

The agreement was never concluded, although several attempts were made in subsequent years.² (This is not to say that the immigrants suffered, for the bills were paid regardless. Despite the lack of formal agreements between the two governments involved, liaison was good between the federal and provincial officers concerned. Disagreement over the formal arrangements appeared to be an academic exercise only -- each trying to prove a point.)

1. Mr. Gauthier, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 13, 1952 pp. 405 and 406.

2. Note: Strangely enough, at one point in the correspondence on this matter (which continued for several years) the Quebec legal advisor wrote the Deputy Minister at Ottawa (February 12, 1962) that since this was a federal matter, Quebec could not assume responsibility ! Needless to say, Ottawa replied by quoting the relevant section of the BNA Act saying immigration was a matter of concurrent jurisdiction giving powers to both federal and provincial levels of government.

While in certain instances one can find in the official Immigration Department Ottawa records, cooperation between federal and provincial officials in matters of immigration at the civil service level, there are few indeed at the senior and political level.

In practically all negotiations with a view to an official agreement, between federal and provincial governments, whether it pertained to Hungarian refugees, text-books for language classes, emergency medical welfare, tuberculosis refugees during WRY, etc. there would either be no reply at all from Quebec regarding the matter or else simply a polite letter in very general terms which was completely non-committal.

Evidence from every possible source seems to substantiate the thesis that at this point the majority of French Canadians, as well as the Duplessis government, were just not interested in immigration, and feared a too-active federal policy.

The federal Parliament reflected Quebec's point of view as more or less agreeing with their provincial line. French-Canadian Members from Quebec ridings spoke in the debate during 1952 but nearly all expressed fears that immigration would increase unemployment. Most felt that the government should continue to move slowly and only bring in carefully selected immigrants. But the Prime Minister, himself a French-Canadian, had this to say of the federal government's policy:

...I think the Canadian public were glad to see the extent to which there was immigration to this country in 1952. Though there may be a small percentage who have not been absorbed in the Canadian population, I feel confident that will be cured within weeks and that the overall

result will be beneficial to the Canadian nation.¹

There were a few, of course, who felt that if federal policy was to bring in immigrants then ways should be found to ensure the obtaining of French-speaking immigrants.

In 1953, an unofficial meeting² was organized by persons interested in the movement of French immigrants to Canada to meet and discuss problems with a Rev. T. Poirier (National Chaplain of the Movement Familial Rural de France) who was over from France on a survey preparatory to establishing a local committee to advise and counsel new immigrants.

With reference to the unfavorable comments from dissatisfied French immigrants about the conditions they found in Canada, Father Poirier said they were probably "inadaptable for Canada or any other country and should have remained at home."

While in Canada, the Rev. Poirier visited various parts of Quebec. He was reported to have stated that Canada had not, in the past, treated French immigrants with due respect and that the country was sadly lacking in culture.

This reference by a guest in the country to the fact that French immigrants had not found a warm reception in Quebec probably was impolite; nevertheless it had some basis in fact, apparently, for previous years. A change, however, had been gradually evolving ever since the end of the war and in an attempt to reflect this change (and, no doubt, to encourage a re-thinking of the question generally), L'Action Nationale in 1954 published

-
1. Hon. L. St. Laurent, House of Commons Debates (revised) March 6, 1952, p. 174
 2. Among those present in the French Tourist Office were representatives from the French Consulate, Montreal School Commission, Board of Trade, Unemployment Insurance Commission, Society for Assistance to Immigrants, Immigration Department and other invited persons.

a series of articles in a special volume on Immigration as a Canadian problem.¹

The editor gave some reasons why he felt that the attitude of some influential French Canadians had changed but that the general public would have to change its feelings towards immigrants and the whole subject of immigration.

He cautioned, however, against subscribing to any idea of 'mass' immigration since this would mean "suicide for Quebec". Some of the articles in this series are severely biased and make unsubstantiated statements such as, 'there has been a determined policy to make Canada Anglo-Saxon and non-Catholic.' One writer, however, points out 'the traditional reserve and hostility of French Canadians towards immigration', but he blames it on the English 'because of their action at the time of (and after) the Conquest'. He admitted this policy was short-sighted and damaging from the French-Canadian point of view, and couldn't understand why French Canadians didn't realize this.

He lamented the inaction of both the Quebec government and the people, saying that only a few church organizations assisted immigrants and that more support must be forthcoming-- French-Canadian 'nationalism' demanded a change in attitude.

Another writer says that politically, economically and morally, Canada does need people and one cannot escape the fact, but for French Canadians to oppose immigration is just

1. L'Action Nationale - Vol. XLIII No. 5 et 6 Montreal
Mai-Juin, 1954

like the worker who tries to stop progress. French Canadians must face reality, he says, but they must also make it serve their purpose. The provincial government must play its part and see to it that the ethnic balance is not upset.

The volume includes the brief of the Société d'Assistance aux Immigrants to the Tremblay Commission, which states that the province's inactivity contributed toward the growth of the British character and the discrimination of the French. The articles recommended various steps the province would have to take to correct the situation in favor of the French-speaking Canadians, but warned that the province must not let the federal government interfere in their jurisdiction over social and economic questions, especially matters of family, religion and education. (Instruction should be given in French not English.) In particular, children of immigrants must be attracted and held in the French-Canadian milieu.

One of the steps advocated was that the Quebec government should set up offices and missions in foreign countries to recruit and select immigrants, using all the most progressive methods known. Reception centres should be set up in the Province and they should receive the public support, among other things. The Société also recommended that a Permanent Advisory Committee on Immigration be established.

The effect that these articles in L'Action Nationale had on either the government or the public is, of course, impossible to determine but appearing, as they did, during a period of change which had been slowly becoming evident ever since the

end of the War, there is no doubt that they provided support for those in favor of some action.

The Quebec government, nevertheless, was not convinced. Two years later we still find reluctance on the part of those in a position to act, even when it concerned large numbers of Roman Catholics and a tremendous humanitarian appeal for assistance in the Hungarian refugee movement.

An example of this provincial government's unwillingness to really become involved in immigration is the following interchange of correspondence between Ottawa and Quebec with regard to the Hungarian Refugee situation; at first it appeared to draw complete support but in the final analysis they simply remained quiet and let the federal government bring in the refugees. On November 30, 1956 a telegram was sent by the then Prime Minister St. Laurent to Quebec (a similar one went to all other Provincial premiers) asking for whatever assistance the Quebec government might be able to give in the reception of these immigrants. Mr. Duplessis' reply of December states:

...I communicated to-day to my colleagues at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers since its inception your telegram of the evening of last November 30th, concerning the recent infamies perpetrated in Hungary by the representatives of Moscow's odious political regime - stop - the Province of Quebec will be happy to do everything reasonably possible under the circumstances to relieve the sufferings and misery of the victims of the inhuman Russian persecution in Hungary... signed Maurice Duplessis.¹

The Acting Minister, Walter Harris, of the Immigration Department then requested the Province of Quebec to establish

1. Departmental files.

certain centers and asked for specific conditions under which these would be set up. Mr. Harris particularly requested to know whether Quebec would provide medical, hospitalization and social care and treatment for those refugees who might need it and, if so, under what conditions. No reply was received to this telegram.

There follows correspondence attempting to get some agreement, similar to that set up by the other provinces, on precisely how the cost for these services would be shared between the federal and provincial governments concerned.

Also, with regard to the teaching of languages and citizenship courses, there was a desire to come to some agreement with the provincial government along the same lines as the other provinces but nothing was done here either, although a letter from Mr. Pickersgill to the Chairman of the Hungarian Refugee Service in Montreal stated:

Refugees now in France and who, we hope, will begin to learn French during their stay in France, will, as far as possible be directed to the Province of Quebec and other French-speaking areas in Canada. It is expected that these 3000 refugees that the Canadian Government has agreed to take from France will arrive after April 1 in groups which will vary in numbers according to transportation facilities.¹

Because there was a question in the House of Commons which resulted in a motion on February 11, 1957 requiring the production of a copy of all correspondence between the federal and the provincial governments on the Hungarian Refugee situation, the Minister (Pickersgill) sent a message to the Premier of Quebec on February 15, stating that before he tabled

¹ Letter signed by Mr. Pickersgill, dated January 11, 1957.

the correspondence with the provincial governments he wanted Quebec to know the details of the special agreement with Saskatchewan which had been signed and the fact that it was felt that all provincial governments would probably come up with similar agreements to that of Saskatchewan.

Mr. Pickersgill offered all the provincial premiers, (including Mr. Duplessis), an alternative to the Saskatchewan agreement; the point was that he was simply trying to get some type of agreement with each of the provinces. But no agreement of any kind and no reply, for that matter, came from this correspondence with Mr. Duplessis.

There is nothing on the files to indicate that there ever was any agreement, but Department officials state that the province did do a certain amount with respect to paying some of the bills for refugees. They simply stayed clear of any formal agreement and, where possible, made the federal government pay as much of the expense as they could.

Provincial action would not appear to have been unduly responsive or co-operative, despite the federal government's particular care in attempting to channel French-speaking refugees to Quebec.

That it was never easy to obtain French-speaking immigrants, especially from France, is indicated by the Minister when he was asked in the House whether the French were eligible under the new 'airlift' facilities which he had announced. He said:

Unfortunately, we do not seem to be able to induce very many Frenchmen to come to Canada, a condition I regret ...

But he pointed out that I.C.E.M. (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration) had been approached to:

...(arrange) the charter of 350 air flights to transport immigrants to Canada from the United Kingdom and France.... This is the largest airlift ever undertaken by the Canadian government, at least of this character, and it will be known as "Air Bridge to Canada", or A.B.C.¹

In reply to a Quebec M.P. who asked:

How many of the 200,000 immigrants who are expected to come to this country in 1957 are expected to be French citizens emigrating from France or from the French colonies?

the Minister replied, "I am a politician, not a prophet."²

While there was not too much success in the efforts to bring immigrants from France (for various reasons, explained in the next chapter), attempts were made to find French-speaking immigrants elsewhere. Over the years, the federal government has attempted periodically to look into the possibility of encouraging French Canadians living in the United States (particularly the New England area) to return to Canada. For example, in 1876, the federal government placed at Worcester, Massachusetts an agent whose primary object was to encourage the repatriation of French Canadians who had moved to the United States. During Sir Clifford Sifton's time, as pointed out previously, efforts were made to entice back those who had left Quebec for the industrial and more prosperous states to the south. However, these attempts to bring the French-speaking emigrés back into the fold met with very little success.

1. Hon J.W. Pickersgill, House of Commons Debates, February 28, 1957, p. 1729

2. Ibid.

But in 1959, as the industrial development in Quebec had begun to be attractive, and since Quebec was the home of many relatives of these French-speaking persons living in the United States, the Immigration Department was again prompted to do something about it. Consideration was even given to opening an office somewhere in the area.

The Minister (Mr. Fulton) thought a discreet survey should be undertaken. A French-speaking immigration officer was selected to go to New England to study the situation and to determine the potential of immigrants in the region. If it were found to be favourable, then the Minister said he would "communicate with Mr. Duplessis regarding the proposals."

The heaviest concentration of Americans of French origin was to be found in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York and Massachusetts -- mostly in the textile or boot and shoe manufacturing industries. Many descendants of English and Scottish Canadians had migrated from the Maritimes into the area also.

An experienced officer was sent down, with instructions "to determine the interest and availability of people and the kinds of skills involved." He was, of course, thoroughly acquainted with the possibilities available in Quebec, but was also advised "to take a tour of the main placement areas of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario to familiarize himself with opportunities in those areas so that he could properly counsel any person...whose skill or aptitude may be more clearly suited to areas other than in the Province of Quebec."

The officer proceeded as instructed in September 1957, and made his survey. Unfortunately, he took severely ill and was unable to submit a final report until October 1958. It was a very comprehensive one, and very optimistic about the large potential of French Canadians who could reverse the migration movement and return to Canada. As a result of this report, the Deputy Minister recommended that a Canadian immigration office be opened by April 1959 in the area, possibly in Boston, Massachusetts.

There is no record (i.e., none available to this researcher)¹ of what transpired in Cabinet. Whatever the reason -- perhaps it was the general curtailment of immigration rising from the economic situation, or possibly the lack of interest on the part of Mr. Duplessis -- no office was opened and nothing further was done about the matter. It may be interesting to note that, had the officer's unfortunate lengthy illness not occurred, the original survey report might have been made immediately, rather than after the lapse of a year, and action might perhaps have taken place before the generally restrictive policy of the Department as a whole was put into effect. Presumably, it came too late.

The above was really only another example of definite efforts on behalf of Quebec's interest, made by the federal government. The records of the Immigration Department clearly indicate that federal officials, sensitive to the 'French feeling re immigration', were consistently striving to obtain co-operation of the Quebec government officials in these attempts

1. This is just one of the many areas that could not be researched properly, because of a lack of time and resources available to this writer.

to find more French-speaking immigrants for Canada. However, the Quebec government continued its attitude of at least seeming disinterested. Certainly, it ignored the many overtures from Ottawa in this regard.

The Minister of Immigration, (Fairclough), wrote a letter to the Premier of Quebec in 1961, stressing the need for good relations and offering fullest possible co-operation in attempting to find the type of immigrant most acceptable to that province; but again, no real response was forthcoming.

Incidentally, reference is made to this in the October 16, 1961 Minutes when the federal Department's so-called 'Management Committee' was discussing the proposed program for 1962. A more aggressive policy was being recommended--particularly with regard to France--and reference was made to the Minister's letter to Quebec assuring utmost co-operation. Consideration was given, also, to the France-Quebec overtures of cordiality. For example, in the discussion of how to get more settlers from Algeria¹, the minutes of this particular meeting read:

The France-Quebec cordiality gives Canada an opportunity to reach the French Government and perhaps get permission to select in Algeria. When we attempted this several years ago, the previous French Government strongly opposed it. The possibility that France will give Algeria its independence may provide emigration pressure that could direct immigrants to Canada.

Again, it is very clear from the Departmental files that the Immigration officials were very much aware of the desirability

1. The question of Algerian immigration is treated in more detail in the next chapter, as is the whole matter of the external influences of France as they affected the Canadian situation.

of obtaining French-speaking immigrants.

As referred to earlier, innumerable articles had begun to appear in the French-Canadian newspapers in the 'fifties', but they were particularly evident in the 'sixties', pointing out that Quebec and French Canadians would have to change their attitude toward immigrants. Their historical distrust of immigration, as a so-called 'English method to overcome them', coupled with the fear that immigrants took jobs from them, caused the coolness; this, in turn, it was alleged, caused immigrants to seek out the English-speaking group, rather than assimilate with the French-speaking element. Writers argued that unless Quebecers changed their views they would, by 1970, find that the French influence would decrease to 20% of the general population, as compared with 30% in 1961. A number of writers and speakers on the subject began advocating not only a change in attitude toward immigrants, but also that the Quebec government should have its own department of immigration. This did not come for another four years.

During this period, the files of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration indicate that the degree of co-operation between the government of the province of Quebec and the federal government left much to be desired. As indicated earlier, many letters requesting the Province's co-operation on specific matters of policy such as special movements of refugees, immigrant medical and health assistance, or simply the general encouragement of immigration into Canada, etc., remained unanswered.

With the political awakening of the Province, however, the Quebec government's attitude toward immigration began to change. Many factors are involved in this complex social phenomenon, of course, but one aspect clearly seems to be the government's desire to take action in many new fields. It has announced that it intends to conduct its own affairs (external as well as internal). The constitutionality of phases of this 'action' is debatable, but not relevant to this particular study. Nevertheless, it was partly this attitude that caused the Quebec government, in 1961, to open its own Quebec House. This was something, of course, that constitutionally could have been done years earlier, as it had been by many of the other provinces. As we have seen, however, Quebec was just not interested in doing so.

On the occasion of the opening, the French government gave Premier Lesage an official reception, and his visit was widely covered by newspapers, radio and television. Even an advertisement appeared in the French press, although, judging from the monthly Operating Report of October 1961, from the Canadian government visa office in Paris, the federal government officers in France were not consulted. This advertisement, extolling Canada as a country of opportunity, was placed in the Paris paper Le Monde Diplomatique and, since the French Government did not normally allow any advertising which would encourage their nationals to emigrate, it would appear to be rather significant.

Nothing much was said publicly of the talks between President de Gaulle and Premier Lesage, but the Premier's intent was to strengthen the ties and to establish a better working

partnership between the French government and Quebec. There is no doubt that the hope, at least on Mr. Lesage's part, was for more Frenchmen to emigrate to Quebec. That he did not work through the federal Department of Immigration is, again, rather indicative.

Concurrent with the provincial government's new interest in immigration, we find concern being expressed by some segments of the general public. An interesting note on the work of Quebec societies working on behalf of immigrants is that of the 'Federation de St. Jean-Baptiste du Quebec' which, in 1962, had formed an Immigration Committee "to attract New Canadians to Quebec with a view to strengthening the French Culture in the Province." They displaced some of the old French-Canadian attitude by the fact that one of the first things the group did was to change the name from 'Comité d'Immigration' to 'Comité pour les Néo-Canadiens', because they felt the word 'Immigration' had a somewhat negative connotation to French-speaking citizens of Quebec. According to Immigration files, full co-operation of the Immigration Department in Ottawa was offered to this Committee, but what the 'co-operation' consisted of-- in view of the announced objective of the group to 'strengthen French culture' -- is not made clear. The committee, however, seemed to reflect encouraging signs of an improved attitude towards newcomers in the Province.

Another indication of the changed attitude on the part of the province of Quebec was the fact that in the provincial election of 1962 we find 'immigration' as one of the topics under discussion.

Referring to some of the election material which was critical of the federal immigration policy and was being used in advertising for the Quebec provincial election, one of the French-Canadian M.P.'s asked a very pertinent question:

...If the premier of Quebec sincerely feels that such an immigration policy, either under our administration or under the present administration, is harmful to the interest of the province of Quebec, why has he never mentioned the fact? Why did he never take up the matter with the present government?... and why has he waited til just before the elections to raise the matter?...

During another debate in Parliament on immigration policy, one M.P. argued that the French-speaking element was 'falling back' and demanded that there be a new immigration policy favourable to the French-Canadian. He went on to say:

...I know that the Minister can reply that the province of Quebec has a certain jurisdiction in the matter of immigration, under Section 95 of the Constitution.

However, it is unfortunate that the Quebec provincial government has been guilty for too long of inertia in the matter of immigration. I do not think that the federal government is justified in taking advantage of such a policy of inertia to pull back the French-speaking element.¹

In 1964, the question of French-speaking immigrants among the Algerian repatriates² again took the limelight, and the Quebec government was criticized in the press and elsewhere for its seeming disinterest. When the matter came up in the House of Commons, the Minister stated that:

-
1. Mr. Choquette, House of Commons Debates (revised), December 14, 1963, p. 5901
 2. The question of Algerian immigration is elaborated upon in Chapter V.

Several provinces have informed the federal authorities that they would be ready to further the establishment of those French families by paying their expenses and helping them find farm land. ...The government of the province of Quebec has not indicated its intention to co-operate¹

There were indications, however, that provincial agricultural officials were co-operating, and seemed to have a pretty good relationship with the federal settlement officers of the Department.

Newspaper editorials and some immigration officials intimated that Quebec officials and French-Canadians generally did not really like the idea of the Algerians coming into their province, but were happy to have them settle in Canada as long as they went into the other provinces. Certain of these editorials wondered why France, after traditionally opposing emigration from their country, would now offer "as much as \$6000 per family to get them safely out of the country and into Canada," and commented wryly that presumably they "had had enough terrorism and rioting".

Throughout the rest of that year, pressures began to mount on the Quebec government to take an interest in the whole subject of immigration and especially to set up its own immigration service. Again, the arguments used were often emotionally charged, and many proponents for such a policy were extremely biased, claiming that the federal policy was a 'National tragedy' and a 'betrayal of Quebec'.

When, in February of 1965, the Quebec government announced in the Quebec legislature that it intended to establish

1. Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 13, 1964, p. 896

its own immigration service as part of the Department of Cultural Affairs, the Minister referred to the example of Ontario, saying, "Nothing stops us from doing the same thing"... (Constitutionally speaking this was, of course, quite true.) It was also admitted that, while Quebec needed to attract more French-speaking immigrants, it might not be easy, since France was itself importing skilled labour and was trying to retain its own.

When questioned in the House of Commons about co-operation between the federal government and the new immigration service of the Province of Quebec, the federal Minister of Immigration also took the position that this action was no different from that of Ontario. He said,

For roughly twenty years the province of Ontario has had a similar service which has been very effective. That department has co-operated well with the federal immigration service...¹

He then went on to say that one of his predecessors in office had suggested that the government of Quebec take this step, and he believed this is what prompted the Quebec government to establish this new service ! (A rather remarkable statement, since agitation for the move had come from many sources over quite a long period of time.)

1. Hon. J. Nicholson, House of Commons Debates (revised),
February 19, 1965, p. 11,513

He further stated, "...I can assure the House that this new agency of the government of Quebec will receive the full and whole-hearted co-operation¹ of the federal department of immigration."² When asked whether the federal government would insist that prospective immigrants to the province of Quebec conform to federal standards for admission to Canada, the Minister replied, "...Mr. Speaker, the answer is 'Yes'."³

It remains to be seen precisely what Quebec's new 'service' for immigrants will do, but the fact that an officer exists is positive proof that the province of Quebec has now revised its official attitude toward immigration. Whether or not it will find it is more successful than the federal government in attracting French-speaking immigrants will depend upon many things -- not the least of which will be the 'external factors' at work in the years ahead.

1. Note: It is rather significant that, following the announcement by the Quebec government of the new Director for the post, the federal Deputy Minister of Immigration wrote to extend his assurance of co-operation to the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs.

He commented upon the fact that the Director had been a former overseas officer of the Department, and warmly welcomed the announcement of the new policy. Reference was made to the federal government's 'progress in recent years', and the opening of offices in Marseilles and Bordeaux, saying "time will say whether we had good cause to be optimistic."

"The purpose of my letter is to express our deep satisfaction and to assure you and your officers of our desire to co-operate in any way you may find helpful." (Departmental files, February 15, 1965)

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 11,512

CHAPTER V - FACTORS INFLUENCING IMMIGRATIONA. External Factors

Introduction All the main studies of major continental migratory currents in modern times (i.e. since the 16th century) list the main stream to be that one which emanated from all parts of Europe to North America. In terms of numbers and continuity, it was far greater than any of the other major migratory streams. Canada received only a portion of this flow it is true, but the point is that regardless of any action, short of the imposition of rigid restrictions excluding migrants completely, this immigration would have taken place in any event. It was not a phenomenon for which Canada could take credit or blame but without it, obviously, there could have been no development as a nation.

The important thing to remember is that the factors which chiefly influenced immigration to Canada were external and were, until very recent years, largely beyond her control.

This fact was briefly referred to in Chapter II for the early years of Canada's development and, indeed, to a very large extent governed any Canadian policies up to the present. The period since the end of the Second World War is, however, of most relevance to this study and perhaps merits more detailed treatment.

A complete survey of all the external factors is not possible since, to determine the nature and extent of each, a thorough analysis of the operations of, at least, the Canadian immigration offices abroad would have been necessary. Reference will therefore be made to a few aspects of the problem and to the degree possible, given the limited data available to this researcher. It is to be hoped that other studies will develop this particular phase more thoroughly in order that solutions may be found to many unanswered questions which now leave the impression more than a little blurred. What image of Canada is projected abroad by our immigration officials? Is it bicultural? Should it be? Does the image they do project bear any relationship to the flow of immigrants which they subsequently attract? Are there any barriers placed in the way of recruitment? How much influence do such factors as lack of funds, staff and facilities generally have on Canada's immigration activities abroad? Only a complete study of the particular situations prevailing in each overseas post plus a thorough analysis of why new posts are not opened in certain countries, etc. could even begin to bring the whole picture into perspective.

Although the coverage of 'External factors' in this study, then, must be restricted in scope, these factors form a part of the whole and cannot be omitted in any treatment

of this subject. One realizes that immigration directly affects all areas of national life and that, while no policy could survive long without a reasonable degree of confidence and support of the population itself -- for if it lacks this, it can become a disruptive force instead of a progressive factor for cultural advancement and national development -- still some of the problems can be resolved only in cooperation with other governments external to the national scene. What are some of those factors? Restrictive measures, (on the part of countries from whom we would like to receive immigrants), such as anti-emigration laws, curbs on recruiting and advertising, etc., vary according to the country concerned and the general situation prevailing on the international scene at any given time.

The post-war period is a case in point. At that time, even if the Canadian government had been keen to embark upon an aggressive immigration policy -- which they were not -- there were many external factors at work which would have limited the flow.

After the war, the lack of available shipping made it very difficult to meet the needs of the back-log of people who had been awaiting cessation of hostilities so that they could emigrate to Canada. Servicemen with their foreign-born

wives and children awaited passage home, and the needs of millions of displaced war refugees cried out for attention. Canada's laws were not all that attractive; in fact, their discriminatory aspects were most discouraging. As early as March 1947, Department officials of both External Affairs and Immigration had drawn up a brief on the fact that the discrimination explicit in Canadian Immigration legislations would place the Canadian United Nations delegation "in an extremely embarrassing position if a delegation from some Asiatic country were to raise the question".

It was pointed out that the "existing Canadian immigration legislation and regulations have impaired friendly relations between Canada and the principal Asiatic countries". Reference was made, also, to the "numerous occasions on which the Canadian Government has been requested by the Governments of India, China and Japan, in particular, to modify its policy of Asiatic exclusion".

Deterrents to immigration from the United Kingdom and European countries were not absent either. Stringent restrictions were imposed by the British Government on the export of funds to Canada, and obviously this made any really massive movement of immigrants unlikely. Similarly in France,

restrictions imposed by the French Government on the transfer of funds discouraged rather thoroughly any migration that might emanated from that country.

Another factor at work to limit migration from overseas countries during various periods has been the devaluation of currencies. A potential immigrant often has his mind changed for him by such basic economic facts as these, but they are, nevertheless, ones over which he has no control.

Needless to say, much depends also on the international state of 'supply and demand', as it were, of labour in both the country of emigration and immigration. The days of free and uncontrolled migrations are past history, chiefly because conditions in 1966 are so vastly different from those in our "immigration hey-day", around the turn of the century.

In a memo to the Director of Immigration, one of the senior officials in the Immigration Department said, in 1950, that he had "come to the conclusion that the era of spontaneous immigration is on the wane and not likely evermore to yield immigrants in numbers and of a quality corresponding to normal periods of immigration in the past. The stated trend is to planned emigration and group movements selected on the basis of occupational aptitudes".¹

1. Departmental files, May 27, 1950

The Departmental files in Ottawa testify to the many difficulties faced by immigration officials in the offices abroad, in their attempts to encourage immigration into Canada, because of the restrictions placed upon their activities by the governments of the countries concerned. They clearly indicate on the other hand, also, how a permissive attitude on the part of authorities can facilitate the flow.

Unfortunately, space does not permit any extensive treatment of each major ethnic grouping of our immigration flow. This would itself be a separate study, in fact several studies. But a very brief reference has been made below to some of the conditions influencing the ones most pertinent to this study, e.g., the French, Belgian, Italian and British.

While, in fact, research had to be limited to Ottawa files -- and only a portion of those -- the material collected was considerable. Again, it is only possible to quote a very few of the innumerable examples which can be found, for instance, even in the minutes of the Departmental Advisory Committee (D.A.C.I.) alone. Some typical examples, however, are indicative:

For instance, the minutes of this committee's July 14, 1952 meeting discussed immigration potential in the light of the views expressed by overseas field officers' reports. Among other comments, these of the staff in France were particularly significant:

... in France the official attitude would appear to be definitely against migration to Canada ...

and ... It was difficult to build up the immigration potential in Denmark, as restrictions imposed by the Danish Government on emigration activities precluded the use of any publicity material ...

Similarly Norway, and particularly France, were also very strict in this regard. As a substitute to publicity and lectures, etc., immigration officers attempted to show films in their own offices at the end of the day, but the officer in Germany stated that the Ambassador at his post would not allow this, because of the disapproval of the host government.

French. Since 1948, it has been federal government departmental policy to encourage French immigration as much as British immigration, but the results have never been very satisfactory.

The French government has not looked with favour on any measures taken by Canadian immigration officers to induce French citizens to migrate. This restrictive attitude toward any active recruiting in France is amply substantiated by the departmental files.

In particular, for many years reports¹ from the Canadian office in France consistently deplored the limitations within which the French authorities prescribed that immigration officials work. If they became too active, complaints would be lodged with the Immigration officials themselves or, some times, even formally with the Canadian ambassador and Canadian government.

In response to one such complaint from the French Ministry of the Interior, e.g., the Paris officer reported (in May 1954) to Ottawa that he had given re-assurance to the French government:

... I said I would continue to be careful and not encourage deliberately the emigration of anyone regarding whom we would receive advice that departure from France would meet definite objection by the French authorities.

-
1. Note: Difficulties with the French authorities go back a long way. For example, immigration officials of the Canadian Department of Agriculture before Confederation, ran into similar obstacles. One agent, (Verret, by name) left Quebec for Europe in 1861 to encourage persons to emigrate to Canada. He went to England first but found the competition with United States agents too stiff and departed for Paris. He reported back to Canada of the many difficulties he was encountering from the French laws concerning emigration. After considerable delay he was notified on March 6, 1862, that before he could open an office in France he must deposit security in cash or bonds to the extent of 25,000 francs. Not being able to comply with these regulations, he left Paris.

J.D. Cameron, The Law Relating to Immigration to Canada, Appendix H, (Unpublished thesis, University of Toronto, 1935), p. 60.

The report then went on to say... "there is a very strong feeling against the emigration of technical or even labour manpower".

The Chief of Operations in Ottawa (a French-Canadian incidentally) consoled the Paris officer with this reply ... "It is the same situation all over once more ... (the) ... complaints are but a re-iteration of the well-known French Government attitude." The Headquarters official then instructed the Paris officer to proceed (with discretion) as he had done thus far. In addition to the difficulties of recruiting or encouraging immigrants in France within the limitation set by French authorities, the operational reports for 1955 indicate that Canadian immigration authorities in Paris had to attempt to counter the adverse reports there of the instability of the Canadian employment situation, which had been played up by Canadian and other press as well as in personal letters from Canadian residents who were discouraging relations or friends in France from proceeding to Canada.

The D.A.C.I. minutes of April 13, 1956 refer to potential immigration possibilities noted by the Chairman while on a trip to the immigration offices and governments of overseas countries, to step up immigration.

In France, the Chairman said he had met with French officials and explained our immigration program, but the French officials complained that Canada was seeking the same type of worker as was needed in France. The Chairman stated that the Ministry of Labour suggested that we give them the name of every prospective immigrant, to enable them to decide whether they would let him go. It was pointed out that we are not agreeable to this proposal, as it would be hindering the free movement of the people.

We are not officially permitted to recruit immigrants in France; however, our officers succeed in arranging meetings where they can show films of Canada and discuss Canada. One difficulty is lack of proper facilities for interviewing people who attend these lectures. Our officers make appointments to see them after the show in 'bistros', which is not very dignified. It is considered that our Paris office is too large for the number of immigrants who report there, and our work in France would be better organized if we had two additional offices in outlying districts.

By July 14, 1956 the situation overseas was apparently very tight, with tremendous demands for labour, and no supply of skilled immigrants available. Some employers had gone over to Europe on selection tours, but this had not been too successful, as European countries object to this. A shortage

of agricultural workers existed, too, with severe shortage in seasonal help. Strangely enough, they decided to modify 'selection criteria' for the 'seasonal crop' type of worker to the extent of accepting unskilled workers as long as they agreed to engage in farm work.

By July 1956 the applications from French-speaking North Africans had mounted to over 7,000, and the situation was still one of strong demand for skilled and unskilled immigrants. The Department had tried to send an officer to North Africa to look them over, but could not get permission from the French authorities, so all applications had to be processed through the Paris office; consequently the operation was very slow and very unsatisfactory. Delays made many decide to emigrate elsewhere. (Again, an external factor playing a large role in policy.) The French Government -- even in spite of a high level discussion between the Deputy Minister and French officials early in 1956 -- was determined to prevent any substantial emigration from North Africa. After independence, of course, the situation changed.

In 1957 both Suez and the Hungarian situation considerably influenced the flow of immigrants, making that year the highest since 1913, the previous record. The remarkable

total of 282,164 immigrants arrived on the Canadian doorstep. The inevitable repercussion was a curtailment in 1958, because of Canadian domestic pressures from organized labour who were concerned over the fear of unemployment. This, in turn, caused a lack of confidence abroad, and resulted in disillusionment to prospective immigrants. Australia was competing strongly with Canada, and the cut-back in immigration had unfortunately created the impression that Canada was no longer interested in receiving immigrants. Consequently, many emigrated 'down-under'.

Other Departmental reports point out that the French authorities required a passport bearing a visa before they were prepared to grant the transfer of funds on behalf of immigrants, and a plea was made that perhaps External Affairs officials could discuss this with higher French authorities, to try for its removal.

In 1955, in response to criticism in Canada about the security arrangements for French immigrants, the Director of Immigration, Ottawa, wrote the Paris office stating that he was concerned about the lack of immigrants and the criticism and that, "We would like to treat the immigration of French nationals identical with that of British".

The Paris office replied, stating they would be happy to have processing procedures expedited, but that the French generally did not wish to emigrate (and referred to all the usual reasons, plus the unstable Canadian employment situation). He then said, "You are correct in assuming that the French authorities still require a visa to issue Canadian currency for immigrants", but stated that negotiations at a high level might help.

In 1956 the Deputy Minister travelled to France to discuss ways and means of getting more French immigrants. After talks with French officials, he reported: "At present we will still have to work under cover in France, as long as we are known as Visa officers and officers of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration." He went on to say that conditions were changing, because of the Algerian situation and that, at the moment, "the French Government would not agree officially to a mission being sent to Algeria". (Australia had, at this point, opened an office there.)

The Deputy Minister said French officials had told him that Canada should not pay too much attention to those who arrived in Algeria after the Second World War because, in his opinion, they were "adventurers who will never be satisfied with conditions in any country in the world".

Complicating the situation was the serious shortage of labour in France and the mobilization of French population to meet the North African emergency -- all of which tended to deplete the immigrant potential for the Canadian immigration officials. The Deputy Minister reported that, while French officials objected to the opening of any new immigration offices in France, it might be a good idea to open consulate offices outside of Paris. One French government official remarked "France has consuls and vice-consuls in several cities in Canada, why should not Canada have more consulate offices in France?"

Both the External Affairs officials and Treasury Board opposed the idea of opening any new offices. External Affairs pointed out that once a consulate was opened it soon found itself involved in Consular matters of every variety for which trained personnel were just not available.

At the present time this falls upon us, our trained personnel and our funds are such that we have been unable to open posts in many places we feel they would be of great value to the Canadian government. For this reason we would find it extremely difficult to consider the establishment of two Consulates in France.
... If the French are not ready to authorize the opening of Immigration offices they would also object to a Consulate activity promoting emigration.

The Acting Deputy Minister of Immigration replied to External Affairs by saying ... "It is felt that advantages of increased immigration from France would outweigh other considerations!" Discussions continued for the next several years on the matter. External Affairs suggested sending mobile teams, but the Deputy Minister pointed out that the suggestion was unacceptable because: "we know from past experience that the French government is opposed to our Immigration operations in France. In fact it took several months to obtain permission to make certain repairs to our office in Paris so that we could utilize an additional floor." In August and September 1956 correspondence on file indicates an exchange of letters between the Agent-General for Ontario in London and the Chief of Operations of the Immigration Department in Ottawa, the Agent-General expressing disappointment at the low numbers of immigrants of French origin and asking for suggestions as to how his office could cooperate in stimulating interest. Ontario was having literature printed for distribution in France to encourage French immigrants to Ontario but, as the Agent-General pointed out: "The main obstacle facing us is that we are precluded from engaging in any promotional activities directly aimed at stimulating emigration from that country."

One of the Paris Office Reports to Headquarters --

France does not encourage the emigration of her subjects to any country, as her requirements and needs of skilled workers and others are numerous:

(1) The army requires hundreds of thousands of young men.

(2) France is going through a period of industrial development; 50,000 technicians will be required to develop her present and future resources.

(3) There is a shortage of farm labourers, etc.

Nevertheless, continuing his efforts to obtain French immigrants, the Deputy Minister wrote to the Visa Section and the Canadian Embassy, Paris referring to the plan underway whereby the Government had chartered aircraft for British and French immigrants but said ... (translation) "the Department was quite concerned with the fact that despite the desire of the Canadian Immigration Department to receive French immigrants, very few agreed to come to Canada for settlement."

He mentioned the North African emigrés and regretted that the Department was not being allowed to open an office but said ... "however, to facilitate that immigration, we have done away with security and authorized the Paris office to decide on those cases." He further lamented that the press continually reported large numbers wishing to come to

Canada, and blamed the Department -- these reports were not based on fact. He also wished to know what the French government was doing to teach French to the Hungarian refugees who were in camps, and waiting to emigrate, and he offered to send an expert over to organize French language courses, etc.

With respect to the difficulties involved in obtaining French emigrants for Canada, the Canadian Ambassador in Paris wrote the Deputy Minister of Immigration on January 25, 1960 (translation):

There are permanent and temporary factors in this problem. The permanent points are as follows:

- 1) Frenchmen do not emigrate in numbers because it is difficult for them to find abroad conditions of climate and the living they enjoy in France.
- 2) French social legislation in the matter of Family Allowances, Health Services, Free Education and Holidays with pay, is generally more favorable than that of other countries.
- 3) Frenchmen are generally little inclined to learn foreign languages.

Temporary factors:

- 1) The facilities of finding employment in France during this period of economic reconstruction.
- 2) The difficulty of exporting capital legally, that is, without losing part of the capital in transfer costs.
- 3) The insufficiency of manpower in France.
- 4) Army recruiting to fill the great needs occasioned by events in Indo-China and Africa.

The Ambassador then went on to say he considered that a more favorable period was about to begin because of the demographic thrust, i.e., increased birth rate in France during and after the war. He suggested various methods, such as films and concerts, to "rouse the enthusiasm of cultured young French people here". (Films would have to be shown by the France-Canada Association to avoid an appearance of propaganda in favor of emigration to Canada.)

In 1960, the Paris office again reported to Headquarters on the need for greater official status:

... I am experiencing some difficulty in approaching officials occupying important positions owing to the fact that I have no official title to justify interviews on a higher level. You will readily understand that here in France it is essential to have a title if one wishes to deal with other than subaltern employees and I consider it a loss of time to seek the assistance of minor representatives whose radiating influence is nil.

Gradually, the situation became a bit more amenable to promotional work on the part of the Department and, during the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 particularly, stepped-up programs were instituted. France in 1964 was faced with an influx in excess of 500,000 repatriates -- from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia -- which the French economy could not absorb. This caused the authorities to open negotiations

with the Canadian Immigration Department officials in Paris to resettle repatriate families in Canada. (Similar discussions took place with other countries such as Australia, Argentina and Brazil.)

The French government began to extend non-refundable financial aid to cover travelling expenses, etc. and also loans for purchase of farms, etc. (Aid was not available to technically skilled people.)

Early in 1964 a group of French officials came to Canada to investigate the opportunities. It seemed clear, however, that the French authorities had no intention of doing very much through overt measures to increase the flow of French immigrants to Canada except for the specific purpose of relieving France of the problems arising from Algerian refugees. (Because of the particular nature of this movement a brief separate treatment is warranted.)

Algerian Immigration

In 1961 the Canadian Government was approached by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) to give some assistance to the grave problem of the Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia.

Canada was loathe to give any consideration to these cases, or to concede to requests for relaxation of the criteria, making it possible for these refugees -- most of whom were Jews, a large number French-speaking -- to enter. The reasons given were that security clearances could not be obtained, since personnel and facilities to conduct personal interviews, etc., were virtually non-existent. In addition, the Immigration Department could not process applications from the regular nationals of Morocco and it would be awkward to send a team in to handle refugees only.

Consideration was given to 'waiving' security checks and it was stated that applications from sponsors in Canada for relatives who were refugees would be sympathetically received. A team was later dispatched to North Africa to select Jewish immigrants from among those wishing to migrate and who were being sponsored by Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (J.I.A.S.). They were brought in by special order-in-council.

'Stage B' criteria were waived by the team in 1963 and again in 1964, but even then only about one-half of those convoked, (French citizens resident in Morocco), appeared for interview. Meanwhile, J.I.A.S. was working quite steadily to bring as many Jewish refugees to Canada as possible.

Prior to Algerian independence, the French government was not all cooperative about Canada obtaining immigrants from Algeria, (or from North Africa generally), and opposed opening a Canadian office in the area. In fact they were very much against the sending of inspectional teams to Algeria. Canadian immigration officials had been aware for years of the immigration potential in Algeria (as well as in Tunisia and Morocco) and had managed to get a survey team in to estimate the prospects. What they found was encouraging and they approached the French Government to see if it would be possible to establish inspectional facilities in the territory. The French Government made it very clear that they did not wish Canada to do this or to promote emigration from Algeria in any way. Then Algerian independence and the political instability made it unwise, for a time, to establish effective facilities. However, when North Africans began arriving in France in extremely large numbers, the French government changed its mind about restrictive emigration. At the time Premier Lesage was in Paris (October 1961) for the opening of 'Quebec House', Canadian newspapers carried a report to the effect that President de Gaulle and the Premier had discussed the coming to Quebec of "a million French people from Algeria". In a letter¹ to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Fairclough) at the time, the Premier stated that this report was completely without basis in fact. (Presumably he meant the figure of 'one million' was not true; in any case, from this time on the number of Algerians coming to Canada increased considerably.)

1 This was a reply to one which had been sent to Premier Lesage from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on October 20, 1961 expressing the federal government's interest in encouraging the movement from France of suitably-qualified French-speaking immigrants.

A report to Ottawa from the Canadian immigration officials in the Paris office in August 1962 states:

...The chef du Cabinet to the Minister responsible for the Algerian repatriates telephoned this office on July 30 advising that we may "open an office" in Marseilles to be near the repatriates, that we may select any number we like and that we may advertise in newspapers our presence in Marseilles...

...We must emphasize that the consent, hitherto unprecedented of the French authorities to our recruitment program involving newspaper publicity will benefit us not only in recruiting Algerian repatriates in Marseilles but also in attracting metropolitan immigrants from that region and, in addition, both Algerian repatriates and metropolitan Frenchmen from all other parts of France, since this program could be extended to cover the whole country. Furthermore, this permission to advertise will create a precedent which it will not be easy for the French authorities to retract and we will take advantage of this to continue to advertise our presence in the press even after the situation of the Algerian repatriates has been settled. This, you will no doubt agree, is a unique opportunity which may not repeat itself in this country where we have endeavoured for years to obtain from the French authorities a more lenient attitude to our recruiting.

From this point on, the situation with regard to promotion work in France changes completely and a positive program begins. Especially do we find selection being made of professional persons, such as teachers for the Colleges Classiques and Department of Education in Quebec. Numerous Algerians were brought in under these arrangements, but statistics for these particular years did not differentiate

between French nationals from France and those from Algeria.¹

The French-Canadian press in 1961 and 1962 carried several articles expressing concern about the character of these French people from Algeria. On the other hand, there were articles exhorting encouragement of this type of immigration and arguing that the Quebec government had been at fault for many years but should now take the initiative in this situation. In Parliament also many Members expressed doubt that the Algerians were desirable immigrants, because of their alleged bad reputations -- even French Canadian members objected. The member for St. Hyacinthe, e.g., felt that

...before inviting farmers from abroad we should make sure that our own farmers have the opportunity to earn their living and those of dependents.²

However, a colleague³ denounced these comments and blamed "absolute and out-of-date prejudices" for the fact that

- 1 During the early 1964 session, the Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister of Immigration stated (in reply to a question), ..."No statistics (of applications) were kept prior to January 1963 showing the number of visas issued to French citizens who formerly resided in Algeria...It is probable that many who applied for admission just before or following Algerian independence received visas before the department began to record such figures...The department has no way of determining precisely how many of these people have come to Canada...Any former resident of Algeria, of French nationality, who returned to France and lived there for more than one year prior to migration would be included with other French citizens who came from France." Mr. Badanai, House of Commons Debates (revised), April 27, 1964.
- 2 Mr. Ricard, House of Commons Debates (revised), July 31, 1964 p. 6263.
- 3 Mr. Choquette, House of Commons Debates (revised), August 14, 1964 pp. 6838-9.

"we have continually lost ground as far as immigration is concerned". He deplored the lack of interest shown by the Quebec government in regard to immigration but said it resulted from such theories as these.

According to the Minister of Immigration, the French government officials had come to Canada to contact federal and provincial authorities concerning assistance for the Algerian farmers who were then in France and wished to emigrate:..."We helped them as much as possible in their investigation", he said.¹

Because of the lack of current statistics, mentioned above, it is not known exactly how extensive that 'help' was or just how many French-speaking Algerians came to Canada. That any came was due, of course, to a combination of external conditions which were the contributory factors.

Belgians - Another instance where external factors affected the flow of the type of immigrant likely to assimilate with the French-speaking element was the situation in the Belgian Congo.

In 1960 a number of the Belgians in the Congo began to apply to Canadian Trade Commissions in Leopoldville regarding the possibilities of migrating to Canada. While relations between Canadian immigration officers and the Belgian government had been more or less on a 'gentleman's agreement' basis, there had not been complete freedom to 'recruit' and the number emigrating from Belgium was not very substantial.²

1 Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (revised), March 13, 1964 pp. 895-6

2 For example, the statistics for the year 1960 show 776 "immigrants of Belgian ethnic origin."

But since these were 'spontaneous applications', Canada could not be accused of 'recruiting' in this case. The situation, however, was delicate, since these were persons actually needed in the Congo -- although they apparently had no intention of staying there.

Senior immigration officers were of the opinion that Canada should take advantage of the availability of these immigrants and permit their admissions. They recommended sending in an Immigration team to handle the matter.

However, no action was taken to obtain these immigrants at the time, because the External Affairs Department was afraid of embarrassing the Belgian Government and, also, they felt that if attempts were made to recruit this group, (mostly skilled and professional), which was so badly needed in the Congo itself, Canada might be accused of interfering in international affairs. Both the Trade Commission and Immigration officials felt that Canada was missing out on some excellent immigrants who were departing in large numbers for such countries as Australia and South America.

Later, however, in 1961 the Brussels office was instructed to handle applicants and take the weight off the British Consulates whose facilities Canada had been using to handle the enquiries. No promotional work was to be carried on, but applications from 'would-be' immigrants would be processed.

Again, it is difficult to say exactly how many such immigrants did finally come to Canada because available statistics for these years do not differentiate between Belgians from Belgium and former residents of the Belgian

Congo or other colonies. External factors, however, determined the action taken.

British Reference has been made in earlier chapters to the historical aspects of immigration from Britain, and further comment will be made in the section on 'ethnic balance'. Suffice it here to say that the prime reason for the relatively large flow of British immigrants to Canada has been the absence of any restrictive external factors -- in contrast to the situation in France and some of the other countries.

Italian Immigration from Italy is a good example of how external factors and the actions of the host government have influenced the Canadian intake of migrants. After strong appeals from the Italian government in the post-World War II years, the government of Canada in January 1947 passed Order-in-Council PC-2908 which, in effect, placed Italy on an equal basis with other Continental European countries with respect to immigration. The large movement which then began has continued ever since to such an extent that in 1958 and several of the following years, the total arrival from Italy exceeded those from any other single country.

Because of their large families and their keen desire to sponsor relatives, control of the movement from the Canadian point of view was virtually lost. Attempts were made, as described elsewhere, to reduce the flow by administrative and other means. In 1964, arrivals numbered 20,720.

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (I.C.E.M.)

Another aspect of the external factors influencing Canada's immigration for some of the post-war years was the existence of an international organization known as I.C.E.M. Canada's policy with respect to I.C.E.M. has often been subject to controversy. This Committee is an outgrowth of PICMME -- Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe -- the organization which took over international migration problems at the end of 1951 when the International Refugee Organization ceased operations. Membership in the Committee was open to governments which had demonstrated interest in the principle of the free movement of persons and which undertook to make a financial contribution to the Committee.

The Canadian Government ratified its constitution on March 4, 1954 by Order-in-Council PC 1954-297, and participated in the organization until 1962, when it withdrew. At the time I.C.E.M. was established, about five million people were estimated to be surplus population in Europe and desirous of migration. They lived mainly in Italy, Greece, Netherlands, Austria and Germany. I.C.E.M. planned to move at least 100,000 annually and was more than reasonably successful in achieving this aim.

Year	Total Moved	Movements to Canada
1952	77,664	8,671
1953	87,534	36,928
1954	121,227	21,294
1955	120,439	8,858
1956	172,232	11,294
1957	194,156	46,453 ¹
1958	94,222	9,845
1959	105,706	5,773

1. (25,000 of whom were Hungarian refugees)

Canada used I.C.E.M. chiefly because of its transportation facilities; otherwise she was never really too interested. She considered that her own immigration service was highly developed, and took exception to I.C.E.M. involving itself in such matters as placement, settlement, selection and examination facilities.

The debate as to whether or not Canada should retain membership in I.C.E.M. continued for a number of years. During this time, several countries criticized Canada's rather negative attitude of making use of the organization only when it suited her purpose, chiefly when transportation was scarce and I.C.E.M. facilities proved of assistance.

In July 1956 the Canadian Deputy Minister and the Director of Immigration went to Washington to discuss the situation. The Americans stated quite candidly that their interest in I.C.E.M. was "to divert potential immigrants to the United States to other countries." A second purpose of the United States was "to provide machinery to handle emigration from over-populated countries where crowding and economic distress created conditions favorable to the growth of communism." She felt Canada must recognize that, if the I.C.E.M. did not exist, undoubtedly some international organization would succeed I.C.E.M. in the migration field. After a thorough review in 1957 by an Inter-departmental Committee on Immigration, it was decided that Canada should stay in. One of the reasons stated at the time was "Canada's withdrawal from I.C.E.M. could only serve to generate ill-will among those countries upon which Canada depends for the majority of its immigrants." Another was a

fear that I.C.E.M. might be weakened by Canadian withdrawal and cease its operations. This might lead to another organization, with membership open to Communist countries, assuming responsibility in the field of international migration.

In 1962, however, the Canadian government did decide to withdraw. The Immigration Department apparently considered:

I.C.E.M. had been established as a temporary organization to assist in the solution of the residual refugee situation in Europe following closure of the International Refugee Organization and also to help alleviate problems associated with surplus population in countries such as Italy, Greece, Austria and Germany:

- (i) The post-war refugee problem in Europe is almost completely solved. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the "old" refugee situation will be brought to a conclusion within two years.
- (ii) Vastly improved economic conditions in Europe have done away with the concept of surplus population. Countries which were once "emigration" countries are now "immigration" countries (for example) Germany and Austria, and there is a large scale intra-European migration into the central Common Market Countries, especially from Spain, Greece and Italy.
- (iii) As the original reasons for its formation lessened in urgency or disappeared, the I.C.E.M. administration became more involved in and promoted projects of technical assistance -- an area of activity which, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, belonged more properly with the United Nations and the specialized international agencies.

In withdrawing, Canada pledged continuing interest in refugee activities and undertook to consider on a year by year basis the possibility of contributing up to \$50,000 for refugee transport provided by I.C.E.M.

It seemed ironical that Canada withdrew at a time when the new Director had just begun to implement a policy embodying all the Canadian viewpoints which he had expressed as such at the I.C.E.M. 16th session in Geneva in April 1962.

Ostensibly Canada's reason for pulling out of I.C.E.M. was that its original purpose, i.e., movement of refugees, was accomplished and that there was no further need for such an organization. Critics argued that, from the international point of view, there were still well over one million refugees awaiting migration opportunities.

The fact that Canada earlier had considered I.C.E.M. as "an excellent forum for migration matters which permits the exchange of views and the building of goodwill at the administrative level between countries of emigration and immigration" raises the question why such an attitude would suddenly cease to be valid. Membership had been considered as "a means to learn first-hand of trends in emigration policies which can influence Canada's future immigration policy," to say nothing of an opportunity to influence certain movements, since Canada had always been on the Executive Committee of the Organization.

New Trends The scientific and technological advances, coupled with resultant social and economic changes taking place throughout the world in the past few years, have caused demand for skilled and professional people to rise sharply in every country. Canada's progress depends upon her securing, either through re-training or immigration, vast numbers of qualified people. Reflecting this situation, the Immigration Department increased the tempo of its

activities in 1963 and has continued to do so. The Minister told Parliament:

... Our economic capacity to absorb skilled, educated and otherwise well-qualified immigrants is virtually unlimited ...(but) ... we must obtain these immigrants in competition with other countries and there is no great surplus of qualified people anywhere in the world.¹

His successor² in office made his first speech, after taking over the portfolio, to an 'ethnic group' dinner in Vancouver, March 19, 1965 at which he, too, referred to the difficulties of getting skilled people. A much better-equipped service was essential if Canada were to meet the new changes in emphasis and respond to the external factors of immigration.

Again, it is not possible here to discuss all the ramifications of the new situation; but for purposes of this study it is necessary to mention the change in attitude of the French government after Algerian independence.

There is no doubt that, from 1963 on, the French government began to show signs of relaxing their restrictive attitudes towards Canadian immigration activities in their country. The reasons probably were threefold: the substantial population growth in France due to natural increase, coupled

1 Hon. René Tremblay, House of Commons Debates (unrevised), August 14, 1964, p. 6819 et seq.

2 Hon. J.R. Nicholson

with the closing off of migration outlets within Metropolitan France, and the return to France of approximately one million French from Algeria.

Because of the French authorities' new attitude, the Canadian Immigration Department re-commenced its negotiations to open additional offices in France, and discussions took place between French and Canadian government officials to encourage migration from France.

The briefing documents provided by Immigration Department officials for the use of the Prime Minister, before his visit to France in January 1964, contained suggestions that Canadian hopes for increased immigration be advanced in top level talks. They added:

If M. Couve de Murville gives any encouragement, it would be for consideration in Paris whether a paragraph on immigration should be proposed for the communique or whether, in view of the delicacy of this subject in Paris, it might be left for future negotiation.

Further correspondence on file indicates plans (on the part of Ottawa immigration authorities) after the two additional consulates were opened, whereby Canada could:

... look forward to increasing the movement from France from 4000 in 1964 to 10,000 by 1968 ... and ... to maintain an annual intake from France from 1968 onwards of at least 10,000 persons -- with 2500 being handled directly by each consulate and 5000 by our head office in Paris.

In a memo of suggested matters that might be referred to in a scheduled meeting with the Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Foreign Service, officials stated:

... In the promotional field we think it would be advisable to speak in general rather than in

specific terms. It might be well to begin by expressing appreciation for the fact that we have been allowed greater latitude in recent years in this area than was previously the case. As you know, we are now allowed to conduct film shows and lectures in various areas of France, although to directly promote emigration is frowned upon. Perhaps a word about our domestic need to secure more French-speaking migrants would produce a sympathetic response, especially if related to the French origin of Canada, and a word is inserted about the complete freedom we have in promoting migration from Britain.¹

The question of Algerian immigrants was also raised as a subject which might be discussed:

... In earlier discussions with the French authorities, they indicated that in their preselection of the Algerian repatriates, they would guarantee the moral background of each settler. In the light of the R.C.M.P. and External Affairs expressions of concern about the possibility of O.A.S. infiltration, we think it might be an idea to discuss this problem with Mr. ----- . We feel sure that he will appreciate our concern in the light of recent and current incidents in Canada.

Apparently during these discussions the Canadian government again declared its desire for French-speaking immigrants, and the French official replied, that:

... any attempt to promote migration overtly by establishing additional facilities which could be identified as immigration offices would be viewed with much concern by the French authorities, because of labour requirements in France. The establishment of consular offices, however, where prospective immigrants could be interviewed and issued visas, would create no problem.

¹ Departmental files, April 8, 1964

Accordingly, two new offices, Marseilles and Bordeaux, were requested of Cabinet on July 23, 1964. In the submission to Cabinet, all the many reasons (mentioned earlier) for opening these offices were quoted, but also another:

Domestic considerations make it more and more difficult to have no Consulates in France ... while Quebec is in the process of developing numerous contacts with France in which Ottawa should take an interest.

Approval was granted, and the press release on this was made September 30, 1964 with Bordeaux office scheduled to open December 16 and Marseilles the following May.

During the last two to three years, Ottawa Immigration headquarters have carried out as heavy an advertising and publicity campaign as French authorities would permit, apparently with very satisfactory results, e.g., over 50% increase in numbers of visas issued. Film shows, conferences, increased press publicity and even direct advertising time on commercial radio stations are all methods now being used, with considerable success.

This new promotional campaign, in keeping with the 'stepped-up' drive for skilled immigrants, must operate, of course, within the bounds of what is permitted by the host country concerned. If restrictive measures are in force, then very little promotional work can be carried out, either directly or indirectly. As already indicated, most countries have refused to allow Canadian immigration officials to actively promote emigration within their borders. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States have really no restrictions -- the regulations of most other countries have made it necessary for Canadian immigration

officers to determine from time to time the current attitudes of the authorities and to govern themselves accordingly.

Particularly in France and Belgium, methods still have to take a relatively 'indirect' form, i.e., maintaining close and continuous liaison with the informational media of that country, in order to make Canada known as thoroughly as possible while still not putting the Immigration Department in the position of 'actively recruiting or encouraging emigrants to choose Canada.'

Added to these obstacles which are beyond the control of the Immigration Department, of course, are the perennial difficulties of limited staff, budget and other resources. All of this means that each post has to work very hard to get the best possible value for each promotional dollar spent and in the final analysis is dependant upon the goodwill of the host government who is, in turn, bound to act according to its own best interests, not to Canada's.

When the Minister of Immigration returned recently, after a three-week tour in seven European countries, a leading newspaper queried him with respect to the possibilities of success. The Minister stated:

... They have need for people with the same professional skills that we have. You are not likely to get very good results if you go into such a country and have what you might call a crash program trying to entice people away from steady jobs that they have in those countries.

What I tried to do, and what I think was the right course, was to put our cards on the table with the officials and cabinet ministers of governments in the countries from which our immigrants come, and tell them that we know they are going to lose a number of people each year through immigration and ask if they would have any objection to our putting forward the advantages of Canada in an information program that would induce people to come to this country.¹

1 Immigration Minister Nicholson, as quoted by the Toronto Globe and Mail, August 20, 1965, p. 7.

B. Domestic Factors

The factors which influence any democratic government's action are, in the first analysis, political. Obviously, no democratic government can stay in power if the majority differs fundamentally with its policies. Thus, where there is certainty that a given policy would mean sharp disapproval, governments do not usually effect that line of action and, obviously, if they have reason to believe a policy will meet with general approval no hesitation occurs. But where there are conflicting opinions and general uncertainty, the only safe method of operation for any vote-conscious government is not to define its policy but to move only in the direction of and at the pace which political expediency decrees. This can change from year to year, month to month and even day to day.

This, in effect, is precisely what the Government of Canada has done, particularly in recent decades -- And the reason for the uncertainty surrounding what the public desires, is that the 'public' is made up of many elements, many of which have conflicting interests. What are these interests and what are the attitudes toward immigration? The difficulty is, how do you measure attitudes in this context? Social scientists have, in recent years, become interested in the survey analysis approach of determining the relations between attitudes and whether or not a given community favours immigrants, etc. Most of these studies are heavily 'behaviouralistic' and, to date, seem to provide

nothing more positive than the obvious conclusion that more study "would contribute to the understanding of the determinants of attitudes"!

All the old arguments about attitudes towards immigrants are trotted out again and again -- to what avail? The need is for full-scale research to be carried out, first on particular communities and then in the national context, as to the degree of assimilation and integration which occur under certain situations. What are the economic, social and political factors which must exist for successful acceptance of immigration and of which types of immigrants? We simply do not know. Not enough facts are available for an accurate answer to be given -- like so many other social phenomena, they await further research.

At the moment all that exists is the crude measuring stick of the political constituency -- which really tells us only that if a policy which the majority dislikes, is embarked upon, then that politician or government is repudiated at the polls. Considering the number of issues in any given campaign, this could mean many things -- it could even mean a 'poor T.V. image' -- not necessarily bad policy. One thing certain is that it militates towards government inaction and non-commitment to any policy; it is a poor basis and certainly insufficient knowledge upon which to formulate complicated and complex programs.

One could, in any given period, trace the economic situations prevailing and relate them to the immigrant flow, showing clearly whether a period of high volume coincided with industrial expansion or unemployment. However, this is not the place for an economic treatise. Nor would it necessarily be significant if any such correlation were found to exist.

It is surely obvious to anyone that one effect of a much larger population would indeed be a lessening of the economic burden in running certain utilities such as transportation, for example. The costs become astronomical in a country whose sparse population is so geographically isolated as to make a national system uneconomic. Likewise, the economics of large-scale production can be applied to innumerable industries, such as the automobile, steel and textiles, to name just three.

Politicians are fond of pointing out the wisdom of an immigration policy which will provide labour force to expand and develop the resources of the country. "Immigrant workers helped to tame the wilds of British Columbia and build Kitimat, to erect the defence lines of the far north and to carve the iron town of Schefferville out of Quebec bush."¹ Similarly, countless developments could be enumerated to illustrate the point. There is no doubt that immigrants have provided both labour force and capital as well as initiative, ideas, incentive

1. A former immigration Minister (Fairclough) speaking in Winnipeg January 26, 1960.

and technical knowledge. Many industries exist in Canada today simply because of one immigrant with vision and determination, such as the Czechoslovakian, Thomas Bata, who created the Bata shoe industry and, in fact, really founded a new town in the process. They have been quoted so often as to become commonplace.

The fact remains, however, that these aspects of immigration -- as they affect the labour force and the productive capacity, consumption, industrial and agricultural development, to say nothing of social, cultural and artistic institutions -- combine as formidable arguments in favour of a strong immigration policy, from the economist's point of view. Whether immigration should be financially assisted in terms of air, sea or rail passage, medical and hospital care employment, housing and social welfare of all types is a matter of degree. They all may be economically feasible and also desirable for the greater well-being of the nation.

On the other hand, in periods of economic recession and unemployment, short-term economic benefits often necessitate curbing any influx which might add to the labour force; although, in reality, the long-term effects might be beneficial -- depending upon the absorptive capacity of the country.

"Absorptive capacity" has been the key term in our immigration policy (particularly since Mackenzie King's 1947 speech). Economists and politicians, however, often differ in their definition of Canada's absorptive capacity. If one

is concerned with the economic aspect only, and the interplay of labour, capital, etc. on production and consumption as mentioned above, then the country's economy may or may not be in need of immigration to provide an important element of its economic health. On the other hand, political and social factors can create circumstances for the politician which make the country's 'absorptive capacity' for immigrants practically nil. To a politician, the definition of this vague and nebulous term is very simple; it is exactly equal to "what the traffic will bear" politically. Since, in the last analysis, a political decision decrees whether or not there will be an immigration policy, it is conceivable that at any given time the flow of immigrants may fall far below the economist's definition of 'absorptive capacity' because, in fact, the economic factor in the equation is only one of many which will govern the political policies of the day.

In a country where a considerable segment of the population is concerned with ethnic balance, economic factors conceivably can be relegated to a very minor position in the influence scale.

Business and industry, particularly the transportation companies, the manufacturing industries and construction employers have increasingly promoted large-scale immigration. Organizations like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Manufacturing Association, etc., consider that more people mean more consumption, more production, more jobs, more homes,

more businesses and so on. All of this, to them, spells a higher standard of living and an expanding, prosperous and strong Canada.

But a distinct lack of accurate data exists on the question of which industries absorb what types of immigrants, and to what degrees. The recently-announced Manpower Department may, in the future, provide some of this much-needed information to be used in ascertaining how many and where immigrants are required, whether or not they are being taken in to industries where the need is greatest and whether or not any distinctions are made on the basis of their language or ethnic origin.

A complete analysis is yet to be made of all factors -- including the political -- which are at work in this complex question of the industrial distribution of immigrants. The thorough research project which this requires would be well worth the time and money involved. While they contain many shortcomings as reliable indices, the recent manpower surveys, undertaken jointly by some of the provinces and the federal government, are only a very small step in the right direction.

Organized Labour -- Trade unions have varied in their reactions, depending upon the nature of the union and whether it is a local or a national spokesman making the statement. They are generally cautious, but in periods of unemployment some of the local bodies can often become vigorously opposed. At such times, 'local jobs for local men, first' seems to be

the slogan and if there are more jobs than men, that is just fine. Unions claim that the immigrant worker is exploited by Management but investigations into this have revealed that, in most cases, such charges against large firms are groundless; however, many instances do occur, particularly among small sub-contracting firms in the construction industry. This is due mainly to lack of ability to speak the language and to learn the laws governing minimum wages, holiday pay, unemployment insurance, etc. Quite often it is found that the greatest exploitation takes place when unscrupulous persons of the same ethnic origin as the immigrant take advantage of his ignorance of the new social customs.

The fear of a flooded labour market, lower wages and lower living standards militate toward the conservative attitude of organized labour, an attitude which is not always successfully erased by the optimism of management. The Canadian Congress of Labour has accused the Government of not having any program and has consistently advocated the establishment of a national advisory committee on Immigration composed of representatives of labour, management, agriculture, and other important interested bodies. Unskilled labour seems to be the primary object of Labour's skepticism, for they recommend 'a policy which admits immigrants who have the necessary qualifications to assist them in establishing themselves successfully in Canada.'

Labour has, justifiably, criticized the excessive ministerial discretion, as well as the delegation of authority in interpreting the regulations allowed by the Act. They

object to department officials assuming what should be a government responsibility and, in effect, setting the admission standards of training and qualifications required for immigrants to enter Canada. The Canadian Labour Congress has published studies which indicate that immigration is not always, or necessarily, a contributory factor in high unemployment. Sufficient research is not yet available to establish clearly just what the role of immigration in economic growth should be; organized labour joins with others in urging a more thorough study of the subject. They argue that "the Canadian Labour Congress is not opposed to immigration," but regard it as¹"one aspect of a more global manpower and economic planning policy." It is interesting to note that nine months later the Prime Minister announced a radical change in Departmental structure -- formation of a manpower department with Immigration and Labour both coming under the one Minister.

Agriculture The pressure of agricultural interests upon Government seemed to have been most successful in the immediate post-war period. Hence, immigration policy unduly emphasized farmers and farm labourers, even though there was a continuing decline in the importance of agriculture in the Canadian economy.

In the past decade, however, the pressure has been nowhere near as effective. There are many evidences of this but the change of emphasis is a fact which is reflected in the immigration statistics. (See table III.)

1. Canadian Labour Congress Memorandum to the Government of Canada, March 10, 1965, p. 24

Religion The influence exerted by religious organizations has caused some considerable controversy in the past. Claims have been made that Ottawa's immigration policy discriminated against one religious denomination or another (depending upon the faith of the person doing the complaining.) They argue, in each case, that a particularly powerful group 'manages' immigration in such a way as to bring in large numbers of its own religion and exclude or hinder immigration of other faiths. There were particularly strong protests raised in the 'fifties' but such charges have always been denied by the Department officials, as well as by the Government of the day. They state emphatically that, "there is no effort, conscious or unconscious" to select immigrants on this basis. "We consider that this would be a very reprehensible thing to do." These denials that any 'religious affiliation' statistics are kept, appear constantly in the press and in 'Hansard'¹ but department records indicate that no permanent-type statistics have ever been kept. They argue that -- although for many years the form used by immigrants to provide pertinent details to the Department contained a 'religious denomination' question -- this information was not tabulated, because it might be a source of contention. Critics asked, "Why was there any

-
1. A typical example appeared in the course of a debate in the House in 1946. The Minister responsible for Immigration, in reply to a question on the subject, denied the existence, past or present, of religious distinctions as part of any Canadian immigration policy and, by implication, denied any attempt to either maintain or change the religious balance of the Canadian population. (The Hon. Mr. Glen, Minister of Mines and Resources, House of Commons Debates, (revised) August 28, 1946 p. 5516).

reference to it on the form at all then?" It is interesting to note that in the minutes of the 'Management Committee' meeting for September 25, 1959 the committee decided to delete the 'religious denomination' reference on Form 1000 "because information is not coded anyway and statistics are not kept. In fact, with the microfilming of landing records, the only way the information could even be developed would be by a physical count, which would be a monumental undertaking. The only purpose served by the information is to direct immigrants to church reception officers at the ports of arrival."

At the present time the fact that there is no reference to religion of immigrants in departmental records makes it impossible to give credence to any charge of religious bias by officials -- in any direction whatsoever -- as an official government policy. Under the terms of reference of this particular study, it is impossible for this researcher to determine what individuals do unofficially.

The main point is that when the question was asked officially, it was for the individual's welfare and for the convenience of various church groups. However, as modes of transportation changed and most immigrants from Northern Europe and the United Kingdom started coming by air, it meant that sea port chaplains were meeting only those from such countries as Italy and Greece -- large numbers who, coincidentally, happened to be Roman Catholic, and it may well have seemed that all the immigrants coming in were Roman Catholic. This seems explainable as a coincidence only, since there seems no evidence that it was a determined or biased policy. In fact,

the area from which the complaints came (Holland and Germany), for most of this time, had Protestant officers in charge and they could hardly be accused of Roman Catholic bias.

Another reason for the misunderstanding may have been that under the prevailing Immigration policy an applicant may well have been turned down, because his particular occupation was not required in Canada at a given time; then a few months later, he might have been accepted. This was not because of religion; it was the fault of the chopping and changing of criteria, (for political and/or economic reasons), in Ottawa's short-term policy.

The moderator of the United Church of Canada charged publicly in 1962 that there was discrimination in favor of Roman Catholics. However, after certain meetings were held with the Deputy Minister, Dr. Mutchmor later publicly stated that, in proportion to the population total, immigration was not causing Protestant churches to lose the percentage race. He is reported to have said:

Never has the percentage of Roman Catholic immigrants exceeded 43 per cent...The United Church has dropped only .3 per cent to 20.1 per cent in the decade up to 1961. The Roman Catholic church had climbed from 45.5 to 46.7 (of the total population)... other Protestant sects had not fared as well as the United Church and the drop in the Protestant total had been from 48.3 to 42.7 per cent.¹

Those who make the charges of manipulation of the immigrant flow in this matter really do not know anything about the nature

1. Dr. Mutchmor, quoted in the Toronto Telegram February 21, 1963.

of the immigration process or they would be aware of how unimportant the religious factor is in selection of immigrants by the immigration officials themselves.

Obviously, in a particular religious organization, for example, if the Jewish Immigration Aid Society decided it had a large number of potential emigrants in a given country, then it would do as much as possible to assist them to migrate to such countries as Australia or Canada. However, if applications for such a group are presented to Canadian officials abroad, their treatment is identical to that given to all applicants (regardless of religious affiliation); acceptance depends on the individual qualifications of the applicants. If they met the admission criteria they would be accepted, regardless of the religious factor although, as mentioned elsewhere in this study, some special concessions have been made at different times with regard to Jewish refugee situations.

Depending upon how active a particular religious organization is in 'sponsoring' or 'pushing' immigrants, it might appear that large numbers of a specific religious faith were being admitted to Canada in any one period. But that is not to say that there is a bias; any religious group is free to bring about a similar result for members of its own faith who wish to migrate, presumably by exerting the same types of pressure on the Government.

The history of religious interest in immigration is too extensive to detail here, but perhaps a brief reference to some factors operating in recent years would be applicable.

After World War II a number of religious (as well as ethnic) organizations became very much involved in the problems of displaced persons and refugees. This meant that they became actively concerned in ensuring that Canadian immigration policy emphasizes the humanitarian aspect, and rightly so. Some denominations worked separately but in June 1947, the Canadian Christian Council for Re-Settlement of Refugees was organized "to assemble, process and present for examination refugees who did not come under the mandate of the I.R.O." At the time the C.C.C.R.R. was comprised of Roman Catholic and various Protestant Societies, but in 1953 the Catholics withdrew and operated separately.

At first the C.C.C.R.R. received an annual grant from the Canadian Government and they, in fact, pre-selected immigrants (D.P.'s) abroad. During 1952, the activities of all voluntary agencies were restricted and their efforts were directed mainly towards re-uniting family groups and selecting farm labourers and domestics.

Subsequently, in 1953, what was referred to as the 'Approved Church Programs' were initiated by the Immigration Department, to achieve closer co-ordination between agencies of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish faiths and Immigration officials. The Jewish agencies, (Canadian Jewish Congress and Jewish Immigrant Aid Society) were particularly active, and were committed to responsibility for all Jewish immigrants coming forward under the Scheme -- although as indicated elsewhere, they did not always meet this 'sponsorship' guarantee.

An attempt was made by the Department to restrict the religious organizations' activities to reception matters, but in 1960 they indicated a desire to actively participate again and new discussions were held between the agencies and the government. The Department wished to get a more binding 'guarantee' regarding sponsorship responsibilities, but certain problems of coordination and liaison still exist and are a continuing concern for all involved.

Nevertheless, immigration officials have strived over the years to work as closely as possible with religious organizations so that immigration generally and immigrants in particular might benefit from their combined interests. Apart from the actions of specific officers (which, because of human nature, cannot always be predictable nor controlled completely) an honest effort has been made by the Immigration Department to ensure objectivity and the absence of any religious bias. There is no evidence to substantiate any charge of favoritism, unless one considers the extra concessions made to J.I.A.S. as referred to above. As a general rule, any religious information available to the Department is obtained simply for the benefit of the individual since it will facilitate the work of welcoming committees in assisting the newcomers after arrival.

That a large number of Italians have been brought into the country is one thing; that, by and large, Italians happen to be Roman Catholic is another, and purely coincidental fact. The real reason there are so many Italians is because of the admission regulations pertaining to 'sponsored' relatives

and the sociological fact that the moment one Italian comes to Canada he begins to work to bring in all his relatives, both near and distant. The only alternative to a large annual flow of Italians is to change the regulations; because of the political repercussions that such a move would engender, this is precisely what Parliament has been loathe to do.

Voluntary Agencies It is difficult to differentiate between the role of voluntary or non-governmental agencies generally and religious organizations because, for example, the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society is both one and the other as are the Catholic Immigration Aid Society and others.

To attempt to assess the role of these various organizations as a factor in influencing policy is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Certainly not everyone is agreed on the nature of the role they should or could play. For example, when the matter was discussed by the Departmental Advisory Council (D.A.C.I.) at its October 4, 1954 meeting there was a strong consensus that voluntary agencies were spending considerable sums of money overseas, in the pre-selection of immigrants, which might better be spent assisting immigrants after their arrival in Canada. Some members argued for curtailment of the overseas activities of voluntary agencies. Canadian Department of Labour officials considered the agencies' activities should be kept at a minimum where placement was concerned also.

A contrast to this attitude was that of the Minister of Immigration addressing a meeting a month later between federal officials and representatives of voluntary agencies. Mr. Pickersgill thanked them for their 'valuable cooperation' in the past and hoped..."that such cooperation would continue to grow."

There was such a controversy at that particular meeting with regard to what the role of the agencies would be, if they were not permitted to function overseas at the pre-selection level that another meeting had to be held in November and they never really did come to a decision.

The church and religious agencies were interested in operating in the pre-selection field, of course, because they could gather together potential migrants who belonged to a specific faith. One example of a voluntary agency concerned with a particular faith was the J.I.A.S. which has been working for many years on behalf of people of Jewish religion. J.I.A.S. and the Canadian Jewish Congress annually present briefs to the federal government, and at all times bring pressure to bear on the Immigration Department requesting (and sometimes demanding) special concessions for Jewish immigrants.

After the Second World War they worked for the admission of D.P.'s on the grounds of humanitarianism (as did numerous other religious groups and voluntary agencies). Actually both J.I.A.S. and Canadian Jewish Congress seem to have enjoyed good relations with the Immigration Department. They were consistently urging wider 'admissible classes',¹ especially

1. For example: On June 2, 1949 they made a plea in a brief to Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for (among other things) enlargement of the 'close relative' category and widening of definition of French citizens as laid down in P.C. 2743. (They wished it changed from 'citizens born in France' to 'citizens' only -- obviously because they were greatly interested in bringing in North African Jews, most of whom, incidentally, were French-speaking.)

in the 'close relative' category and managed to bring in several otherwise 'unadmissible' immigrants by having special orders-in-council passed.

Similarly, at the time of the Hungarian revolution they played an important role. At first they agreed to do this from their own funds but subsequently they requested (and were granted) reimbursement for monies spent. (About \$32,500 was paid in one instance.)

Again, when the restrictions were brought into force regarding regulations for 'close-relative' classes in 1959, pressures were brought to bear by both J.I.A.S. and C.J.C. The Executive Director of the Canadian Jewish Congress was one of the first to be informed of the rescinding of the Order in a letter April 24, 1959 from the Director of Immigration.

Space does not permit an account of all the concessions granted these groups, to say nothing of the personal courtesies extended their officials on trips abroad, etc., re immigration matters.

In fact, the concessions made were so many that some Department officials in 1964 decided to re-assess the situation and to establish with J.I.A.S. a better form of sponsorship guarantee system. However, J.I.A.S. did not wish to accept an agreement of guarantee as drawn up by the Department and suggested a revised wording of their own.

Evidence is conclusive that, through constant representation to Immigration authorities in Ottawa, J.I.A.S. has been able to obtain numerous concessions and favours for the work that they do for Jewish immigrants and it does appear that other ethnic groups and associations are not granted the same types of concession. It may, of course, stem from the fact that others are not quite so active, either in aiding immigrants or in making personal representations to the Minister.

As an illustration of one of their projects, some reference to their role in the North African immigration question is of interest. Large numbers of Jews in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria had been trying to migrate for some time but, as far as Canada was concerned, it appeared impossible because they did not meet the regulations for admission and, in any event, Canadian officials had no facilities there for interview, etc. The Jewish organizations, who were very interested in this matter of pre-selection, worked hard preparing lists of persons requiring approval of authorities to move to Canada.

Just as they had done over the years with other movements of Jews, the Canadian Jewish Congress and other Jewish agencies continued to pressure the Canadian government to allow admission of Jews from North Africa (particularly Morocco and Tunisia).

The Director of Immigration had some reservations about the security risk involved with a particular group of Jews bearing Sherifian passports, because they were not considered nationals of France and therefore not eligible for the Minister's waiver then in effect. Later, however, security was waived for this group, too, and admissions were granted under special orders-in-council.

The reason was said to be that humanitarianism was more important than the security risk in these cases. Some questioned this and pointed up that pressure had been exerted, noting that some of the groups were business people of considerable means.

The Director of the Société d'Assistance aux Immigrants (Rev. Messier) warned there might be a danger in selecting school teachers from the North African group because they were mostly leftists, if not communists. The Jewish organizations (J.I.A.S. and C.J.C.) argued that the plight of the Jews in Morocco was just about the worst in any place in the world at the time (1961).

Judging from the correspondence on file, the Minister and his senior officials in the Immigration Department met frequently with the heads of the Jewish Congress and J.I.A.S.

all through this period.¹ Apparently careful attention was paid to these pressure groups and decisions were made accordingly. On this particular matter the organizations were reminded that the department did not want any publicity given to this, if at all possible. Press clippings indicate reluctance of Quebec people to accept Algerian French at this time, even though the overwhelming proportion of those arriving were French-speaking. Theories were expressed that among the group were fascists and members of terrorist organizations.

The fact that J.I.A.S. had so-called 'sponsored' these groups led to some ill-feeling on another score. Rather large numbers began to show up on 'welfare' in the Toronto area particularly, and J.I.A.S. was accused of going back on its word of guarantee that they would not become public charges.

The Immigration officer's report of the 1965 team effort to select Moroccan Jews, in effect, objected to the special arrangements being made for Jews. He pointed out that, since Immigration officers were working under the

1. Note - After one of these meetings between the Minister (Favreau) and heads of Jewish agencies, this memo was recorded: "With respect to the security risk posed by Jewish Immigration, we concluded that it was minimal. The Jewish Customs and Religion which govern their way of life to a considerable extent are incompatible with communism, and the Jews are therefore unlikely to be subversive on the whole. There are, of course, a few renegades and some who are idealistic communists holding rather high positions in Iron Curtain countries, but the chances of their emigrating are slim."

umbrella of the British Embassy, the Moroccan authorities might misinterpret the whole matter and subject the British authorities to unfavorable reaction.

Pressure from J.I.A.S. was resented, he felt, and he recommended that J.I.A.S. should work in Canada on the reception end of things rather than pressuring at the admission stage in Africa.

The work of the non-governmental agencies in furthering the aims of immigration is a matter of record. Ministers of Immigration, who seem to have a habit of addressing the meetings of Associations such as the J.I.A.S. have often praised them for their interests in immigrant welfare. Their "dedication to service" has been described as "an inspiration"¹, but the amount of influence they have had on policy is rather difficult to assess.

Practically every national organization, (and many which are local or regional only), interested in immigration to any degree, presents a brief or resolutions to the Minister -- usually annually. These are always received politely, and the organization is told its views will be considered carefully by the Department. The difficulty is that there are a great many of these, and often the same recommendations

1. Hon. R.A. Bell, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration speaking to Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, Toronto January 20, 1963.

are to be found in several briefs at the same time so that it is impossible to tell which ones influence the government and to what extent. Officials themselves claim that they give careful consideration to all such briefs and incorporate the views, where possible, into policies currently in effect.

A cynic could state that, regardless of public opinion, the Department (particularly its Minister) goes right on doing nothing. For example, practically every brief presented in the last decade or more has urged 'complete revision of the Immigration Act'. Nearly every critic in Parliament has done likewise, yet there is still no sign of a new Act being introduced.

Professional Societies Speakers at a recent conference¹ claimed that Canada was guilty of a gross waste of manpower, particularly in professional categories, because no level of government takes responsibility for teaching the immigrants English or French. They also claimed governments had let the professional bodies go too far in making restrictive rules to "keep out" professionals from other countries. It was argued that the professional associations have too much power in this respect and that their standards differ from one place in Canada to another.

1. Sponsored by COSTI, the Italian Immigrant Education Association November 12 and 13, 1965 in Toronto -- as quoted by the Toronto Globe and Mail, November 15, 1965.

The charges that the medical, dental, engineering, nursing and numerous other professional organizations make it impossible for immigrants (especially those without much knowledge of English or French) to engage in their profession, have been made consistently by numerous immigrants (and by interested associations on their behalf) for many years. Canadian professional organizations have not been anxious to see an influx of individuals arriving in Canada to compete in their professions, and it would appear that such matters should be taken up with the appropriate authorities and resolved, so that Canada's national interest would be served as, indeed, would the interest of the individuals and the professional societies concerned. Certain provincial governments have, after some difficulties, (viz., the Saskatchewan Medical Dispute) overcome the professional organization's influence but, on the whole, the problem remains unresolved.

Citizenship. One factor which, (particularly over the long-term), most definitely influences the immigrant flow is the reception accorded new arrivals in any given area. Obviously, the attitude of his neighbours, or the public generally, will have a great bearing on whether the immigrant will stay; more importantly, it will influence his decision of whether or not to encourage relatives and friends to follow his example and immigrate into Canada.

In this task of assisting the immigrant, non-governmental organizations of various descriptions -- professional, business, labour, religious, and particularly the Immigrant Aid Societies -- do much toward easing the transition period of the newly-arrived from his former way of life to that of a Canadian citizen.

Added to the work of non-governmental associations is that of the government body known as the Citizenship Branch, which is part of the federal government's Department of Citizenship and Immigration. (Some provincial governments, such as Ontario, also have a similar branch to handle matters of citizenship.)

The Citizenship Branch of the federal Government has as its main task the development of community programs to facilitate the rapid adjustment of immigrants to Canadian life, and particularly to 'educate' the community toward an enlightened attitude with respect to the immigrant and immigration. It operates through its liaison officers, who work with all those bodies interested, not only in immigrants, but in citizenship generally. To assist the immigrant to integrate more easily, the Citizenship Branch encourages him to learn one of Canada's national languages. However, as education is a provincial responsibility, the federal government has felt itself obliged to tread very

lightly in this respect. It organizes classes indirectly, by entering into agreements with the provincial government education departments.

A great deal remains to be done in this area, as detailed in the previous chapter. Concern over immigrants' welfare varies from province to province and from community to community. Often the degree of concern depends upon the size and type of the community -- rural or urban, industrialized or otherwise, and so on -- in particular, it depends upon the number of immigrants living in the area. In cities like Toronto (which has a phenomenally large immigrant population), the need for immigrant services and facilities is so substantial as to warrant the full-time attention of numerous organizations, both governmental and voluntary. Sometimes it becomes necessary for the community to demand that its local city or municipal council take action on behalf of both the immigrant and society.

Officials of the Immigration Department claim that their best testimonials for the purpose of recruitment of new immigrants are the "glowing letters to the folks back home." No amount of promotional work by an immigration officer can begin to get the favourable response elicited by the letters of a satisfied and happy immigrant. Nor can official arguments overcome the 'adverse' effects if

the immigrant is discouraged or disillusioned with his Canadian surroundings. The social evils that follow a breakdown in concern for citizenship -- lack of proper housing, employment, education, medical care, and welfare in general-- are surely too well-known to be repeated here.

Society ignores, at its own peril, the attitudes, work and opinions of the immigrant organizations which are making a concerted effort to understand the human, everyday needs of immigrants and to serve them as best they can, usually with far-too-limited resources. Government today, therefore, must be alive to the implications of 'citizenship' needs. The present federal 'Citizenship Branch', which really began its work in the post-war period, has always thought in terms of integration (not assimilation) of all ethnic groups (and, incidentally, most of its directors have been French Canadian), in order to be 'Canadians', not 'hyphenated Canadians'. How this goal could ever be fitted into any so-called 'two-nation' concept is something about which the Citizenship officers themselves have expressed deep concern. The difficulties of a non-French, non-English immigrant who, in some cities, finds himself pulled by both cultures and 'pressured', in some instances, to declare himself pro-French or pro-English, place him in a dilemma. Newcomers do not want to concern themselves with this problem; they are concerned enough

with the practical problems of, first and foremost, economic integration. Neither do members of 'other' ethnic groups (other than French or English), who have resided in Canada for some time, desire to be 'identified' with one or the other. This will be discussed further in the section on 'ethnic balance', below. The point to be made at this juncture is that 'Citizenship' matters, where the immigrant is concerned, cannot be divorced from the politically controversial (and presently acute) problem of 'French-English' relations.

The public's attitude to immigrants is not easily assessed, because the question of immigration becomes enmeshed, far too often, in the emotionally-charged question of French-English relations which, in some respects, cannot be separated. Yet one has a right to ask, at least, the academic question: What is the public opinion in Canada with respect to immigration? and, of course, for this study, the further question: Does this opinion or attitude differ as between the French and English ethnic groups? This is the whole 'raison d'être' of this research.

The dimensions of the problem may be appreciated from what has been said so far. The charges, by the one group, that immigration policy, allegedly, has purposely upset a so-called 'ethnic balance' and thereby been detrimental to that ethnic group, make it imperative that this concept now be discussed in the context of the research data to this point.

Since this implies that 'ethnic balance' is the determining factor in the formulation of policy, we must examine all aspects of the matter carefully.

C. 'Ethnic Balance'

The term 'ethnic balance', with reference to Canada's population, means only one thing to a French Canadian. It is the ratio of persons of French origin to 'les anglais'. As indicated earlier, the difficulty comes when attempting to define 'les anglais' in this particular context.

The Canadian population cannot be dismissed as being composed of two only, ethnic parts; the question of the ratio or 'balance' between the two just is not relevant. That being so, in what sense can one speak of 'ratios'? What is the ethnic composition of Canada's population?

Since census statistics reveal the presence of persons of over 60 ethnic origins who cannot, under any stretch of the imagination be called English, for purposes of this discussion we can combine into one group persons of French ethnic origin, into another persons of British ethnic origin and into the third, persons of all 'other' ethnic groups. Do all three groups agree in their attitude toward immigration?

Public Opinion - First let us look at public opinion generally. Public attitudes concerning immigration have found expression, to greater or lesser degrees in many areas, but the present situation has developed rather markedly since the Second World War. Most of the current controversy surrounding immigration began about

1950, coincident with the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the rather drastic revision of Immigration Regulations which altered the basis of the Department's operations. In the years immediately preceeding, Canadian immigration had been more or less a simple matter -- with restricted categories and very small totals from 1930 to 1946.

Then from 1946 to 1950 immigration into Canada consisted mostly of servicemen and dependents, plus certain categories of refugees and D.P.'s; there were about 430,000 admissions, mostly in large groups. However, as a result of changes in the regulations in 1950 the period of 1951 to 1955 saw 709,000 immigrants admitted and the years 1956-60 brought in another 780,000. Almost all of these required immigration procedures involving individual selection, counselling and movement. Meanwhile the situation in Europe had changed from conditions giving rise to large numbers of eager migrants, to new circumstances of stiff competition among many countries seeking suitably-qualified immigrants.

It is probably accurate to say that the public criticism engendered following the war was the chief impetus giving rise to the 1950 changes in the regulations. In turn, the new terms of admission -- which increased the role of the Immigration Branch considerably, requiring new staff and facilities and bringing in thousands of newcomers -- set the stage for further increased public concern over the subject of immigration. Without the public reaction, changes would not have been wrought in the manner they

were. Improved services for immigrants were a necessity. (Not only the public, but the immigrants themselves and their national governments had been demanding them.)

The old days, when the immigrant was left to the laws of natural survival, had changed. As one of the senior officials in the Department pointed out, you have only to go back to the years preceding the war of 1939-45 to note the enormous change of governments' attitudes. They did not then accept any responsibility, to speak of, as far as the immigrant and his integration into the Canadian community were concerned. Immigrants were on their own to sink or swim. After the War, the Department and federal government generally -- and later the provincial governments -- began to accept certain limited responsibilities toward the individuals they brought into the country. A sort of limited health and welfare protection was provided for them through specific arrangements which were separate and distinct from the ordinary social welfare arrangements open to immigrants at the local level.

Gradually, various measures had been introduced -- welfare assistance was brought in in 1951 on a modest scale; assisted Passage Loan schemes in 1951; and even a type of Family Assistance grant in 1956 for the immigrant during his first year while not eligible for Family Allowance. Certain types of emergency hospital, medical and dental care, and emergency welfare assistance are now available under specific conditions during the immigrant's first year also.

All of these services were a reflection of the public's new attitude toward immigration generally. The specialized staff of the Department attempted to recruit, select and bring these immigrants to Canada and then place them in employment. There began in the fifties a system of 'follow-up' on problem cases and a much improved counselling service -- Out of all of this has developed a far different Immigration Branch than the one existing prior to 1950. The heavy criticism of the Department by the public and Parliament in the said fifties seemed to have had a salutary effect. Today, even though reorganization is still in progress and improvements are still lacking in some areas, the scale and quality of the immigration operations generally is far better than one could expect, considering the lack of initiative and decision, within the political sphere, with respect to immigration.

It is true that there are very few problems as politically sensitive as those which find their way to the desk of the Immigration Minister, and many an M.P. whose constituency is composed of a majority of some particular ethnic group has had cause to rue the day he ever heard the word "immigration". It is also true that governments, of course, react to political pressures and to ignore such can mean political suicide.

What should Canada's immigration policy be? Public opinion reflects answers ranging across the spectrum from the extremes of total restriction to unlimited entry with all degrees in between. Accordingly, to the politicians, the formulation of

responsible immigration policy should be one of the most complex and delicate of political tasks. But, depending upon the state of political affairs at any given time it has been, far too often, a case of the immigrant flow running hot and cold in the taps of government immigration policy.

Some politicians in the House of Commons have tried to play fast and loose with immigration policy. When in opposition they have criticized the government just for the sake of opposition and when in power have switched their arguments from offence to defence re the same policy. The Liberals and Conservative have been equally guilty. The ordinary taxpayer, in reading the record in Hansard, has every right to be indignant and to wonder why he continues to foot the bill for not only the politicians' cavalier attitude but their gross neglect¹ of sound policy to benefit Canada's national interest.

One is reminded of 18th and 19th century imperialist policies when continents were carved up by rival powers for the sake of selfish interest and so-called 'balance of power', with an utter disregard for the future interest of the peoples of the 'empires' concerned or, for that matter, of the long-term interest of the countries of which they themselves were leaders ! Had Canadian governments been made up of statesmen, rather than politicians, more concern might have been given to immigration policy. For

1. Neglect is also evident in another sense -- At one point in a debate on Immigration Estimates in the House of Commons September 25, 1964, there were only 25 out of Canada's 265 M.P.'s in their seats.

immigration, in a country such as Canada, will forever influence -- in fact, determine, -- its character, because it governs its present and future development. When one studies the actions of Canada's politicians as they pertain to immigration, one is tempted to doubt the efficacy of parliamentary democracy. Is it the fault of the men or the institution? One must conclude that both must share the blame.

Public opinion covers a wide range of attitudes, some of which stem wholly from prejudice or ignorance (or both). This writer has considered the findings of the various opinion polls on the subject but they are not significant with respect to points at issue in this study. Aside from the reservations about their accuracy as a reflection of public opinion, there is conflicting information in the limited data as given.

Also, not much is gained from the National survey conducted for this Research group which posed two questions on immigration. The replies confirmed the commonly held opinion that respondents of 'other' ethnic groups

...are most likely to answer affirmatively to the question of 'Does Canada need more immigrants?'; English Canadians are equally split between a positive and negative response, while 7 out of 10 French-Canadian respondents feel that Canada has already enough or too many immigrants.¹

Not enough information is available on the attitudes of each of the three major groupings under discussion, concerning which

1. Social Research Group: A Study on Inter-ethnic Relations in Canada 1965 p. 14

countries the immigrants should come from. This is another confused area; it is emotionally-charged and, until some thorough studies are done on the subject, repetition of all the well-worn myths does not dissolve the obscurity. In view of the lack of scientific data upon which to base any conclusions, the question of which immigrants assimilate best with the French Canadians and which with the non-French, remains unanswered. The writer is not unaware of the studies conducted, for example, on the Jews in Montreal (and in other cities). Most of these indicate a slight 'likelihood' that persons of Jewish origin (if French speaking) may assimilate better with the French-Canadian culture than the so-called English-Canadian culture. The findings of other small studies, which claim that Latin groups (especially if Roman Catholic) are slightly more acceptable to French Canadians than are other groups of immigrants, are no more conclusive. Much more research needs to be conducted in the total field of assimilation of immigrants of all ethnic groups; only then will it be possible to draw any conclusions on this controversial point.

One point that seems conclusive from many sources is that ethnic origin is really less important in the process of assimilation than are the social and economic conditions which the immigrant meets in his new environment. But even more significant is the individual's own personality and desire to become integrated into the community in which he finds himself a citizen. If the personal motivation for adaptation, or integration, is lacking, ethnic origin won't help.

A Controversial Concept. Repeating all that has been said on the

controversial subject of 'ethnic balance' would require a volume of encyclopaedic proportion, and most of it would be without basis in fact. In the very first instance, there was never any constitutional or other legislation which decreed that government policy on immigration must concern itself with any alleged 'ethnic balance'. In the last two decades, the policy most often quoted as being the basis for a definite federal policy to this effect, is the statement of Mackenzie King in 1947. Those guilty of quoting that are making a fundamental error. The conclusion seems to be irrefutable that when Mackenzie King said that the government policy was one of "no fundamental alteration in the character of our population", he simply meant a 'non-Asian' policy. He had brought the matter up in the context of his discussion on the alleged discrimination in Canadian policy occasioned by the Chinese Immigration Act. He had also pointed out that the government felt immigration of Japanese should not be permitted (an obvious carry-over of attitudes resulting from the just-completed war). He told the House of Commons, in his famous speech (quoted earlier) concerning immigration policy on May 1, 1947:

...There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population. Large-scale immigration from the orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population. Any considerable oriental immigration would, moreover, be certain to give rise to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. The government, therefore, has no thought of making any change in immigration regulations which

would have consequences of that kind...

Then he went right on to say that, apart from some minor changes,

...the government has no intention of removing the existing regulations respecting Asiatic immigration unless and until alternative measures of effective control have been worked out.

A further clear indication that the Prime Minister did not have the so-called 'French-English' balance in mind when he spoke of his policy of "no fundamental changes in the composition of the population," was evident in the nature of 'admissible classes' at the time he was speaking -- In fact, only certain British subjects and United States citizens were then included in the preferential groups. Citizens of France were not even mentioned and actually did not enjoy similar considerations in law, until the Order-in-Council PC 4186 of September 16, 1948 placed them in exactly the same position regarding admissibility to Canada, as British subjects and citizens of the United States. The question of any "French-English balance" never even entered his mind. (Even though that statement may be a little hard on the French-Canadian ego, it is, nevertheless, a fact.)

It would seem to this researcher that the perpetration of any such contention does more harm than good. A single glance at Chart No. 2 will show the ethnic composition at the first census following Confederation and for 1961 and the intervening decennial ones as well.

It should also be quite apparent that if such an 'ethnic balance' were in question, it is the British group that has been affected by immigration and not the French, since the ratio of British to the total population has declined from 60.55% in 1871 to 43.84% in 1961 while the French ratio has remained practically constant. This means, obviously enough, that as the 'other ethnic' group¹ has risen and the British percentage has correspondingly fallen, the French are fast becoming the largest single ethnic group which is homogeneous and culturally distinct. (Only a statistician would group the Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English in one unit when speaking in terms of ethnic origins!)

1. This group is gradually becoming aware of its role and may become more articulate concerning the argument that the 'French-British' origin controversy is not the only battle to be won on the immigration field.

Chart No. 2

	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>% British</u>	<u>% French</u>	<u>% Others</u>
1871	3,485,761	60.55	31.09	8.38
1881	4,324,810	58.9	30.0	12.1
1891	4,833,239	*	29.07	*
1901	5,371,315	57.03	30.71	12.26
1911	7,206,643	55.49	28.61	15.90
1921	8,787,949	55.40	27.91	16.69
1931	10,376,786	51.85	28.22	19.93
1941	11,506,655	49.68	30.27	20.05
1951	14,009,429	47.89	30.83	21.28
1961	18,238,247	43.84	30.37	25.79

Immigration figures indicate that up until 1925 the annual proportion of British immigrants was approximately 50%; this was the chief reason the British proportion in the total remained in the vicinity of 55% to 57%.

However, from then on statistics of the immigrant flow reveal (except for the post-war years which indicate entry of Canadian servicemen's wives and dependants) a steady decrease in the British content of the total immigration and a steady rise in the category of 'others', chiefly because of Italian immigration.

To generalize, one could say that in the first quarter of the century the British proportion fell less than 2% while in the second quarter the drop was more than 7½ and then more

* In 1891 the only classification by origin was between French and all others.

sharply as the 1961 census shows. This represents a drop of 13.19% for the British since 1901, while the French ratio is practically identically the same.¹

If this trend persists (assuming the factors of immigration flow and rate of natural growth continue more or less as at present), the ethnic composition will be as follows: The proportion of British by the end of this century will have declined to approximately 25% of the total population with the French remaining roughly as at present and the proportion of 'others' rising rather rapidly to 45% or more. One can justifiably say that in 1961 the ratio of Canadians of French origin to the total population differed only a fraction of 1% from the proportion it held when the first census was taken right after confederation.

-
1. A slight drop had occurred in the French ratio between 1901 and 1931 but during the depression the drop in the Anglo-Saxon birthrate, coupled with low immigration, brought the French back again to the proportion it held both in 1901 and 1881.

Emigration¹ is a vital factor unmentioned so far, and although no official figures are available, consideration should be given to it. Some persons argue that immigration has not made any appreciable net difference over the decades, and quote figures as if they are the final and conclusive word. In fact, some rather superficial studies have tried to maintain that immigrants with no or few skills come to Canada, while highly skilled or professional native Canadians are driven out.

1. As was pointed out previously, many of those who leave have been French Canadians. One of the many reasons for this exodus was given by a member of Parliament recently. He told the House:..."out of the thousands of French immigrants that we have received within the last two generations, many have left the country. As a matter of fact, before I was elected to this house and at the request of the American consul, I used to translate and clerk the documents of the French and Belgian people who wished to obtain a certificate executed and authenticated by a notary. ...From the outset, namely some time before 1954 or 1955 I cannot remember a single week when I was not required to translate such documents for French people who had immigrated to Canada and were going to the United States. When they were asked why they were doing so, they answered: 'Well, here, in Canada, the weather is very cold'. Most of these immigrants were coming, so it seems, from southern France, and they were going to California. We could not keep them here and this is the reason for this lack of balance in the field of immigration. (Mr. Marcel Lambert, House of Commons Debates (revised) December 20, 1963 p. 6248)

In the same debate, another French-speaking member (Grégoire) pointed out that many French Canadians left for the United States to "take advantage of the social legislation in that country."

There is no substantiation in fact for these charges. There is no need, either, to re-state here the arguments advanced by noted economists (Dr. M.F. Timlin and others) who have refuted such shallow analyses of the situation.

Space does not permit a re-working of the ground or even a listing of the research studies on emigration but those which attempt seriously to determine the nature of this "outflow" have concluded, that there is no substantiation for the popular cry of 'brain drain'. There was, on the contrary, a net inflow of approximately 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ million people to Canada in the post-war years to 1963 and, to quote only one special study prepared by the Economic Council of Canada:

...It may be conservatively estimated that it would have cost \$532 million (in 1961 prices) for Canada to have duplicated the additional university instruction, books and facilities embodied in the education of professional immigrants arriving in this country during the period 1953-63. In the same period, emigration of professionals to the United States accounted for the outflow of about \$292 million in educational costs, leaving an estimated net gain of \$240 million on these movements.¹

A data paper compiled by Dr. E. F. Sheffield, Director of Research for the Canadian Universities Foundation, analyses the movement of highly qualified persons in and out of Canada. He also concludes that 'gain not drain' is the net result of the exchange.

While in the past most of these professional people (Parai says more than 50%) have come of their own volition from Britain,

1. Parai, Louis, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower during the Post-War Period; prepared for the Economic Council of Canada, June 1965, p. 4

there has been no evidence of a similar desire on the part of professionals from France to come to Canada. However, considerable effort has been and is being expended by the federal immigration branch (and latterly by the province of Quebec), to encourage French-speaking persons in the professions to come to Canada.

The same errors are committed by critics who make statements about so-called 'brain-drains' as by those who charge discrimination against the French Canadian in the 'ethnic balance' arguments without taking the trouble to check the facts.

Illustrations If further evidence is needed, in addition to what has been stated in earlier pages of this report, the immigration department files reveal many instances which would indicate the contrary to any charge of actively promoting British immigration at all times. For example, despite excessive pressure brought to bear upon them in the immediate post-war years, by numerous organizations and individuals, the government actually feared to bring to Canada some of the large numbers of war-casualty British children for adoption -- surely a humanitarian cause if there ever was one.

Whether reluctance to act was because Ottawa felt that any influx of British children would disturb French-Canadian politicians (as was charged by many) is impossible to tell from the information available. Official files indicate that the federal government excused its position for far too long by saying this was a provincial matter and no concern of Ottawa.

It is interesting to note that in the United States, (with similar constitutional problems), when pressures were brought to bear about adoption of countless Korean orphans during and after that disastrous war, the United States government recognized the problem by emergency legislation outside the regular immigration policies. Another fact of note on Department files is this statement, by a French-Canadian officer who was far from pro-British. He had been sent to London in 1950 to check the federal government immigration facilities there. He reported back to Ottawa:

...it is no exaggeration to say that the Weymouth St. premises are a disgrace by any standards of appraisal... By comparison with our offices¹ on the continent it would rather seem that we are placing the accent on Continental emigration.

-
1. While in 1950 the cry was a desperate one for new accommodation, just a year previously the Ontario Government had offered the federal government their 'Rainbow Corner' premises at a very modest price, but the federal government had refused. The provincial government had made the offer in a letter of October 14, 1949 saying that it understood the federal government was extending its services and accordingly it was curtailing its own...Our government is most anxious to cooperate with yours, and as there is such an acute shortage of suitable office space in the heart of London we wish to give you the first opportunity...The Ontario government had also mentioned the availability of 23 trained staff personnel which they would be releasing. The federal government, however, did not accept the offer and after a lengthy delay moved at considerable cost into a modest establishment. The following year, there was a request for funds to re-decorate because of the poor impression the offices presented to potential immigrants. The letter stated, "The interior at present is a disgrace to the Canadian government"...The pleading went on for several years with the cries becoming more strident -- in fact, one H.Q. officer (the same French-Canadian who had gone previously) sent over to investigate called the place a 'hell hole of Calcutta' saying "if we are to stay in business something has to be done -- the London, Glasgow and Liverpool offices are disgraces ! I cannot see for the life of me how we can talk of a land of opportunity when we are dealing with people in such shabby and dismal offices".

This subject of facilities brings up the question of overseas staff, and whether or not the charges of discrimination against the French-speaking immigrants have any validity.

Is a bilingual image of Canada projected by the immigration officers abroad? This could only be definitely established by a thorough study of the offices abroad but, as far as the data available to this researcher was concerned, there is nothing to indicate that this is not so. Every effort is made to advise the potential immigrant of the exact conditions he will find in Canada, whether he settles in Quebec or in any of the other provinces.

The charges that immigration officers misled immigrants regarding the economic prospects in Canada may have been true 15 years ago but are not today except, perhaps, in isolated cases when a particular officer, (human nature being what it is) might err in some specific instance.¹

-
1. Similarly in the case of discrimination on the grounds of prejudice, it is possible that there has been a desire on the part of certain officials at given times in specific places to allow personal biases to deter them from an objective implementation of policy. It is easy, of course, for any one particular immigration officer to put obstacles in the paths (or on the other hand, to oil the wheels, so to speak) in order that an immigrant may or may not be permitted entry.

How often this has been the case would be impossible to ascertain, simply because it is impossible to calculate how many times the spoken word or shrug of the shoulder in a discussion between a prospective immigrant and the official concerned has deterred or postponed forever the chance to emigrate. Whether proportionately more French-speaking immigrants have met with this kind of treatment than English or non-French-speaking persons is pure conjecture, owing to the simple fact that there is absolutely no way to tell. However, what one individual does is not necessarily government policy.

As general policy and in 99% of the cases officials do attempt to dispel any misunderstandings or myths which the potential immigrant may have about Canada. They try also, of course, to point out all the good points of the country and, as far as possible, to be fair to all parts of Canada. Literature provided by the Department to all immigrants, prior to their departure for Canada, clearly states the Quebec 'fact' and material is printed in both official languages (as well as others).

The Department claims that, as a general policy, and wherever possible, officers at overseas posts are selected on the basis of ability to speak the language of the country to which they are posted.

This is not the place to make any critique of the Department with respect to the perennial shortages of qualified personnel due to poor salaries and nearly impossible administrative tasks (in view of the hopelessly outdated laws and regulations). All of these factors combine to make anyone who is at all familiar with the whole procedure marvel that the Department's officials do as well as they do. Considering the constant 'reorganizations', which seem to come with the inordinantly frequent changes of Ministers, and the endless surveys by one Commission or another, the writer feels that the Immigration Branch personnel should no doubt be commended, just as those politically responsible should be strongly condemned for allowing the circumstances of the past decades to exist and persist.

Charges are made by some French Canadians that expenditures in the U.K. are enormous in comparison with those in France. Aside from the fact that expenditures are not in themselves significant and are really quite meaningless in view of all the factors involved, those who quote them to substantiate discrimination charges ignore a very important fact. The amount spent in terms of the number of immigrants received places the exorbitant expenditures in France, not the reverse. In a return concerning expenditures tabled in the House of Commons (March 25, 1964) in reply to a question as to the amounts spent by the Department in the years 1960 - 63 inclusive, the figures given show that the offices in France spent more money than those in Italy and a third of the amount spent in Britain. In view of the fact that Italy and Britain were the two largest sources of immigrants, whereas France provides a negligible few, the criticism, etc., might well be levelled at this extravagance in the French operations as a misuse of taxpayers' money, considering the returns for dollars spent.

This is just one more illustration that there are innumerable factors behind any given set of statistics, but perhaps the final word on this 'ethnic balance' concept, as it pertains to present federal government policy, would be the following questions ¹ and replies given in the House of Commons on April 20, 1966 by the

1. House of Commons Debates (Daily Edition) April 20, 1966 p.4042.

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration:

Questions: Does the government have an immigration policy which favours alike the two ethnic groups of Canada and, if so, does the same policy apply to each of the provinces of Canada?

In what way does the immigration policy of Canada take into account the French ethnic group in Quebec?

Answers: There is no difference in Canada's immigration policy with respect to the two major ethnic groups of Canada. The same policy applies to all provinces of Canada.

Canada's immigrant selection policy is not based in any way upon the ethnic origin of immigrants. The policy is to select those immigrants who are likely to become self supporting members of the Canadian community regardless of their ethnic origin.

Summary In the face of the evidence of attempts by the federal government to bring in French-speaking persons, even when the majority of Quebec's population -- and certainly her government -- were not in the slightest degree interested, one wonders how French Canadians can legitimately complain today about the lack of immigration from France. Even going back to the days when the area belonged to France, only 1200 immigrants came in the space of over half a century, from 1608 to 1660. In fact, as late as 1636, one hundred and two years after Jacques Cartier, there were only 200 Frenchmen in Canada ! By 1672, emigration from France virtually ceased and the 'mother land' turned its back on the colony, where life was anything but easy. Nearly a hundred years later, the English became responsible for the area--

The French Canadians can hardly blame 'les anglais' for their own lack of development. They had few ties with France, and after the French Revolution they had even less, for the clergy had "written off" post-revolutionary France as a lost child of the church.

The English have been blamed for everything that the French Canadian considers is wrong with his position. That there are factors on both sides is irrefutable, but the claims that English policies have been conceived deliberately to keep the French Canadian down are a different matter -- ... "it is dubious whether such extreme allegations can be substantiated."¹

The same writers go on to indicate that the French-Canadian poverty and poor education are due to specific values and traditions of the French-Canadian group and are not the result of prejudice or discrimination exercised by English Canadians. But they also point out that while there is no objective basis for the French-Canadian attitude, the fact that they hold, subjectively, this attitude is in itself the determining factor covering the state of relations between the two groups.

Perhaps one of the reasons why French Canadians hold to these views is because small politicians have catered to the prejudices on both sides and have used "immigration" as a tool to

1. Charles Wagley and Marian Harris, The French Canadians, one of six case studies on Minorities in the New World, based on reports to UNESCO of social scientists, Columbia Press, N.Y. and London, 1964, p. 170.

further their endless political machinations. Selfish ends have taken precedence over Canada's well-being. Pursuing personal gain is disgusting enough at any time, but knowingly dividing the country on the basis of English-French prejudices should be tantamount to treason.

The only solution, as far as immigration is concerned, is to lift policy out of the sphere of influence of the petty 'ward-heeler', the lobbyist, M.P., backbencher and Cabinet rank alike. Policy that moulds a nation should be above the level of bartering, especially when it means prostituting national interest for immediate political gain.

In a Parliamentary democracy, laws have to be made by Parliament, but can this not be in the hands of a Joint Senate and House of Commons Standing Committee, which bases its reports and actions on the recommendations of a non-governmental advisory committee of objective experts, involving both the federal and provincial representatives.

Up until now legislators have not had the courage to spell out policy and have left the onus on the Immigration Department. Full-fledged debates in Parliament have been conspicuous by their absence because of the potential political repercussions. Certainly the delay in bringing in new legislation has not been the fault of the Department itself; in recent years there have been over 15 drafts prepared, all of which have been thrown out for a variety of reasons -- all political.

Is it not time to lay the ghost of 'ethnic balance' and 'detrimental policies' to this one group or that? In the past, the government, whenever it did make policy announcements, has claimed to be 'encouraging immigration' -- a nebulous and meaningless aim in light of the results. As one writer has said, they profess to be interested, but take no action; it is like a motorist fiddling with all the buttons on the dashboard to make the car go, while neglecting to accelerate the gas pedal.

If Canada wants immigrants, let a decision be made on what kind, and then plan a policy accordingly and put an end to the polemics over this controversial concept of 'ethnic balance'.

CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS

There are two conclusions and some comments.

1. The first conclusion from this research is that there should be no conclusions because the study is not complete; much has been left undone, due to inadequate time for the necessary research; glaring omissions of material are obvious and questions remain unanswered -- not from intent but from necessity.
2. The second conclusion is that both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians should stop perpetuating the myths and half-truths of the past. Quebec has hidden itself behind its motto, 'Je me souviens' and has allowed the past to colour its concepts of the present, while the rest of Canada has been too ready to leave them buried. Where are the philosophers to call all Canadians to an honest, contemplative consideration of the kinds of national goals so essential for the betterment of all? While the battles of yesteryear are stupidly re-fought with worn-out clichés and shabby prejudices, the bright young present slips from our grasp and the promises of the future are drastically postponed -- if not lost forever.

.. .. .

Following from the above, this report as it now stands, leads to these comments:

'Immigration' has been the red flag around which have rallied all those who wished to vent their annoyance or displeasure at the state of so-called French-English relations

in Canada. Both groups have erred excessively in this respect. Too many emotionally-charged statements have been made, sans knowledge, sans reason, sans honesty, sans justice but above all, sans sympathetic or compassionate understanding.

It is amazingly simple, for those who wish to ignore the facts, to draw inferences from annual statistics of immigrant flow and prate them to justify one's own particular cause without making any attempt to determine the significance of those figures or the reasons behind their existence.

In truth there should be only three questions to ask. Does Canada need immigrants? If so, what kind or type? and from where are they obtainable?

Honest answers to these would form the basis for the formulation of national policy objectives in the immigration field. Is there enough goodwill among today's leaders to make the effort to find those solutions?

What should Canada's immigration policy be? What is a Canadian? Considering how often this latter question has gone unanswered and the number of years that men have sought in vain for this Holy Grail -- Canadian identity -- it is not surprising that national objectives in immigration are non-existent. In the absence of any 'grand destiny', is it possible to fashion a viable immigration policy?

If you have no destination, how do you decide the road to take, the direction to go, the speed to travel or even the mode of transportation?

Today's planning must precede tomorrow's development -- unless one is satisfied with 'Topsy-like' growth - but 17th and 18th century concepts will not nourish a child of the space age. A government that will not act does not stand still; it regresses, for it cannot defy the natural laws of development in a scientific and technological age. Closing a door will not stop the trends of the times -- the population explosions and the empty bellies await without. -- Those basking in the midst of plenty may keep the bars up just so long and no more.

The question is, do you throw wide the door to receive the guest before the feast is prepared? Should not planning for economic development precede immigration policy? Where are the national economic goals? Who is to achieve those goals and on what basis do we proceed?

Surely governments which lack vision and vacillate back and forth reacting to every pressure, however contradictory, cannot lead a country to greatness. Perhaps the French - English schizophrenia is at the basis of this uncertainty over, or lack of agreement upon, national aims. After a century of unwillingness or inability to cooperate, because of years of misunderstanding, (intentional or otherwise), is it too late for frank discussions as to what constitutes national interest in this field of immigration? Cannot both levels of government -- federal and provincial, whether French-speaking or English-speaking -- agree on a policy which will meet the needs of all?

The next hundred years may not be as forgiving of our sins of omission.. The judgment of History can be as relentless as the sea.

One of the questions which this study was expected to examine was whether or not immigration policy could be directly related to changes in the ethnic composition of the population, officially planned to the detriment of the French-speaking portion. I am obliged to conclude in all intellectual honesty that any such relationship on the part of the federal government is impossible to substantiate from the data which this researcher was able to consult, and that continual exploration of such a thesis appears to be an exercise in futility.

The results of federal immigration policy, that is, the bringing to Canada of various individuals of diverse ethnic origins obviously may or may not change the composition of our population at any one given time or over the long-term; but that is not to say that the causal factors are necessarily related to the effects, nor is it to say that any one ethnic group is favored to the exclusion of all or some one particular ethnic type.

To say that there is such a cause and effect relationship is to be guilty of gross over-simplification and to misunderstand the whole machinery of immigration policy, to say nothing of mis-judging the intent of the officials of the immigration department or misconstruing governmental policies -- when and if they could be ascertained. To impugn motives to civil servants who, by and large, have simply been carrying out

their duties under what are sometimes next to impossible conditions obliged, as they often are, to uphold untenable situations, is downright dishonest. Further, to say that government policy has been consistently and consciously directed to 'use' immigration for a pre-determined end vis-à-vis the English-French problem is to over-estimate the Machiavellian capacities of cabinet ministers who, far too often, have not even been interested in the subject of immigration except to the degree that the public forced them to act or react, let alone capable of master-minding any such scheme - particularly such a politically suicidal plot.

There never has been, in Canada, a Prime Minister or any federal Cabinet Minister responsible for Immigration (other than possibly, Clifford Sifton) who was really totally committed to the concept of a long-term, planned, immigration policy for Canada. Again, apart from Sifton, there does not even appear to have been an 'immigration minister' dedicated to any overall policy or, for that matter, not even for one particular policy, (good or bad), for any length of time. The reason for this situation (which on the surface appears a strange phenomenon in a country of such immense geographical proportion and vast population potential in view of the immense natural resources) is that the question is a politically volatile one -- a veritable 'government breaker' if mishandled. As is typical in controversial political problems, the solution (for most Canadian politicians, at least) was to do as little as possible in order not to rock the political boat. A weak response to an urgent call here, a reaction of sorts to another prod there but always

with a careful eye to the weighing of the immediate advantages and disadvantages as far as the Government of the day is concerned, given the political situation in the body politic at that particular time.

If any federal Government had been truly committed to a principle of positive immigration of any real consequence, Canada today would have had a population of roughly equal proportion to her southern neighbor, the United States. As it is, just one of its fifty states, California, has a population closely approximating the whole of Canada!

To study the larger question of a general immigration policy would indeed be worth the effort of a great number of researchers. A large body of factual evidence to substantiate the charge that Canada's immigration policy is detrimental to Canada's national interest would be relatively easy to document. However, to say that the policy has been more harmful to one particular ethnic group as opposed to another is quite a different matter. The only case that can be made conclusively is that Canada's record of immigration policy and administrative practice substantiates, very clearly, during certain periods of history, a marked discrimination against Asians and negroes but there is no substantiation for a federal policy purposely discriminating against or detrimental to, French Canadians.

That during certain periods of her development, Canada preferred particular nationalities and categories to the extent of making greater efforts to induce them does not detract from the statement that federal immigration policy has not intentionally been detrimental to French Canada. That the policy of one

of Canada's provinces (Ontario), at given points in her history, preferred one ethnic group to all others - although not to the exclusion of others - is a matter wholly within that province's right and any other province could have done likewise. But to be pro-British is not necessarily to be anti-French.

Except for one short period (Sifton era) Canada has never had a clearly-defined, positive or aggressive federal immigration policy. It would probably be true to say that the reason for this was that, owing to the external factors governing international migration for most of this time, any large-scale movement would have been suspect as far as the French Canadians were concerned -- or so the federal Cabinets were led to believe. Accordingly, rather than risk overt political opposition, the federal government for most of the time remained passive, accepting just those it wished out of the many who fortunately found their ways to its shores. To some extent immigration was left to the Provincial governments and most of them, in turn, for numerous reasons, let it run its natural course. Outside of Ontario and Quebec, the provinces neither assisted nor hindered the flow to any appreciable extent.

By default then, the provinces exerted no real authority in this field. All of which suited Quebec admirably, for this meant that for over half a century nothing of consequence was really done. A policy of large scale immigration, to some French Canadians, would have meant a strengthening of the foe. For the extreme nationalists, it would have postponed the day when they expected to outnumber Canadians of British origin and, hopefully, someday even to form the majority of the population.

Perhaps the surest indication that no really strong policy of promoting a heavy immigration flow to Canada has existed since Sifton's day, is the very fact that the French Canadians, broadly-speaking, have never had to embark upon an overt political campaign against the federal government. The quiet tactics of exerting pressure at the key influential spot -- the federal Cabinet -- with the occasional public rumblings in the press and political circles, to keep the pot boiling, have been sufficient (together with the passive inaction of most provincial governments), to ensure that no really large scale immigration ever took place. Had Quebec made a truly sharp issue of the matter, the positions of both 'sides' as it were, would have been solidified, causing strong stands to be taken by both groups. Thus a positive policy of 'mass' immigration for Canada has just never existed; had it done so, French Canada might have mobilized a nationalistic and spiritied self-defence -- or so her politicians claimed. If so, it could have resulted in a much more serious national cleavage than even the conscription issues caused.

The factors which have influenced federal policy have first and foremost been external and these have been discussed at length in the body of the report. Some recent writers have taken exception to arguments such as are presented in this thesis, i.e., that the French government's restrictive policies did not permit migration of any significance plus the fact that basically the French have not been an 'emigrating' people, (or at least did not in the past seem interested in migrating to Canada). The

same writers claim that the French do emigrate and they quote United States statistics to support their claim. It is only necessary to analyze those figures to see exactly who, when and which categories emigrated, to really learn how insignificant such statistics are in the light of the approximately two hundred million population of the United States, and the role the French have played in proportion to other nationalities in that country.

The facts presented in this study are an attempt to get at the real reasons why so few emigrated from France to Canada up to 1965.

Secondly, domestic factors have played a role, in varying degrees, and, of these, the political influence of French Canada has, over the long-run, been the most decisive -- but from the negative point of view. Canada has never in this century mounted the type of immigration campaign that Australia and other countries (less desirable than Canada from the immigrant's point of view) have done. In fact, Canada has been fortunate indeed that so many immigrants have come on their own, despite any real encouragement on the part of the government. In the post-war period, particularly, Canada enjoyed enearned fruits, benefits of the instability of Europe -- it was not until the late fifties and early sixties that economic buoyancy on the Continent curbed the flow and Canada began to wake up to the fact that the 'push' factor was no longer present and she would have to exert some 'pull' herself.

The provincial factor, where immigration policy is concerned (with the exception of Ontario and Quebec for different reasons)

has been negligible. Some people maintain this is a good thing, since eleven different policies would be disastrous for Canada. One must agree that a 'balkanized' immigration policy might be less than desirable but, in fact, such an eventuality need not be the case. Constitutionally, federal immigration law is paramount but this does not rule out provincial action -- and the more vigorous the better. Provincial concern should be welcomed and action applauded, provided that the same provincial governments are prepared to assist the immigrants they admit and facilitate their integration into their respective provincial economies; and provided that the immigrants meet federal admission requirements.

If immigration laws are made through machinery which includes the cooperation of the provinces in the first instance, there need be no concern. Admissibility qualifications -- if based on technical and professional skills, etc., and ensuring that factors of religion, nationality and ethnic origin are not causes of exclusion, -- need present no real problem. Harmful competition occurs only when all bases of trust and cooperation are absent; surely this situation would not be allowed to develop.

For those smaller provinces whose economies cannot justify the maintenance of an active policy of their own, the federal government must be prepared to assume the complete responsibility for recruitment and selection, with the provinces handling reception and post-arrival problems.

If Quebec wishes to recruit only in France or in French-speaking countries, constitutionally there is no problem whatsoever; likewise Ontario in Britain, or British Columbia

in Japan,etc., -- provided, in each case, admissibility regulations of Canada's laws are met. This presupposes that the provinces are prepared to meet, either alone or in cooperation with the federal government, the basic social and economic needs of the immigrants they admit. But it is obvious that something more must be done by way of a thorough study of the social and economic effects of large numbers of immigrants accumulating in urban situations such as the 'group settlements' of Italians in Toronto and other cities. The various social problems which are beginning to manifest themselves today in such ominous fashion, were partly obscured in former years by the fact that the immigrants were spread over larger areas, many of which were rural, and in general their problems were considered to be their own affairs. In other words, they had to manage as best they could, whereas today a re-awakened social conscience is concerning itself with all aspects of the immigration question.

The educational problem alone is in dire need of attention; historically this has been a provincial and local problem. In the case of immigrants it has been a personal one since they have always been left pretty much to fend for themselves in this respect. Here and there the odd community, through voluntary organizations of one sort or another, has seen fit to set up language classes and to try to assist the immigrant to become integrated. In such situations it was usually a matter of emphasizing the citizenship aspect. Where numbers were small, the problem obviously was never acute enough in any one place to raise pressure spots of national interest. But during the last two or three decades the increasingly large intake of immigrants,

especially with large numbers of school-age children unable to speak the language of the community, has brought into focus the full dimension of this potentially great social irritant.

Certain school-boards have had to place this on their already lengthy, complex agendas. In Toronto one pilot project is underway with immigrant children unable to speak English sufficiently well to enable them to take advantage of the regular public school offerings. This special school is experimenting with new teaching techniques and methodology in the hope that results might prove applicable in other schools throughout the city, and, if possible, the province (or wherever such specialized educational facilities are required). In a city where the needs are so fantastically large this is obviously just a small beginning, but at least it might serve to focus the government's responsibilities (federal and provincial) in the whole question. It is certain that we neglect this at our peril.

Perhaps it will be necessary to make a basic knowledge of ~~the~~ language (either French or English) a condition of admission to the country. Certainly, the problem has to be faced squarely and a solution found before it becomes socially explosive. Faced with a massive re-training program on the home-front, it might even be essential to set up a list of priorities: --train the Canadian unskilled first, and quickly; re-train the semi-skilled or 'technologically obsolete' Canadian worker and then, the immigrant unskilled, (if skilled are not available). To ignore any longer the large numbers of untrained and ill-educated that

are on our own doorsteps is courting trouble. Provincial governments really have no choice, but they cannot bear the burden without federal cooperation.

Just exactly why provinces have not exercised to any appreciable degree, their jurisdiction in the immigration field, is a strange phenomenon in this day of federal-provincial disputes over constitutional powers. By default they have surrendered a clearly constitutional right. This fact holds a fascination for the political science researcher who would like to discover a more refined answer than just the obvious one that immigration policy is so politically sensitive that only 'fools rush in where angels fear to tread'.

A full-scale examination of this aspect is more than long-overdue; in fact, it is another academic sin of omission of which there are so many in the field of social science research in Canada.

Has immigration been detrimental to Quebec? Having neglected to use one's own power, can one really blame the exercise of power by another? If Quebec, which is the self-appointed protector of so-called French Canada, has never seen fit until 1965 to concern itself in anything but a negative fashion with what it claims to be its own particular problem, can it rightfully condemn action on the part of the federal government which is simply seeking -- although rather belatedly -- Canada's national interests in the larger sense. A great need exists, unquestionably, for a careful re-defining of the nation's needs as far as immigration policy is concerned and, while it can be cogently argued that Canada does need people and a positive immigration policy for the country's economic and social development, there are still proponents ready to take

the position that twenty million people are enough.

However, given the need for immigrants, and the limited supply of skilled people available, is Canada justified in refusing entry to those she could obtain, on the grounds that the language spoken is other than would satisfy a particular part of the country? Given a limited source of food, does one refrain from eating if one's favourite dish is not on the table?

There is no doubt that, from the international perspective, Canada's national interest would have been better served if today her population consisted of at least fifty million, rather than less than twenty; whether domestically it would have been politically feasible to institute mass migration is one of the great 'ifs' of history.

This planet has few remaining land areas such as Canada, capable of sustaining greater numbers of people -- how long the vastly over-populated areas with their starving millions will allow this anomaly to persist, time alone will tell.

While it is true that mass migration offers no reasonable possibility of resolving the tremendous problems which the 'population explosion' is creating for some of the developing countries, the fact remains that this truth is not always grasped by the landless, hungry millions and therefore relatively empty areas such as Canada may well become highly coveted.

The luxury of domestic quarrels, such as Canada's French-English problem, seems somehow strangely out-dated -- part of an era that inevitably has to end for the betterment of mankind.

Is it too optimistic to expect that ten Commissioners will contribute, in small measure at least, to the enlightenment which will make a new era possible?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Only the books or articles actually
quoted are listed, as the references
are too extensive to include here.)

BOOKS

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| CORBETT, DAVID C. | <u>Canada's Immigration Policy;</u>
(Univ. of Toronto Press, 1957) |
| COWAN, H. | <u>British Emigration to British</u>
<u>North America</u> , rev. & enlarged
edition (Univ. of Toronto Press,
1961) |
| DAFOE, JOHN W. | <u>Clifford Sifton in Relation to</u>
<u>His Times</u> , Toronto (Macmillan,
1931) |
| FOWKE, V.C. | <u>Canadian Agricultural Policy,</u>
Toronto, 1946 |
| GIBBON, JOHN MURRAY | <u>Canadian Mosaic - The Making of</u>
<u>a Northern Nation</u> , (McClelland
and Stewart, Toronto 1958) |
| MacDONALD, NORMAN | <u>Canada, 1763-1841: Immigration</u>
<u>and Settlement</u> (Longman's Green,
New York, 1939) |
| MORTON, W.L. (ed.) | <u>Birth of a Province</u> , published by
Manitoba Record Society, 1965 |
| NEW, CHESTER | <u>Lord Durham's Mission to Canada,</u>
an abridgement edited by H.W.
McCreedy, (McClelland and
Stewart Limited, 1963) |
| PARAI, LOUIS | <u>Immigration and Emigration of</u>
<u>Professional and Skilled Man-</u>
<u>power during the Post-War Period,</u>
prepared for the Economic
Council of Canada, June 1965. |

TIMLIN, M.F.

Does Canada Need More People?
Oxford, 1951

WAGLEY, CHARLES and
HARRIS, MARIAN

The French Canadians, one of six
case studies on Minorities in the
New World, based on reports to
UNESCO of social scientists,
Columbia Press, N.Y. and London,
1964.

WALMSLEY, N.E.

Canada's Response to the Inter-
national Problem of Displaced
Persons 1947-51, (unpublished
thesis, McGill University, 1954)

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DOCUMENTS

Archives of Canada - Clifford Sifton Papers

Canada Year Books

Census of Canada

Canada Statutes

Debates, House of Commons (extensively) for period 1945-1966

Department of Citizenship and Immigration publications

Department of Citizenship and Immigration files

Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch
Annual Reports -- 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940

MANITOBA GOVERNMENT

Report of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic
Future 1962-1975

ONTARIO GOVERNMENT

Department of Economics and Development Annual Report 1964

Department of Planning and Development -- pamphlet on
Ontario House, 1950

Ontario Government Immigration Branch files

Debates, Ontario Legislature

JOURNALS, ARTICLES AND MAGAZINES

Gates, Paul W.

Official Encouragement to
Immigration by the Province of
Canada, The Canadian Historical
Review, Vol. XV (University of
Toronto Press, 1934)

Mercier, Jean

Canadian Bar Review, Vol 22, 1944

Spence, Thomas

Resources and Advantages
to the Immigrant, etc.,
pamphlet, 1871L'Action NationaleVol. XLIII, No. 5 et 6
Montreal, Mai-Juin, 1954Financial PostLe DevoirLe DroitOttawa JournalOttawa CitizenToronto Globe and MailToronto TelegramVancouver SunVancouver News HeraldWinnipeg Free Press

Sundry public addressed by various Immigration Ministers.

Appendix A.

List of Questions Posed to Each Provincial Premier¹A. Background information.

1. Which Provincial Department or agency is responsible for immigration matters?
 - Does it publish an annual report?
2. What provision is there in the Estimates of the current year for the purpose of encouraging immigration to your province?
3. How many personnel are employed in this work
 - a) in Canada?
 - b) overseas?
 - In the case of (b), in which countries are these activities carried on?
 - Are these offices bilingually staffed?
 - Are statistics available on the number of enquiries handled, etc.?
4. What current provincial statutes do you have relating to immigration?
 - Have any ever existed in your province?
 - If so, please provide reference to such legislation.
 - If there are no specific acts, have 'white papers', etc. existed?
5. What specific programmes does the province have under way currently:
 - a) for helping immigrants already living in your province?
 - b) for welcoming and assisting newcomers upon arrival?
 - c) for 'recruiting' or attracting immigrants to your province?
 - d) regarding language instruction for newcomers?
6. Does the province publish any statistics on (or have any idea of) total numbers of arrivals?

If yes: (Please answer for all years possible)

 - Do you keep statistics of arrivals as to occupation, age, worker or non-worker, sex, etc.?
 - a) Have any French-speaking immigrants arrived in your province?

If so, what percentage is this of total arrivals?

What are the national origins of these French-language immigrants?

1 Except Quebec -- see Chapter I, p. 9


(cont'd)

- b) Have you any idea how many of these new arrivals subsequently leave your province?
- 7. a) What provincial government publications are prepared for assistance of immigrants before arrival? Can samples be supplied?
- b) What provincial government publications are prepared for assistance of immigrants after arrival?
Can samples be supplied?
- 8. What government-sponsored (or supported) organizations have been set up to encourage new immigrants (or assist them upon and after arrival)?
- What voluntary organizations assist in this work?
- 9. What printed documents, speeches, etc. have been prepared for distribution outlining your government's policy on immigration (or immigrants) as information for the general public?

B. Policy

- 1. What are the areas of disagreement with Federal government policy on immigration?
- Has your province formally protested any aspect of (or requested specific changes to) present policy With what degree of success?
- 2. Are there any major areas of constitutional conflict between your province and the Federal government with respect to immigration?
- 3. Does your government place any specific emphasis upon encouraging particular occupations or types of immigrants?
- Are there any pressures to exclude any particular group?
- 4. Has there been conscious encouragement of French-speaking immigration?
Has there been overt objection to French-speaking immigration?
Have there been informal or subtle forms of discouragement?

THE 'SEED' IMMIGRANT



THE "SEED" IMMIGRANT

This illustrates the "chain reaction" movement of sponsored immigrants resulting from the selection of one open placement farm worker. Up to 1960, 23 persons have been nominated. In the process 5 immigrants with no blood relationship within this family were admitted who will be in a position to sponsor their own blood relatives.

* Admitted as immigrants

▨ Future seed immigrants within the sponsored movement

-Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration

DOMINION OF CANADA!

V.



R.

EMIGRATION

TO THE

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

To Capitalists, Tenant Farmers, Agricultural Labourers, Mechanics,
Day Labourers, and all parties desirous of improving their circumstances by emigrating to a new country.

The attention of intending Emigrants is invited to the great advantages presented by the Province of Ontario. Persons living on the interest of their money can easily get eight per cent. on first-class security.

TENANT FARMERS WITH LIMITED CAPITAL

Can buy and stock a Freehold Estate with the money needed to carry on a small farm in Britain. Good cleared land, with a dwelling, and good barn and out-houses upon it, can be purchased in desirable localities at from £4 to £10 Sig. per. acre. Farm hands can readily obtain work at good wages.

Among the inducements offered to intending Emigrants, by the Government, is

A FREE GRANT OF LAND

(WITHOUT ANY CHARGE WHATSOEVER)

Every Head of a Family can obtain, on condition of settlement, a free grant of two hundred acres of land for himself, and one hundred acres additional for each member of his family, male or female, over eighteen years of age.

All Persons over 18 years of age can obtain a Free Grant of 100 Acres.

The Free Grants are protected by a Homestead Exemption Act; and are not liable to seizure for any debt incurred before the issue of the patent, or for twenty years after its issue. They are within easy access of the front settlements, and are supplied with regular postal communication.

REGISTERS OF THE LABOUR MARKET.

And of Improved Farms for sale, are kept at the Immigration Agencies in the Province, and arrangements are made for directing emigrants to those points where employment can be most readily obtained. Several new lines of railway and other public works are in course of construction, or about being commenced, which will afford employment to an almost unlimited number of labourers.

Persons desiring fuller information concerning the Province of Ontario, are invited to apply personally, or by letter, to the Canadian Government Emigration Agents in Europe, viz.: WM. DIXON, 11 Adam Street, Adelphi, London, W.C.; J. G. MOYLAN, Dublin; CHARLES FOY, Belfast; DAVID SHAW, Glasgow; and E. SIMAYS, Continental Agent at Antwerp.

Also to the Emigration Agents in Canada, viz.:

JOHN A. DONALDSON, Toronto; R. H. RAE, Hamilton; WM. J. WILLS, Ottawa; JAS. MACPHERSON, Kingston; L. STAFFORD, Quebec; J. J. DALEY, Montreal; E. CLAY, Halifax, Nova Scotia; ROBT. SHIVES, St. John, and J. G. LAYTON, Miramichi, New Brunswick.

From whom pamphlets, issued under the authority of the Government of Ontario, containing full particulars in relation to the character and resources of, and the cost of living wages, &c., in the Province, can be obtained.

JOHN CARLING,

DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION,
Toronto, October, 1869.

Commissioner of Agriculture and Public Works for the Province of Ontario.

Please Post in a Good Position, for Public Information.

HUNTER, ROSE & CO., PRINTERS, TORONTO.

Summary of Principal Components
of Canada's Population, 1861-1961

Period	Intercensal Years Data			Population at End of Decade		
	Births	Deaths	Immigration	Total	Canadian Born	Foreign Born
1861-1871	1,369	718	(in thousands) 183	3,689	3,064	625
1871-1881	1,477	754	353	4,325	3,722	603
1881-1891	1,538	824	903	4,833	4,189	644
1891-1901	1,546	828	326	5,371	4,672	699
1901-1911	1,931	811	1,759	7,207	5,620	1,587
1911-1921	2,338	988(1)	1,612	8,788	6,832	1,956
1921-1931	2,415	1,055	1,203	10,377	8,069	2,308
1931-1941	2,294	1,072	150	11,507	9,488	2,019
1941-1951	3,186	1,214	548	14,009(2)	11,949	2,060
1951-1961	4,468	1,320	1,543	18,238	15,394	2,844

(1) Excludes extra mortality associated with World War I, estimated at 120,000.

(2) Includes Newfoundland which had a population of 361,416 in 1951.

Source: Statistics obtained from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

IMMIGRATION TO CANADA BY CALENDAR YEAR 1852-1964

1852.....	29,307	1881.....	47,991	1910.....	286,839	1939.....	16,994
1853.....	29,464	1882.....	112,458	1911.....	331,288	1940.....	11,324
1854.....	37,263	1883.....	133,624	1912.....	375,756	1941.....	9,329
1855.....	25,296	1884.....	103,824	1913.....	400,870	1942.....	7,576
1856.....	22,544	1885.....	79,169	1914.....	150,484	1943.....	8,504
1857.....	33,854	1886.....	69,152	1915.....	36,665	1944.....	12,801
1858.....	12,339	1887.....	84,526	1916.....	55,914	1945.....	22,722
1859.....	6,300	1888.....	88,766	1917.....	72,910	1946.....	71,719
1860.....	6,276	1889.....	91,600	1918.....	41,845	1947.....	64,127
1861.....	13,589	1890.....	75,067	1919.....	107,698	1948.....	125,414
1862.....	18,294	1891.....	82,165	1920.....	138,824	1949.....	95,217
1863.....	21,000	1892.....	30,996	1921.....	91,728	1950.....	73,912
1864.....	24,779	1893.....	29,633	1922.....	64,224	1951.....	194,391
1865.....	18,958	1894.....	20,829	1923.....	133,729	1952.....	164,498
1866.....	11,427	1895.....	18,790	1924.....	124,164	1953.....	168,868
1867.....	10,666	1896.....	16,835	1925.....	84,907	1954.....	154,227
1868.....	12,765	1897.....	21,716	1926.....	135,982	1955.....	109,946
1869.....	18,630	1898.....	31,900	1927.....	158,886	1956.....	164,857
1870.....	24,706	1899.....	44,343	1928.....	166,783	1957.....	282,164
1871.....	27,773	1900.....	41,681	1929.....	164,993	1958.....	124,951
1872.....	36,578	1901.....	55,747	1930.....	104,806	1959.....	106,928
1873.....	50,050	1902.....	89,102	1931.....	27,530	1960.....	104,111
1874.....	39,373	1903.....	138,660	1932.....	20,591	1961.....	74,689
1875.....	27,382	1904.....	131,252	1933.....	14,382	1962.....	74,586
1876.....	25,633	1905.....	141,465	1934.....	12,476	1963.....	93,151
1877.....	27,082	1906.....	211,653	1935.....	11,277	1964.....	112,606
1878.....	29,807	1907.....	272,409	1936.....	11,643		
1879.....	40,492	1908.....	143,326	1937.....	15,101		
1880.....	38,505	1909.....	173,694	1938.....	17,244		

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration - Immigration Branch

Table III

INTENDED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF POST WAR IMMIGRANTS, 1946-64

Occupational Groups Groupes d'occupations	1946- 1955	1956- 1961	1962	1963	1964	1946- 1964
<u>DESTINED TO LABOUR FORCE - TRAVAILLEURS</u>						
Managerial - Administration (2)	4,213	5,714	1,093	1,159	1,212	13,391
Professional - Professions	44,526	54,015	8,218	9,640	11,965	128,364
Clerical - Bureaux	46,788	48,617	4,898	6,186	7,931	114,420
Transportation - Transports	14,331	8,761	369	473	549	24,483
Communication - Communications (2)	1,001	2,773	120	179	219	4,292
Commercial - Commerce	25,257	16,884	1,050	1,381	1,916	46,488
Financial - Finance (2)	474	1,227	164	115	83	2,063
Service - Service (1)	69,447	67,935	5,853	6,099	6,420	155,754
Agricultural - Agriculture	138,195	36,036	1,923	2,398	2,234	180,786
Construction - Construction	52,516	41,583	2,667	3,852	4,799	105,417
Fishing, Trapping and Logging - Pêche, chasse et piégeage	12,928	1,877	78	66	73	15,022
Mining - Mines	10,029	4,171	100	130	114	14,544
Manufacturing and Mechanical - Fabrication et mécanique	148,095	93,952	7,018	10,563	12,677	272,305
Labourers - Manœuvres	58,743	61,745	3,145	3,559	5,737	132,929
Others - Autres	9,255	2,271	52	66	261	11,905
TOTAL	635,798	447,561	36,748	45,866	56,190	1,222,163
<u>NOT DESTINED TO THE LABOUR FORCE - NON TRAVAILLEURS</u>						
Wives - Épouses	252,347	165,634	15,674	19,305	21,023	473,983
Children - Enfants	289,298	207,652	18,137	23,226	29,819	568,132
Others - Autres	44,876	33,753	4,027	4,754	5,574	92,984
TOTAL	586,521	407,039	37,838	47,285	56,416	1,135,099
GRAND TOTAL TOTAL GÉNÉRAL	1,222,319	854,600	74,586	93,151	112,606	2,357,262

(1) Includes domestic servants - Comprend les domestiques

109,901

(2) Available as a separate occupational group since 1953 only. - Indiqué comme groupe d'occupations depuis 1953 seulement.

109,901

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration - Immigration Branch

Table IV


INTENDED DESTINATION OF POST WAR IMMIGRANTS, 1946-64

Province	1946-1955	1956-1961	1962	1963	1964	1946-1964
Newfoundland - Terre-Neuve	2,565	2,310	378	349	445	6,047
Prince Edward Island - Île-du-Prince-Édouard	2,490	567	77	78	79	3,291
Nova Scotia - Nouvelle-Écosse	23,495	9,412	989	1,198	1,189	36,283
New Brunswick - Nouveau-Brunswick	12,827	5,601	944	769	696	20,837
Quebec - Québec	240,432	180,422	19,132	23,264	25,973	489,223
Ontario - Ontario	636,033	448,597	37,210	49,216	61,468	1,232,524
Manitoba - Manitoba	62,343	32,616	2,410	2,792	3,006	103,167
Saskatchewan - Saskatchewan	36,881	14,459	1,163	1,438	1,795	55,736
Alberta - Alberta	95,343	58,714	4,745	4,731	5,521	169,054
British Columbia - Colombie Britannique	109,347	97,186	7,441	9,254	12,324	235,552
Yukon and N.W.T. - Yukon et Territoires du Nord-Ouest	563	833	97	62	110	1,665
Not Specified - Inconnus	..	3,883	3,883
TOTAL	1,222,319	854,600	74,586	93,151	112,606	2,357,262

Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration - Immigration Branch

Table V

PERIODS OF IMMIGRATION BY ETHNIC ORIGIN IN CANADA




13 F FRENCH OTHER

BY MOTHER TONGUE

* SOURCE: DBS 92-562 - 1.3-11; TABULATIONS 124/125, (13-4-1964)

IMMIGRANT POPULATION - PERIODS OF IMMIGRATION BY MOTHER TONGUE

IN CANADA



LEGEND

① ——— ENGLISH

② - - - - - FRENCH

③ OTHER

